Axel Gelfert

Kant on Testimony

Immanuel Kant is often regarded as an exponent of the ‘individualist’ tradition in epistemology, according to which testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge. The present paper argues that this view is far from accurate. Kant devotes ample space to discussions of testimony and, in his lectures on logic, arrives at a distinct and stable philosophical position regarding testimony. Important elements of this position consist in (a) acknowledging the ineliminability of testimony; (b) realizing that testimony can establish empirical knowledge with certainty; (c) establishing a presumptive principle regarding the acceptance of testimony; (d) arguing for a symmetry between knowledge based on experience and knowledge based on testimony. Rejecting testimony as a fundamental source of knowledge merely on the basis that no theoretically necessary ground for its truth can be given, would, as Kant puts it, indicate ‘a lack of moral interest’. Such ‘incredulity’ would be a form of ‘logical egoism’: it demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to think oneself in the place of others, yet this we must do if we are to trust our own judgements. While Kant strongly endorses testimony as a source of empirical knowledge, he does, however, make one important restriction: ‘Propositions of reason’ (Vernunftwahrheiten), such as universal moral principles, may not be adopted on the basis of testimony. I argue that this distinction, between testimonial knowledge of empirical matters of fact and individual knowledge of propositions of reason, is an important element of Kant’s epistemology of testimony, as it explains how his strong endorsement of testimony as a source of knowledge can be squared with his equally strong demand for intellectual autonomy. Finally, I comment on the overall implications of this account for Kant’s discussion, elsewhere in his work, of the public nature of communication.

Manipulative success and the unreal

In its original form due to Ian Hacking, entity realism postulates a criterion of manipulative success which replaces explanatory virtue as the criterion of justified scientific belief. The article analyses the foundations on which this postulate rests and identifies the conditions on which one can derive a form of entity realism from it. It then develops in detail an extensive class of counterexamples, drawing on the notion of quasi-particles in condensed matter physics. While the phenomena associated with quasi-particles pass the entity realists criterion of manipulative success, quasi-particles themselves are illusions, and can be seen to be so even on the basis of the largely non-theoretical “home truths” that one must be ready to admit as background knowledge. Hence, Hackings entity realism is shown to be incoherent.

The absence of finite-temperature phase transitions in low-dimensional many-body models: a survey and new results

After a brief discussion of the Bogoliubov inequality and possible generalizations thereof, we present a complete review of results concerning the Mermin-Wagner theorem for various many-body systems, geometries and order parameters. We extend the method to cover magnetic phase transitions in the periodic Anderson model as well as certain superconducting pairing mechanisms for Hubbard films. The relevance of the Mermin-Wagner theorem to approximations in many-body physics is discussed on a conceptual level.

Rigorous results, cross-model justification, and the transfer of empirical warrant: the case of many-body models in physics

This paper argues that a successful philosophical analysis of models and simulations must accommodate an account of mathematically rigorous results. Such rigorous results may be thought of as genuinely model-specific contributions, which can neither be deduced from fundamental theory nor inferred from empirical data. Rigorous results provide new indirect ways of assessing the success of models and simulations and are crucial to understanding the connections between different models. This is most obvious in cases where rigorous results map different models on to one another. Not only does this put constraints on the extent to which performance in specific empirical contexts may be regarded as the main touchstone of success in scientific modelling, it also allows for the transfer of warrant across different models. Mathematically rigorous results can thus come to be seen as not only strengthening the cohesion between scientific strategies of modelling and simulation, but also as offering new ways of indirect confirmation.

Before Biopolis: Representations of the Biotechnology Discourse in Singapore

Singapores foray into biotechnology is generally considered an economic and scientific success, its most visible sign being Biopolis, launched in 2003 as an integrated cluster of research facilities in an urban setting. Biopolis, however, is itself the result of a long-term effort to build up capacities for biotechnological research. The present article analyzes the early (pre-Biopolis) biotechnology discourse in Singapore, with special emphasis on its representations in the official media and on its strategic uses by the various stakeholders involved. Against the backdrop of the global emergence of biotechnology from the late 1970s onward, the article traces the motivations for Singapores formulation of its own biotechnology policy, paying attention throughout to the dynamic between scientists and policy makers. It is this relationship, along with the ambiguities that characterize it, that is responsible for the sustained establishment of biotechnology in Singapore. At an interpretative level, an attempt is made to compare the case of Singapores biotechnology policy with competing discourses of technology and modernity. The discourse on biotechnology can thus be recognized as a means of mobilizing its intended audience for the various stages in the countrys path toward (real or perceived) modernization.

Mathematical Rigor in Physics: Putting Exact Results in Their Place

The present paper examines the role of exact results in the theory of many‐body physics, and specifically the example of the Mermin‐Wagner theorem, a rigorous result concerning the absence of phase transitions in low‐dimensional systems. While the theorem has been shown to hold for a wide range of many‐body models, it is frequently ‘violated’ by results derived from the same models using numerical techniques. This raises the question of how scientists regulate their theoretical commitments in such cases, given that the models, too, are often described as approximations to the underlying ‘full’ many‐body problem.

Strategies of model-building in condensed matter physics: trade-offs as a demarcation criterion between physics and biology?

This paper contrasts and compares strategies of model-building in condensed matter physics and biology, with respect to their alleged unequal susceptibility to trade-offs between different theoretical desiderata. It challenges the view, often expressed in the philosophical literature on trade-offs in population biology, that the existence of systematic trade-offs is a feature that is specific to biological models, since unlike physics, biology studies evolved systems that exhibit considerable natural variability. By contrast, I argue that the development of ever more sophisticated experimental, theoretical, and computational methods in physics is beginning to erode this contrast, since condensed matter physics is now in a position to measure, describe, model, and manipulate sample-specific features of individual systems—for example at the mesoscopic level—in a way that accounts for their contingency and heterogeneity. Model-building in certain areas of physics thus turns out to be more akin to modeling in biology than has been supposed and, indeed, has traditionally been the case.

Philosophical perspectives on synthetic biology

Although the emerging field of synthetic biology looks back on barely a decade of development, the stakes are high. It is a multidisciplinary research field that aims at integrating the life sciences with engineering and the physical/chemical sciences. The common goal is to design and construct novel biological components, functions and systems in order to implement, in a controlled way, biological devices and production systems not necessarily found in nature. Among the many potential applications are novel drugs and pesticides, cancer treatments, biofuels, and new materials. According to the most optimistic visions, synthetic biology may thus lead to a biotechnological revolution by transforming microorganisms into ‘factories’ of sorts, which could eventually displace conventional industrial methods. Beyond the immediate interest of natural scientists and engineers, synthetic biology has also attracted the attention of social scientists, economists, and philosophers. As early as 2002, Evelyn Fox Keller, drawing on precursor notions such as Stéphane Leduc’s ‘biologie synthétique’, outlined the aims of synthetic biology in her book Making Sense of Life (2002). In 2006, the anthropologist Paul Rabinow became involved in the work of the Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (SynBERC), where he created the Center’s Human Practices division, which was itself conceived of as a contribution to ‘anthropological research on the contemporary’ (Rabinow & Bennett, 2009; see www.anthropos-lab.net). By 2007, both the economic potential of synthetic biology (Henkel & Maurer, 2007) and its property rights problems (Rai & Boyle, 2007) had already been explored; simultaneously, over a two-year period in 2007–2008, the European Union’s Synbiosafe project implemented a study on the safety and ethical aspects of the nascent discipline (Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt, Kelle, Ganguli-Mitra, & de Vriend, 2009; see www.synbiosafe.eu). In 2008, a group of researchers at the University of Exeter’s ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society (Egenis), which included philosopher Maureen O’Malley, sociologist Jane Calvert, and a pair of research students, characterized synthetic biology as a high-profile area of research, driven by the challenge of DNA-based device construction, genome-driven cell engineering and protocell creation (O’Malley, Powell, Davies,

Hume on Curiosity

Hume concludes Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature with a section on the passion of curiosity, ‘that love of truth, which was the first source of all our enquiries’. At first sight, this characterization of curiosity – as the motivating factor in that specifically human activity that is the pursuit of knowledge – may seem unoriginal. However, when Hume speaks of the ‘source of all our enquiries’, he is referring both to the universal human pursuit of knowledge and to his own philosophical project. Seen in this light, his discussion of curiosity takes on a new significance, as it weaves together elements of his systematic account of human nature – notably, his theory of cognition and motivation – with observations about the pursuit of philosophy as well as the progress of the arts and sciences. In the present paper, I offer a reconstruction of Humes view on curiosity and its role in cognition and inquiry.

Kant and the Enlightenment's Contribution to Social Epistemology

The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a source of knowledge, via such philosophers as C. Thomasius, C. A. Crusius, J. M. Chladenius, G. F. Meier, and finally Kant. Building on recent work on Kants epistemology of testimony, the paper considers Kants broader contributions to social epistemology. This includes an analysis of Kants comments on the social basis of contingent epistemic standards, e.g. in the sciences, as well as on problems arising from the management of what Kant calls the growing ‘volume of knowledge’. Special attention is paid to the relation between Kants views and contemporary problems arising both in the context of education and from our increased reliance on scientific experts.