Badar Nadeem Ashraf

Shareholder Protection, Creditor Rights and Bank Dividend Policies

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of legal protection of bank minority shareholders (noncontrolling shareholders) and bank creditors (e.g. depositors or debt-holders) on bank dividend payout policies using a panel data set of 5,918 banks from 52 countries over the period 1998-2007, after controlling for country-level deposit insurance coverage and bank- and country-level regulatory pressures. Design/methodology/approach - – Tobit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on bank dividend payout amounts. And, logit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on banks’ likelihood to pay dividends. Findings - – The authors support the outcome hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher amount of dividends and, are more likely to pay dividends in strong minority shareholder protection countries. However, the authors reject the substitute hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher dividends and are more likely to pay dividends in weak creditor rights countries, and banks do not substitute weak creditor rights with lower dividend payout amounts. Contrary, the authors support the literature which argues the importance of creditor rights for capital market development because one possible reason for low dividend payouts in strong creditor rights countries could be that the banks retain more profits for extending more loans. Practical implications - – By finding that creditor rights index has a negative relation with bank dividend policies in contrast to its positive relation with nonfinancial firms’ dividend policies, the authors support the literature which argues that managers of banks give less importance to factors such as current degree of financial leverage, the contractual constraints such as dividend restrictions in debt contracts, and the financing considerations such as the cost of raising external funds, while deciding about the dividend payments. The authors also suggest to keep financial and nonfinancial firms separate, to better understand the dividend puzzle. Originality/value - – Extant literature recognizes that legal institutions such as shareholder protection and creditor rights affect corporate firms’ dividend policies significantly but largely excludes banking sector. This paper, by examining the relations between legal protection of shareholders and creditors and bank dividend policies, fills this research gap.

Regulatory Hypothesis and Bank Dividend Payouts: Empirical Evidence from Italian Banking Sector

This study examines the regulatory hypothesis for bank dividend payouts using a panel dataset of 229 Italian banks over the period 2005–2012. Regulatory hypothesis suggests that undercapitalized banks face more regulatory pressure for increasing capital levels by paying lower amount of dividends. Empirical results support the regulatory hypothesis by finding that the Italian banks having lower equity to total assets ratios or lower regulatory capital ratios retain more profits and pay lower amount of dividends. Results also suggest that dividend payer banks try to maintain dividends at previous level by not skipping or reducing dividends. Results further support that Fama and French (2001)s three characteristics of dividend payers are also applicable to banks. That is, big-in-size, more profitable and low growth Italian banks pay higher amount of dividends. Findings of this study have important implications for recent regulatory proposals that suggest a direct regulation of dividends. A direct regulation of dividends, on one hand, and regulatory pressure on dividend payout decisions through capital requirements, on the other hand, may have unintended consequences for dividends as signaling and agency cost reducing tools.

Political Institutions, Political Pressure and State-Owned Banks’ Lending and Performance: Evidence from Developing Countries

The theory of political benefits argues that politicians use state-owned banks for political purposes such as obtaining and maintaining political support. While the theory of social welfare goal argues that state-owned banks exist to counter market failures and finance socially important projects. This paper is a contribution to the theory of political benefits of state-owned banks. Using an international sample of 185 state-owned banks from 51 developing countries over the period 1998-2012, we report two main findings. First, we find significant political pressure on state-owned banks; that is, state-owned banks lend more and earn less in election years in developing countries. Second, we find that political pressure is more prevalent in weak political institutions developing countries but not in strong political institutions countries. Strong political institutions in the form of higher constraints on a policy change by anyone fraction of the government and higher democratic accountability are helpful in eliminating political pressure on state-owned banks in developing countries.

Foreign Bank Subsidiariess Risk-Taking Behavior: Impact of Home and Host Country National Culture

This paper examines whether the risk-taking behavior of foreign affiliates of multinational banks is more influenced by the national culture of their parent banks’ home country or the national culture of foreign affiliates’ host country. The study uses a dataset of 292 foreign affiliates (i.e., subsidiaries or branch operations) operating in 66 countries having parent banks in 26 countries for empirical analysis. National culture of both home and host countries is measured with four dimensions—uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and power distance— of Hofstede’s framework of national culture. Findings suggest that the national culture of parent banks’ home country has higher impact on the risk-taking behavior of foreign affiliates of multinational banks than the national culture of their host country. Specifically, foreign affiliates’ risk-taking is higher if parent banks’ home country has low uncertainty avoidance, high individualism and low power distance cultural values. This study extends our understanding that how informal institutions, such as the national culture, influence the financial decisions in multinational banks.