Axel H. Kind

Are Convertible Bonds Underpriced?: An Analysis of the French Market

We investigate the pricing of convertible bonds on the French convertible bond market using daily market prices for a period of 18 months. Instead of a firm-value model as used in previous studies, we use a stock-based binomial-tree model with exogenous credit risk that accounts for all important convertible bond specifications and is therefore well suited for pricing convertible bonds. The empirical analysis shows that the theoretical values for the analyzed convertible bonds are on average more than 3% higher than the observed market prices. This result applies to both the standard convertibles and the exchangeable bonds in our sample. The difference between market and model prices is greater for out-of-the-money convertibles than for at- or in-the-money convertibles. A partition of the sample according to maturity indicates that there is a positive relationship between underpricing and maturity with decreasing mispricing for bonds with shorter time to maturity.

Forced Manager Turnovers in English Soccer Leagues: A Long-Term Perspective

The authors conduct an empirical analysis of a hand-collected sample of 2,376 turnovers of soccer managers in the four major English leagues in the seasons from 1949-1950 to 2007-2008. While the relation between the probability of a manager being fired and long-term performance remained remarkably stable, both the absolute frequency and the sensitivity of firing decisions on the outcome of recent matches steadily and significantly increased during the six decades covered by the sample. This is likely to reflect the increased level of competition in and economic importance of the English soccer leagues.

Are Forced Turnovers Good or Bad News

To gain insights about the quality of board’s firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new handcollected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous studies, we show that forced turnovers do not per se represent a positive signal to shareholders. On the contrary, investors seem to critically assess the board’s firing decision by considering the quality of the departing manager. When an outperforming CEO is dismissed or forced to leave - an event that occurs in as many as 35% of all dismissals in our sample - shareholders disesteem the board’s decision. This finding is confirmed in multivariate cross-sectional regressions, holds for different time subperiods, and is robust to various event-test specifications and proxies of CEO quality.