Axel Dreher

Does Globalization Affect Growth? : evidence from a new Index of Globalization

The study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. Using panel data for 123 countries in 1970–2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth. As the results show, globalization indeed promotes growth. The dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries. Although less robustly, information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect.

Has Globalisation Increased Inequality

A panel system includes a first skin, a second skin, a web core constructed from sheet material for securing the skins together in a spaced, sandwich relationship, and a connecting means for affixing the web core within the skins. The web core includes a plurality of spaced apart longitudinal members having longitudinally spaced projections extending therefrom and further having transversely aligned, longitudinally spaced slots therein. The web core further includes a plurality of spaced-apart, transverse cross members each having spaced slots therein receiving the longitudinal members at corresponding transversely aligned slots thereof to provide an interlocked grid between the first and second skins. The grid is connected to the skins utilizing the projections, which extend through slits in the skins to facilitate welding or otherwise bonding the components.

Cross-Country Determinants of Life Satisfaction: Exploring Different Determinants Across Groups in Society

This paper explores a wide range of cross-country determinants of life satisfaction exploiting a database of 90,000 observations in 70 countries. We distinguish four groups of aggregate variables as potential determinants of satisfaction: political, economic, institutional, and human development and culture. We use ordered probit to investigate the importance of these variables on individual life satisfaction and test the robustness of our results with Extreme Bounds Analysis. The results show that only a small number of factors, such as openness, business climate, postcommunism, the number of chambers in parliament, Christian majority, and infant mortality, robustly influence life satisfaction across countries while the importance of many variables suggested in the previous literature is not confirmed. This remains largely true when the analysis splits national populations according to gender, income, and political orientation also.

The Influence of Globalization on Taxes and Social Policy - An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries

Using panel regression for the period 1970-2000 the paper analyzes whether globalization has influenced the OECD countries’ social and overall spending as well as their tax rates on labor, consumption and capital. Accounting for potential endogeneity of the regressors, the results show that globalization (measured by an index covering 23 variables) did not generally decrease the leeway for independent economic policy. Globalization even increased implicit tax rates on capital (as calculated by Carey and Rabesona 2002) – a result that is mainly driven by economic integration. However, there seems to be competition over tax rates on capital when data based on legislation as suggested by Devereux and Griffith (2003) is employed. Depending on the method of estimation, increasing social integration also influences policies, while political integration does not matter for economic policy in most specifications.

Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model

The causes and consequences of corruption have attracted much attention in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Central in the discussion on the impact of corruption are perception-based indices. While informative, these indices are ordinal in nature and hence provide no indication of how much economic loss is attributed to corruption. Arguably, this shortcoming is rooted in the lack of a structural model. This is the issue addressed in this paper. By treating corruption as a latent variable that is directly related to its underlying causes, a cardinal index of corruption is derived for approximately 100 countries. This allows us to compute a measure of the losses due to corruption as a percentage of GDP per capita.

Are 'new' donors different? Comparing the allocation of bilateral aid between non-DAC and DAC donor countries

Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. On the other hand, new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) may have competitive advantages in allocating aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the PLAID initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that new donors (i) focus on closer neighbors, (ii) care less for recipient need, (iii) exhibit a weaker bias towards badly governed countries, (iv) respond to disasters, but with fewer resources than old donors, and (v) do not pursue commercial self interest.

Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions

In this paper, we analyze whether International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality is exclusively designed to be in line with observable economic indicators or whether it is partly driven by the IMFs major shareholder, the United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries, submitted during the period April 1997 through February 2003, revealed that the number of conditions on an IMF loan depended on a borrowing country’s voting pattern in the UN General Assembly. Closer allies of the United States (and other Group of 7 [G7] countries) received IMF loans with fewer conditions, especially prior to elections. These results are relevant to current public policy debates on the role and process of setting IMF loan conditions and provide broader insight into the influence of the United States and other G7 countries on international institutions.

The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?

Governments provide foreign aid for both political and economic reasons, as is now well documented. Conventional wisdom holds that political motivations lower the effectiveness of aid in promoting developmental objectives. We test this claim by focusing on a setting in which we observe “effectiveness” with some precision, using the ex post performance ratings of World Bank projects. Our measures of “political importance” are plausibly exogenous: temporary membership on the UN Security Council or the World Bank Executive Board. We find that political motivations have a detrimental effect for Security Council members only when the country already faces excessive short-term debt or debt service. This finding suggests that political influence in aid allocation may impair aid’s effectiveness only when the recipient country faces a weak macroeconomic position.

Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data

Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1982–2002, we employ two indexes that cover a wide range of human rights to empirically analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects human rights. According to our results, terrorism significantly, but not dramatically, diminishes governments’ respect for basic human rights such as the absence of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. The result is robust to how we measure terrorist attacks, to the method of estimation, and to the choice of countries in our sample. However, we find no effect of terrorism on empowerment rights.