Ayşe Mumcu

Interaction between price, quality and country of origin when estimating automobile demand: the case of Turkey

We estimate the demand for new automobiles in Turkey immediately following its entry to Custom Union with the European Union in 1996. We use quarterly data on price, quantity, quality, country of origin and product characteristics of the new automobile sales market and macroeconomic variables to estimate market demand during 1996–1999 using dynamic Generalized Least Squares Estimation method. In addition to including quality, we also include country of origin, to serve as another proxy for quality and to capture differences in cost-increasing and demand-reducing trade restrictions imposed on cars from certain countries as well as taste differences. Our results indicate that country of origin as well as quality matter for automobile demand in Turkey. Consistent with other aggregate automobile demand models for other countries, the demand for new automobiles is found to be price inelastic in the short run.

Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

We consider one-to-one matching with externalities, where the individuals are allowed to be single. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of the stable set and the core.

An analysis of mergers and acquisitions in the Turkish banking sector

We explore various aspects of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry within a simple model that allows explicit comparison of sector performance before and after the mergers and acquisitions. The industry structure we look at involves a few dominant banks and a competitive fringe, which we take it as the structure most likely to resemble the Turkish banking industry in the aftermath of the ongoing restructuring process. Using a reasonable set of parameters to simulate the model, we do comparative statics exercises regarding the impact of mergers among domestic as well as with foreign banks on equilibrium outcomes.

Strategic Withholding of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining

The bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital is examined. It is shown that the workers ability to withhold his/her skills strategically increases his/her bargaining power. Multiple efficient as well as inefficient equilibria involving delays in negotiation are characterized. When the firm has outside options, the range of both efficient and inefficient equilibria shrinks; moreover, delays are shortened in inefficient equilibria. The model predicts that wages are procyclical.