Ashvin Ahuja

Are House Prices Rising Too Fast in China

Sharp increase in house prices combined with the extraordinary Chinese lending growth during 2009 has led to concerns of an emerging real estate bubble. We find that, for China as a whole, the current levels of house prices do not seem significantly higher than would be justified by underlying fundamentals. However, there are signs of overvaluation in some cities’ mass-market and luxury segments. Unlike advanced economies before 2007-8, prices have tended to correct frequently in China. Given persistently low real interest rates, lack of alternative investment and mortgage-to-GDP trend, rapid property price growth in China has, and will continue to have, a structural driver.

Investment-Led Growth in China; Global Spillovers

Over the past decade, Chinas growth model has become more reliant on investment and its footprint in global imports has widened substantially. Several economies within Chinas supply chain are increasingly exposed to its investment-led growth and face growing risks from a deceleration in investment in China. This note quantifies potential global spillovers from an investment slowdown in China. It finds that a one percentage point slowdown in investment in China is associated with a reduction of global growth of just under one-tenth of a percentage point. The impact is about five times larger than in 2002. Regional supply chain economies and commodity exporters with relatively less diversified economies are most vulnerable to an investment slowdown in China. The spillover effects also register strongly across a range of macroeconomic, trade, and financial variables among G20 trading partners.

Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms; Cross-Country Evidenceon Macroprudential Policies and Lessons From Hong Kong SAR

We assess the effectiveness of macroprudential policies against a number of different indicators of property sector activity and financial stability. At the cross-country level the use of LTV caps decelerates property price growth. Both LTV and DTI caps slow property lending growth. LTV caps also affect a broader range of financial stability indicators in economies with pegged exchange rates and currency boards. For Hong Kong SAR, LTV policy tends to be forward looking, with caps lowered to counter downward movements in mortgage rates, and higher growth in mortgage loan and volumes of transactions. The reduction in caps appears to respond to small and medium size flat price appreciation, and contributes to a decline in high-end volume growth after a year and total transactions volume growth after 1½–2 years. Price growth responds favorably after 2 years. The evidence suggests LTV tightening could affect property activity through the expectations channel rather than through the credit channel.

The Spillover Effects of a Downturn in China's Real Estate Investment

Real estate investment accounts for a quarter of total fixed asset investment (FAI) in China. The real estate sector’s extensive industrial and financial linkages make it a special type of economic activity, especially where the credit creation process relies primarily on collateral, like in China. As a result, the impact on economic activity of a collapse in real estate investment in China—though a low-probability event—would be sizable, with large spillovers to a number of China’s trading partners. Using a two-region factor-augmented vector autoregression model that allows for interaction between China and the rest of the G20 economies, we find that a 1-percent decline in China’s real estate investment would shave about 0.1 percent off China’s real GDP within the first year, with negative spillover impacts to China’s G20 trading partners that would cause global output to decline by roughly 0.05 percent from baseline. Japan, Korea, and Germany would be among the hardest hit. In that event, commodity prices, especially metal prices, could fall by as much as 0.8–2.2 percent below baseline one year after the shock.

Trade and Financial Spilloveron Hong Kong SAR from a Downturn in Europe and Mainland China

Hong Kong SAR was hit hard by the global financial crisis, which started out in the U.S. and spilled over to the rest of the world. Three years later, vulnerabilities in the euro areas financial system and concerns over a hard landing in Mainland China have started to weigh on Hong Kongs growth prospects. Against this backdrop, this paper aims to quantify the trade and financial spillovers on Hong Kong SARs economy from a downturn in the euro area and Mainland China. Based on simulations using a version of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) model and a Global VAR (GVAR) that includes both balance sheet and standard macroeconomic indicators, Hong Kong SARs output growth could fall by as much as 1½ times the decline in euro area output growth given its high dependence on external trade and many links with the global financial system. A worsening of the crisis in the euro area could reduce Hong Kong SARs output by as much as 4-4½ percent below baseline during the first two years after the shock, pushing Hong Kong SAR back into recession and possible deflation. In the event of a hard landing in China, the model simulations suggest that Hong Kong SAR would be on a sustained downturn with output growth falling by about 3 percentage points below baseline in the first two years. Should these events materialize, countercyclical fiscal response could help cushion, but not fully offset, the impact of slower growth in the euro area or China.

De-Monopolization Toward Long-Term Prosperity in China

During the past decade, the average Chinese earns roughly 9 times less and is 10 times less productive than the average American at purchasing power parity. Current consensus attributes large differences in output per worker to differences in total factor productivity (TFP). Evidence suggests that most of the US-China TFP differences lie in the inefficiency of Chinas domestic-oriented service and agricultural sectors. This paper focuses on (1) the evidence of monopoly rights and its influence on work practice improvement at Chinas firms and plants and (2) the evidence that policy arrangement there has encouraged more competition in merchandise manufacturing and heavy industries while barriers to market access remain high against new firms in the domestic market (especially in services). A numerical experiment is provided, which suggests that China can enhance long-term income per capita by a factor of 10 largely through TFP gains by implementing reform to weaken protection of monopolies and encourage entry in all industries.