Azzam Mourad

Security Design Patterns: Survey and Evaluation

Security design patterns have been proposed recently as a tool for the improvement of software security during the architecture and design phases. Since the appearance of this research topic in 1997, several catalogs have emerged, and the security pattern community has produced significant contributions, with many related to design. In this paper, we survey major contributions in the state of the art in the field of security design patterns and assess their quality in the context of an established classification. From our results, we determined a classification of inappropriate pattern qualities. Using a six sigma approach, we propose a set of desirable properties that would prevent flaws in new design patterns, as well as a template for expressing them

An aspect-oriented approach for the systematic security hardening of code

In this paper, we present an aspect-oriented approach for the systematic security hardening of source code. It aims at allowing developers to perform software security hardening by providing an abstraction over the actions required to improve the security of the program. This is done by giving them the capabilities to specify high-level security hardening plans that leverage a priori defined security hardening patterns. These patterns describe the required steps and actions to harden security code, including detailed information on how and where to inject the security code. We show the viability and relevance of our approach by: (1) elaborating security hardening patterns and plans to common security hardening practices, (2) realizing these patterns by implementing them into aspect-oriented languages, (3) applying them to secure applications, (4) testing the hardened applications. Furthermore, we discuss, in this paper, our insights on the appropriateness, strengths and limitations of the aspect-oriented paradigm for security hardening.

Towards an Aspect Oriented Approach for the Security Hardening of Code

In this paper, we present an approach revolving around aspect-oriented software development (AOSD) for the systematic security hardening of source code. It provides an abstraction over the actions required to improve the security of the program. Security architects can specify high level security hardening plans that leverages a priori defined security hardening patterns. These patterns describe the steps and actions required for hardening, including detailed information on how and where to inject the security code. We show the viability and relevance of our approach by: (1) Elaborating security hardening patterns and plans to common security hardening practices, (2) realizing these patterns by implementing them into aspect oriented languages, (3) applying them to secure applications, (4) testing the hardened applications.

A High-level Aspect-oriented-based Framework for Software Security Hardening

ABSTRACT In this paper, we present an aspect-oriented approach and propose a high-level language called SHL (Security Hardening Language) for the systematic security hardening of software. The primary contribution of this proposition is providing the software architects with the capabilities to perform security hardening by applying well-defined solutions and without the need to have expertise in the security solution domain. At the same time, the security hardening is applied in an organized and systematic way in order not to alter the original functionalities of the software. This is done by providing an abstraction over the actions required to improve the security of a program and adopting aspect-oriented programming to build and develop the solutions. SHL allows the developers to describe and specify the security hardening plans and patterns needed to harden systematically security into open source software. It is a minimalist language built on top of the current aspect-oriented technologies that are based on advice-poincut model and can also be used in conjunction with them. We explore the viability and relevance of our proposition by applying it into several security hardening case studies and presenting their experimental results.

Accelerating embedded Java for mobile devices

With the proliferation of wireless devices, networks, and systems, the deployment of efficient embedded Java virtual machines is becoming a challenging and important research area. Accordingly, a plethora of acceleration techniques have been proposed. In this article we present a new acceleration technology that we developed for embedded Java virtual machines. Acceleration is achieved by the integration of a new selective dynamic compiler, which we called Armed E-Bunny, into the J2ME/CLDC (Java 2 Micro-Edition for Connected Limited Device Configuration) kilobyte virtual machine (KVM). The modified KVM is ported on a handheld PDA that is powered with embedded Linux. Experimental results demonstrate that we accomplished an important speedup (more than 360 percent) with respect to Suns latest version of KVM. This experimentation was carried out using standard J2ME benchmarks.

Armed E-Bunny: a selective dynamic compiler for embedded Java virtual machine targeting ARM processors

This paper presents a new selective dynamic compilation technique targeting ARM 16/32-bit embedded system processors. This compiler is built inside the J2ME/CLDC (Java 2 Micro Edition for Connected Limited Device Configuration) platform [8]. The primary objective of our work is to come up with an efficient, lightweight and low-footprint accelerated Java virtual machine ready to be executed on embedded machines. This is achieved by implementing a selective ARM dynamic compiler called Armed E-Bunny into Suns Kilobyte Virtual Machine (KVM) [9]. In this paper, we present the motivations, the requirements, the architecture, the design, the implementation and debugging issues of Armed E-Bunny. The modified KVM is ported on an Embedded-Linux PDA and is tested using standard J2ME benchmarks. The experimental results on its performance demonstrate that a speedup of 360% over the last version of Suns KVM is accomplished with a footprint overhead that does not exceed 119KB.

A selective dynamic compiler for embedded Java virtual machines targeting ARM processors

This paper presents a new selective dynamic compilation technique targeting ARM 16/32-bit embedded system processors. This compiler is built inside the J2ME/CLDC (Java 2 Micro Edition for Connected Limited Device Configuration) platform [Sun MicroSystems, Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition, Version 1.0 Connected, Limited Device Configuration, Specification, Technical Report, Sun Microsystems, CA, USA, May 2000]. The primary objective of this work is to elaborate an efficient, lightweight and low-footprint accelerated Java virtual machine ready to be executed on embedded machines. This is achieved by implementing a selective ARM dynamic compiler called Armed E-Bunny into Suns Kilobyte Virtual Machine (KVM) [Sun MicroSystems, KVM porting guide, Technical Report, Sun MicroSystems, CA, USA, September 2001]. In this paper we present the motivations, the architecture, the design and the implementation of Armed E-Bunny. The modified KVM is ported on a handheld PDA that is powered with embedded Linux and is tested using standard J2ME benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that a speed-up of 360% over the last version of Suns KVM is accomplished with a footprint that does not exceed 119 KB. An important result of this paper is also the proposition of an acceleration technique that leverages Armed E-Bunny by establishing a synergy between efficient interpretation and selective dynamic compilation. The main traits of this technique are: a one-pass compilation by code reuse, an efficient threaded interpretation and a fast switching mechanism between the interpreted and compiled modes.

Improving the security of SNMP in wireless networks

Simple network management protocol (SNMP) is widely used for monitoring and managing computers and network devices on wired and wireless network. SNMPv1 and v2 do not provide security when managing agents. Three very important security features (authentication, encryption, access control) are added to SNMPv3 under the user-based security model (USM). Symmetric cryptography is used for encryption and one-way cryptography is used for authentication. The two keys used for encryption and authentication are derived from the shared password between the manager and agent. In this paper, we are addressing (1) the problem of one way authentication that leads to the man-in-the-middle attack and (2) the vulnerability pertaining to the password update method of SNMPv3. We propose to use certification authority for two-way authentication and Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange to mitigate the impacts of these problems.

New aspect-oriented constructs for security hardening concerns

In this paper, we present new pointcuts and primitives to Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) languages that are needed for systematic hardening of security concerns. The two proposed pointcuts allow to identify particular join points in a programs control-flow graph (CFG). The first one is the GAFlow, Closest Guaranteed Ancestor, which returns the closest ancestor join point to the pointcuts of interest that is on all their runtime paths. The second one is the GDFlow, Closest Guaranteed Descendant, which returns the closest child join point that can be reached by all paths starting from the pointcut of interest. The two proposed primitives are called ExportParameter and ImportParameter and are used to pass parameters between two pointcuts. They allow to analyze a programs call graph in order to determine how to change function signatures for passing the parameters associated with a given security hardening. We find these pointcuts and primitives to be necessary because they are needed to perform many security hardening practices and, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing ones can provide their functionalities. Moreover, we show the viability and correctness of the proposed pointcuts and primitives by elaborating and implementing their algorithms and presenting the result of explanatory case studies.

Control Flow Based Pointcuts for Security Hardening Concerns

In this paper, we present two new control flow based point-cuts to Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) languages that are needed for systematic hardening of security concerns. They allow to identify particular join points in a program’s control flow graph (CFG). The first proposed primitive is the GAFlow, the closest guaranteed ancestor, which returns the closest ancestor join point to the pointcuts of interest that is on all their runtime paths. The second proposed primitive is the GDFlow, the closest guaranteed descendant, which returns the closest child join point that can be reached by all paths starting from the pointcuts of interest. We find these pointcuts to be necessary because they are needed to perform many security hardening practices and, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing pointcuts can provide their functionalities. Moreover, we show the viability and correctness of our proposed pointcuts by elaborating and implementing their algorithms and presenting the results of a testing case study.