Aytek Erdil
University of Cambridge
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Featured researches published by Aytek Erdil.
Journal of Economic Theory | 2014
Aytek Erdil
I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance. I show that non-wasteful strategy-proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms, however nonwastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization. In fact, the Random Priority mechanism (i.e., the Random Serial Dictatorship), and a recently adopted school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance with Random Tie-breaking, are wasteful. I find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms. In general, strategy-proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects, and therefore must involve assigning more objects. Forthcoming in
Journal of Economic Theory | 2010
Lars Ehlers; Aytek Erdil
A widespread practice in assignment of heterogeneous indivisible objects is to prioritize some recipients over others depending on the type of the object. Leading examples include assignment of public school seats, and allocation of houses, courses, or offices. Each object comes with a coarse priority ranking over recipients. Respecting such priorities constrains the set of feasible assignments, and therefore might lead to inefficiency, highlighting a tension between respecting priorities and Pareto efficiency. Via an easily verifiable criterion, we fully characterize priority structures under which the constrained efficient assignments do not suffer from such welfare loss, and the constrained efficient rule (CER) is indeed efficient. We also identify the priority structures for which the CER is singleton-valued and group strategy-proof.
auctions market mechanisms and their applications | 2011
Aytek Erdil; Taro Kumano
We introduce a general class of priority orders over sets, which captures both indifferences and substitutability. Our notion of substitutability ensures the existence of stable assignment. The characterization of efficient priority structures implies that there is usually a conflict between efficiency and stability. Thus we turn to the problem of finding a constrained efficient assignment, and give an algorithm which solves the problem for any priority structure that falls into our class. As an important application, gender equality or racial equality in school choice can be captured by our model, but not previous models in the literature.
The American Economic Review | 2008
Aytek Erdil; Haluk Ergin
Economics Papers | 2009
Aytek Erdil; Paul Klemperer
Archive | 2013
Aytek Erdil; Taro Kumano
Journal of Economic Theory | 2017
Aytek Erdil; Haluk Ergin
Archive | 2017
Aytek Erdil; Haluk Ergin
Archive | 2013
Aytek Erdil; Haluk Ergin
AMMA | 2011
Aytek Erdil; Taro Kumano