Avery Poole

The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and Identity

Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Early post-Suharto governments were preoccupied with the business of democratic transition—establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the military from politics, and resisting the various threats to reform. In more recent years, however, foreign policy has become a higher priority; the government has tried to improve Indonesia’s international image, and to enhance its role in Southeast Asia and in the world. Its foreign policy goals emphasize peace, prosperity and stability—in both the immediate region and globally—and Indonesia’s role in pursuing these goals. What explains the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy?

The threat of autocracy diffusion in consolidated democracies? The case of China, Singapore and Australia

ABSTRACT The majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies.

Conclusion: Five Emergent Themes for Public Policy in the Asian Century

The Asian Century holds the potential to generate a paradigm shift in how we understand public policy, administration and governance, equivalent to the impacts of neo-liberalism and the New Public Management (NPM) of the late twentieth century. The futures that this book imagines for public policy in the Asian Century require an openness of perspective, a willingness to acknowledge the values and histories that sit behind diverse countries’ approaches to public policy, and an embrace of collaboration and knowledge exchange. To this end, this chapter attempts to draw together the central threads of this volume, to acknowledge its limitations and to set out five emergent themes that we believe are imminent in the Asian Century and ripe for exploration by future research.

Ambitions Versus Capacity: The Role of Institutions in ASEAN

Is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) receptive to the norm exports of the EU? Is it thus appropriate to analyse ASEAN in comparison to the EU, or does ASEAN provide a distinct example of regionalism? This chapter explores these questions in the context of a particular empirical puzzle. The 2008 ASEAN Charter purportedly establishes a ‘legal and institutional framework’ for ASEAN. It contains several apparent institutional innovations, including the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat. However, these ambitions are not matched by changes to the Association’s institutional capacity. This chapter reviews the institutional innovations made by the Charter, and argues that change in ASEAN institutions is contingent upon traditional interpretations of ASEAN norms—particularly sovereignty, non-interference and the ‘ASEAN Way’ of consensus decision-making. ASEAN states do consider the EU ‘model’ to some extent, but they often do this to highlight the ways in which ASEAN is distinct. Thus, for the most part, ASEAN is a ‘resister’ of EU norm exports.

The East Asia Summit

The concept of an East Asia Grouping was first promoted in 1991 by the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad. The first summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 14 December 2005. Kuala Lumpur Declaration: EAS is an “open forum” for dialogue on strategic, political, and economic issues in order to promote peace, economic prosperity, and regional integration in East Asia. India is a founding member of the East Asia Summit.

The East Asia Summit: Navigating ASEAN Multilateralism

The Australian government places great emphasis on the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the key regional grouping in the Asia-Pacific region. It celebrates Australia’s role as a “founding member” of the EAS, which was established in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. The EAS has become increasingly prominent in the region, and Australian foreign ministry officials publicly state that it is the regional institution of the highest priority. Why does Australia put so much emphasis on the EAS? And what are the implications for Australia’s relations with ASEAN? This chapter explores Australia’s emphasis on the EAS and the implications this has for Australia’s role in the broader regional architecture,1 and its relations with individual ASEAN states. Australia’s prioritization of the EAS is partly due to the membership of particular states (particularly China and the United States), which are strategically significant and important trading partners. Australian officials refer to the “security agenda” and potential for confidence-building measures in the EAS. However, the chapter argues that while Australia should certainly remain engaged with the EAS, it must be careful not to neglect relations with ASEAN states—its closest neighbors, which provide important opportunities for closer economic and strategic cooperation. In particular, indications that Australia may want the EAS to be more independent of ASEAN might not bode well for Australia-ASEAN relations. The Australian government should also remain cognizant of the limits to the EAS given the tensions and rivalry among particular members.