Atsushi Iimi

Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse

Botswana is typical of the countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources. Although it is commonly accepted that resource-rich economies tend to fail in accelerating growth, Botswana has experienced the most remarkable economic performance in the region. Using the latest cross-country data, this study empirically readdresses the question of whether resource abundance can contribute to growth. It finds that governance determines the extent to which the growth effects of resource wealth can materialize. In developing countries in particular, the quality of regulation, such as the predictability of changes of regulations, and anticorruption policies, such as transparency and accountability in the public sector, are most important for effective natural resource management and growth.

Exchange Rate Misalignment: An Application of the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) to Botswana

Botswanas successive currency devaluations and recent move from a fixed to a crawling peg exchange rate regime raise the question of whether the exchange rate might be misaligned with economic fundamentals. This paper, applying the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach, analyzes the behavior of the real exchange rate for the period 1985-2004. It finds that the pula was undervalued in the later 1980s but overvalued in recent years. Some policy lessons from experiences in other countries with crawling peg arrangements are therefore considered in the context of Botswana.

Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed

Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs.

Estimating Global Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Projects: Applications in India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam

The world is faced with considerable risk and uncertainty about climate change. Particular attention has been paid increasingly to hydropower generation in recent years because it is renewable energy. However, hydropower is among the most vulnerable industries to changes in global and regional climate. This paper aims to examine the possibility of applying a simple vector autoregressive model to forecast future hydrological series and evaluate the resulting impact on hydropower projects. Three projects are considered - in India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. The results are still tentative in terms of both methodology and implications; but the analysis shows that the calibrated dynamic forecasts of hydrological series are much different from the conventional reference points in the 90 percent dependable year. The paper also finds that hydrological discharges tend to increase with rainfall and decrease with temperature. The rainy season would likely have higher water levels, but in the lean season water resources would become even more limited. The amount of energy generated would be affected to a certain extent, but the project viability may not change so much. Comparing the three cases, it is suggested that having larger installed capacity and some storage capacity might be useful to accommodate future hydrological series and seasonality. A broader assessment will be called for at the project preparation stage.

(Un)Bundling Public-Private Partnership Contracts in the Water Sector: Competition in Auctions and Economies of Scale in Operation

In public-private partnership transactions in the water sector, one of the alleged concerns is that there is little market competition at the auction stage. This paper casts light on a tradeoff between the competition effect at the auction level and potential economies of scale in service operation. If the authorities design a large-scale public-private partnership water transaction, it is expected to exploit operational scale economies. But the competition effect may have to be sacrificed. The paper shows a risk that the selection of the contract size could be a very restrictive condition that excludes many prospective bidders. Moreover, the paper quantifies the optimal size of public-private partnership contracts in the sector by estimating a cost function. The analysis shows that economies of scale exist but tend to diminish quickly as production increases. When the amount of water sold exceeds about 40 million m3, the statistical significance of economies of scale disappears. And there is no rationale for auctioning the water operation with annual water delivery of more than 400 million m3 under a single contract.

Procurement in Infrastructure: What Does Theory Tell Us ?

Infrastructure has particular challenges in public procurement, because it is highly complex and customized and often requires economic, political and social considerations from a long time horizon. To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. The paper provides a minimum package of important economic theories that could guide governments to wise decision-making at each stage. Theory suggests that in general it would be a good option to contract out infrastructure to the private sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such as fixed-price contracts. However, this holds under certain conditions. Theory also shows that ownership should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or objective of infrastructure provision. Public and private ownership have different advantages and can deal with different problems. It is also shown that it would be a better option to integrate more than one public task (for example, investment and operation) into the same ownership, whether public or private, if they exhibit positive externalities.

Infrastructure and Trade Preferences for the Livestock Sector : Empirical Evidence from the Beef Industry in Africa

Trade preferences are expected to facilitate global market integration and offer the potential for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction for developing countries. But those preferences do not always guarantee sustainable external competitiveness to beneficiary countries and may risk discouraging their efforts to improve underlying productivity. This paper examines the EU beef import market where several African countries have been granted preferential treatment. The estimation results suggest that profitability improvement achieved by countries under the Cotonou protocol compares unfavorably with the returns to nonbeneficiary countries in recent years. Rather, it shows that public infrastructure, such as paved roads, has an important role in lowering production costs and thus increasing external competitiveness and market shares.

what is missing between agricultural growth and infrastructure development ? cases of coffee and dairy in Africa

Although it is commonly believed that aggregate economic growth must be associated with public infrastructure stocks, the possible infrastructure needs and effects are different from industry to industry. The agriculture sector is typical. Various infrastructures would affect agriculture growth differently depending on the type of commodity. This paper finds that a general transport network is essential to promote coffee and cocoa production, perhaps along with irrigation facilities, depending on local rainfall. Conversely, along with the transport network, the dairy industry necessitates rural water supply services as well. In some African countries, a 1 percent improvement in these key aspects of infrastructure could raise GDP by about 0.1-0.4 percent, and by possibly by several percent in some cases.

Bidders' entry and auctioneer's rejection : applying a double selection model to road procurement auctions

Public procurement is a dynamic process involving vendors, contractors and procuring agencies. Even before submitting bids, competition among contractors may already have started. Given the nature of public work and expected strategies of rivals, some firms decide to enter the market, but others do not. Procurers can also enhance or limit the bidder participation through various ex ante qualification procedures for quality assurance purposes. Some applicants are qualified, but others are not. Thus, the selection process has two dimensions: bidders self-select, and an auctioneer may (dis)qualify some applicants. The paper explores this selection dynamics, using procurement data from road projects in developing countries. It shows that bidders are selecting themselves; low-cost firms are more prone to enter the market. But they are more likely to be rejected for technical reasons. Procurement design, such as contract size, and public governance are also found important determinants of the entry strategy of firms.

Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement

Infrastructure is essential for economic growth, and public procurement is an important instrument to use limited resources effectively. Among public procurers there remains a strong view that quality should not be compromised, particularly in high-value transactions, such as infrastructure projects. The common practice excludes incompetent applicants from the selection process. An alternative view is that infrastructure procurement can stimulate the economy by loosing qualification standards. The article examines this trade-off between price and quality. Using procurement data from electricity projects in developing countries, it shows that the adoption of substantive quality qualification increases bid prices for technical reasons and deters the bidder entry, which would raise procurement costs further. The auctioneer’s decision to adopt the quality qualification procedure is also found exogenous, meaning that auctioneers would not compromise the quality of projects regardless of the level of competition. This is an important measure to ensure the quality of complex infrastructure works.