Aurélie Pierre

Compulsory private complementary health insurance offered by employers in France: Implications and current debate

In January 2013, within the framework of a National Inter-professional Agreement (NIA), the French government required all employers (irrespective of the size of their business) to offer private complementary health insurance to their employees from January 2016. The generalization of group complementary health insurance to all employees will directly affect insurers, employers and employees, as well as individuals not directly concerned (students, retirees, unemployed and civil servants). In this paper, we present the issues raised by this regulation, the expected consequences and the current debate around this reform. In particular, we argue that this reform may have adverse effects on equity of access to complementary health insurance in France, since the risk structure of the market for individual health insurance will change, potentially increasing inequalities between wage-earners and others. Moreover, tax exemptions given to group contracts are problematic because public funds used to support these contracts can be higher at individual level for high-salary individuals than those allocated to improve access for the poorest. In response to the criticism and with the aim of ensuring equity in the system, the government decided to reconsider some of the fiscal advantages given to group contracts, to enhance programs and aids dedicated to the poorest and to redefine an overall context of incentives.

The likely effects of employer-mandated complementary health insurance on health coverage in France

In France, access to health care greatly depends on having a complementary health insurance coverage (CHI). Thus, the generalisation of CHI became a core factor in the national health strategy created by the government in 2013. The first measure has been to compulsorily extend employer-sponsored CHI to all private sector employees on January 1st, 2016 and improve its portability coverage for unemployed former employees for up to 12 months. Based on data from the 2012 Health, Health Care and Insurance survey, this article provides a simulation of the likely effects of this mandate on CHI coverage and related inequalities in the general population by age, health status, socio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. We show that the non-coverage rate that was estimated to be 5% in 2012 will drop to 4% following the generalisation of employer-sponsored CHI and to 3.7% after accounting for portability coverage. The most vulnerable populations are expected to remain more often without CHI whereas non coverage will significantly decrease among the less risk averse and the more present oriented. With its focus on private sector employees, the policy is thus likely to do little for populations that would benefit most from additional insurance coverage while expanding coverage for other populations that appear to place little value on CHI.

Supplemental Health Insurance and Healthcare Consumption—A Dynamic Approach to Moral Hazard

We analyze the existence and persistence of moral hazard over time to test the assumption of pent-up demand. We consider the effects of supplemental health insurance provided by a private insurer when added to compulsory public insurance that is already supplemented by private insurance. Using original panel data from a French mutuelle, we study the influence of insurance on all of the dimensions of healthcare expenditures: (1) the probability of using health care, (2) the number of uses conditional on use, and (3) the per unit cost of care. To conduct this study, we control, to the extent possible, for endogeneity because of adverse selection using the characteristics of our panel data. Our study allows us to confirm a positive and significant effect of the extra complementary health insurance on healthcare consumption, primarily in terms of the probability of using care. More interestingly, our results show that these effects are principally transitory mainly for the probability of using dental care and optical care and depend on income. Finally, we show that individuals did not postpone health care before enrollment. Copyright