Augustus Richard Norton

Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon

Using as its starting point the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, this article traces Hizballah9s development from a radical resistance group known especially for suicide bombings and kidnappings to a highly professional guerrilla force and a political party with a broad constituency and pragmatic leadership. The author examines Hizballah9s entry into politics in the early 1990s; its evolving relations with state actors, especially Syria and Iran; its conduct during and following the withdrawal; and its future prospects.

The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics

Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as a manifestation of Irans influence and a response to Israels massive invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah (cooperating with Syria) won legitimacy by resisting Israels occupation, but it also offered Shias a credible ideology and an array of institutions. The party is now deeply embedded in Lebanese politics. After Israels unilateral withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued to assert its “national resistance” role, but this claim has been openly challenged, especially after the 2006 war. Since then, the government and the opposition have been at a dangerous impasse, with compromise elusive and the dangers of new violence growing.

In)security Zones in South Lebanon

This essay considers the dilemma of south Lebanon, a region enmeshed in regional conflict and an area where Lebanons internal conflicts have reverberated and even exploded. The region, which borders Israel to the south and Syria to the east, has been for more than two decades a virtual battlefield where the inhabitants have been punished dearly for the accident of living in the crossfire between Israeli and Palestinian guns. As the peace process moves forward on other fronts, the fate of this region remains to be resolved. Spasms of violence in southern Lebanon involving Israel and its enemies have become the norm, not to mention intra-Lebanese conflicts and Lebanese-Palestinian violence that has often, but not always, been an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Long neglected by the government in Beirut, the south, with its absence of legitimate authority, has acted like a magnet for regional powers intent on engaging Israel without jeopardizing their own borders. Over the years, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have found the pull of the south irresistible. For its part, Israel has been heavily involved there, using the area variously as a launching site for larger adventures in Lebanon and as a place for hunkering down and conducting forays, more or less at will, to preempt, punish, and intimidate its foes. More than 150,000

Ritual, Blood, and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon

Lebanon is a small country, roughly the size of Connecticut, but the venerable southern city of al-Nabatiyya seems a continent away from the fussy lifestyles, the bustling restaurants, and the Hard Rock Cafes of cosmopolitan Beirut. The minute or so drive from Beirut to Nabatiyya is not just a departure from the capital’s sensual delights but a sojourn to a part of the country that lived in the vortex of conflict for more than three decades. Many Beiruti bon vivants are aghast at the prospect of making the southward trek. Yet, for Lebanon’s largest sect, the . million or so Shiite Muslims (about  percent of the total population), Nabatiyya is the commercial center in Jabal Amil, the Shiite heartland that extends from the wadis and hills of southern Lebanon to the southern Biqa valley. In fact, every weekend there is what seems a tidal flow of people from the overwhelmingly Shiite Muslim suburbs of Beirut southward as Shiites head to the al-dai ah, “the village,” which is usually taken to mean “going to the countryside” where life is simple, wholesome, and unblemished by urban vices. Except during the bone-chilling, often icy winter in Jabal Amil, when people stay in Beirut and its environs, hundreds of thousands of people move back and forth weekly. From the s to the s, the flow often reversed as the people of the South sought refuge from bombardment and conflict with relatives in the comparative safety of the city. While the precise advent of Shiism in Jabal Amil is in dispute, there is no question that the community predates the introduction of Shiism to Persia (Iran) in the th century. Certainly, Jabal Amil was a center for scholarship at least by the late th century. Indeed, scholars from Jabal Amil (as well as from Iraq and Bahrain) assisted in the installation of Shiite Islam in Safavid Persia (–). This was well before the Persian cities of Mashhad, Shiraz, or Qum emerged as major centers of Shiite scholarship. Jabal Amil has long been eclipsed by al-Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, the two great Iraqi shrine cities, and since the th century by the now famous Persian (Iranian) cities of Shiite learning. Regardless, Jabal Amil continues to be revered by Shiites, especially during Muharram, the first month of the Muslim calendar.

Lebanon's malaise

Lebanon is burdened by a weak economy, ineffective government, political subordination to Syria and a resurgence of sectarianism. The new government of Rafiq Hariri, whose election confounded Syrian designs, confronts an enormous debt burden as well as a plethora of diplomatic challenges that the previous government fumbled. If there is fragile hope, it is that the inchoate dialogue about Lebanons relationship with Syria could signal the start of a larger debate, one that may help to rescue the country from its malaise. Certainly, there is not appetite for walking once again to the abyss of civil war. And while the violence in Israel-Palestine, as well as the capture of Israelis by Hizbollah, has strained the structure of Israeli-Hizbollah deterrence, it is a tribute to both sides that they have been careful to respect physical boundaries.

Walking between raindrops: Hizballah in Lebanon

The Lebanese Party of God or Hizballah is an illuminating case study in the evolution of a radical Islamist movement. Hizballah has pragmatically confronted the shifting political landscape of regional politics, as well as the changing terrain of Lebanese politics. It has retained its commitment to ending Israels occupation in southern Lebanon but it has also entered the game of confessional politics in Lebanon, despite its earlier contempt for the prospect. Although the evolution of the Iranian regime has affected Hizballah, as has the hegemonic position of Syria vis‐a‐vis Lebanon, there is little doubt that Hizballah has proved itself responsive to the attitudes and aspirations of its domestic constituency. With Hizballahs entry into the political system, latent regional and ideological tensions and divisions have been revealed but these only serve to demonstrate the degree of transformation that has occurred.

Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon

Scarcely three years ago there was little scholarly or policy interest in the Shiite community of Lebanon. Long irrelevant politically within Lebanon, the Shiites languished under the firm control of traditional leaders who were not seriously challenged until the 1960s. By the mid-1960s, however, the Shiites were becoming politicized. The most important role in mobilizing them was played by a charismatic Iranian cleric of Lebanese descent, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr. His efforts were disrupted by the war of 1975-76, and it was not until 1978 that the movement he started enjoyed a revival, in part because of his mysterious disappearance. By the eve of the Israeli invasion of 1982, al-Sadrs organization, Amal, was the most important political grouping among the Shiites. However, since the events of 1982, the Amal movement—an essentially moderate formation—has been challenged by a number of more extreme organizations, including Hezbollah, which seeks an Islamic solution to the plight of the Shiites. As of mid-1985, Amal was arguably the leading Shiite organization, but the ravages of further frustration and radicalization may shift the balance of power.

Political Reform in the Middle East

A river of ink has already flowed in interesting debates over the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. While experts disagree sharply over the reasons, there is a striking consensus around a skeptical view of democracy’s chances in most of the states of the region. Political culture explanations vie with political economy arguments, even as other specialists debate the ideology and the project of Islamist opposition movements or weigh the relevance of civil society. The impediments to democratic transitions deserve to be seriously considered, and they shall be reviewed in the following pages. Nonetheless, there is an element of spuriousness to the academic tussles. Although the prospects for the emergence of more open, freer political systems in the Middle East may seem bleak, there are also good reasons to presume that authoritarian politics as usual may be close to running its course. Indeed, the region may be standing on the brink of a momentous period of political recrafting.

Lebanon and Syria: Internal and Regional Dimensions

The following is an edited transcript of the twenty-fifth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on May 23, 2001, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., moderating.

The Soviet Union and Cyprus

Unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Soviet involvement has often carried heavy diplomatic costs and high potential risks, Cyprus is a low-cost venture for Soviet foreign policy. Although there have been cordial relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union since the island’s independence in 1960, Moscow has no noteworthy economic stakes on the island, nor does it have any treaty obligations which could ensnare it in the feud.1 In the early years of the Cypriot Republic, the Soviet Union supplied arms to the government of Archbishop Makarios, but, presently, Moscow does not provide weapons to either side in the Cyprus conflict 2