B. Kelsey Jack

Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) policies compensate individuals or communities for undertaking actions that increase the provision of ecosystem services such as water purification, flood mitigation, or carbon sequestration. PES schemes rely on incentives to induce behavioral change and can thus be considered part of the broader class of incentive- or market-based mechanisms for environmental policy. By recognizing that PES programs are incentive-based, policymakers can draw on insights from the substantial body of accumulated knowledge about this class of instruments. In particular, this article offers a set of lessons about how the environmental, socioeconomic, political, and dynamic context of a PES policy is likely to interact with policy design to produce policy outcomes, including environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and poverty alleviation.

Designing Markets for Carbon Offsets: A Field Experiment in Malawi

Revealing private information to improve allocation and pricing in carbon offset projects can help improve the competitiveness of developing country offsets on global carbon markets. This study provides the first evidence from a developing country to directly compare alternative allocation mechanisms: a uniform-price, sealed bid procurement auction and a posted offer market. The field experiment was conducted in Malawi for the allocation of tree planting contracts. Results reveal highly divergent outcomes for the two strategically equivalent mechanisms. The auction set the clearing price for both mechanisms and enrolled the 38 percent of the auction treatment group that bid below the price. In the posted offer treatment group, 99.5 percent of participants accepted the contract at the auction clearing price. Compliance results show significantly more trees surviving per contract allocated under the auction. At the clearing price, the auction achieves a better selection of high compliance landholders, but potentially at greater cost than the posted offer market. Results confirm the presence of information asymmetries in these markets and demonstrate that project design affects both the cost effectiveness and the environmental effectiveness of carbon offset projects.

Self-selection into payments for ecosystem services programs

Designers and funders of payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs have long worried that payments flow to landholders who would have conserved forests even without the program, undermining the environmental benefits (“additionality”) and cost-effectiveness of PES. If landholders self-select into PES programs based on how much conservation they were going to undertake anyway, then those who were planning to conserve should always enroll. This paper discusses the less-appreciated fact that enrollment is often based on other factors too. The hassle of signing up or financial costs of enrollment (e.g., purchasing seedlings) can affect who participates in a PES program. These enrollment costs reduce overall take-up, and, importantly, they can also influence the composition of landholders who select into the program—and thereby the program’s environmental benefits per enrollee. Enrollment costs can increase a program’s benefits per enrollee if they are systematically higher for (and thus deter enrollment by) landholders who would have conserved anyway. Alternatively, enrollment costs can dampen per-enrollee benefits if their correlation with status-quo conservation is in the opposite direction. We illustrate these points with evidence from two studies of randomized trials of PES programs aimed at increasing forest cover in Uganda and Malawi. We also discuss how in other sectors, such as social welfare, policy designers have purposefully adjusted the costs of program enrollment to influence the composition of participants and improve cost-effectiveness. We propose that these ideas for targeting could be incorporated into the design of PES programs.

Seasonal Liquidity, Rural Labor Markets and Agricultural Production

Many rural households in low and middle income countries continue to rely on small-scale agriculture as their primary source of income. In the absence of irrigation, income arrives only once or twice per year, and has to cover consumption and input needs until the subsequent harvest. We develop a model to show that seasonal liquidity constraints not only undermine households’ ability to smooth consumption over the cropping cycle, but also affect labor markets if liquidity-constrained farmers sell family labor off-farm to meet short-run cash needs. To identify the impact of seasonal constraints on labor allocation and agricultural production, we conducted a two-year randomized controlled trial with small-scale farmers in rural Zambia. Our results indicate that lowering the cost of accessing liquidity at the time of the year when farmers are most constrained (the lean season) reduces aggregate labor supply, drives up wages and leads to a reallocation of labor from less to more liquidity-constrained farms. This reallocation reduces consumption and income inequality among treated farmers and increases average agricultural output.