Barbara A. Misztal

Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order

The article asserts that Goffmans concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is—in turn—predicated “on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints” (Goffman 1983, American Sociological Review 48:1–53, p. 5 cited here).

Trust and cooperation: The democratic public sphere

The current deficit of trust in the working of democracy has been attracting the increasing attention of social scientists. Nevertheless, there is still a conspicuous lack of an integrative theory of trust. Existing literature is united in its recognition that the preferable democratic order should be rooted in trust relations. This assertion that democracy and trust are connected is based on the assumption that either civil society or institutional frameworks are prerequisite for achieving a healthy and stable democracy. This article argues that the communitarian and republican solutions to the deficit of trust should supplement each other. Only joint implementation of these two strategies for recovering trust can activate formal and informal mechanisms of trust production. A society that achieves an appropriate balance between the informality and formality of interactional practices is the one able to create conditions for cooperation and engagement in the public sphere.

Durkheim on Collective Memory

The paper argues that although Durkheim did not explicitly employ the notion of collective memory, his approach offers a very insightful understanding of the need for historical continuity. Durkheims belief that every society displays and requires a sense of continuity with the past and that the past confers identity on individuals and groups allows us to see collective memory as one of the elementary forms of social life. The paper presents Durkheims discussion of commemorative rituals in early societies, where he directly addresses the notion of social memory, which is seen as perpetuated by religious rites and as a means of ensuring shared morality and social cohesion. His conceptualization of the role of law and memory in sustaining organic solidarity is also considered. In conclusion it is discussed whether Durkheims understanding of social memory provides us with relevant means to interpret social processes of remembering in todays societies.

The sacralization of memory

This article argues that today’s search for identity, in the context of the rise of a new spirituality and the decline of authoritative memories, facilitates the forging of a new connection between soul and memory and enhances the importance of traumatic memories. Consequently, we witness the sacralization of memory which in unsettled times, when memories tend to become fixed and frozen, can undermine intergroup cooperation. The article asserts that an ethical burden, prompted by viewing memory as the surrogate of the soul and the overrating of the importance of the politics of identity, can result in the displacement of public concerns with private ones. It stresses a need to rethink what kind of memory is compatible with a just, pluralist and cohesive democratic system.

Collective Memory in a Global Age Learning How and What to Remember

This article argues that attempts to conceptualize the memory boom in amnesic societies have resulted in a clash between two theoretical stands: the approach which stresses the significance of remembering and the perspective which insists on the value of forgetting. It asserts that neither the value of memory nor the value of forgetting can be taken for granted and argues that any search for possible resolutions to the dialectical relationship between remembering and forgetting should be taken in the interest of cultivating a relationship with the past that enhances societal well-being in the present. Such reasoning leads us to judge the value of cosmopolitan memory in terms of its capacity to shape post-nationalist solidaristic political communities. The acceptance of the need to judge the act of putting the past in the service of the present requires us to question the contrasting projects of cosmopolitan citizenship: one claiming that remembering is vital for sustaining plurality and diversity of a global citizenship, and the other that stresses the importance of forgetting for the emergence of the politics of a global citizenship. After presenting contrasting views on the importance of memory for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship, the article searches for an approach to memory which is better suited to projects that aim to ensure post-nationalistic solidarity and human rights while protecting cultural rights, minority rights and personal identity.

Memory and Democracy

This article reconstructs and evaluates prevalent assumptions in the literature about links between collective memory and democracy. There are widespread assertions that memory is important for democratic community to achieve its potential, avoid dangers of past crimes, and secure its continuation. These assertions assume collective memory as a condition for freedom, justice, and the stability of democratic order. This article considers these assumptions with equally popular counterpropositions, arguing that memory presents a threat to democratic community because it can undermine cohesion, increase the costs of cooperation, and cause moral damage to civil society by conflating political and ethnic or cultural boundaries. The relationship between memory and democracy is discussed, along with the intermediate notions of identity, trauma, and ritual. The article concludes that what matters for democracy’s health is not social remembering per se but the way in which the past is called up and made present.

The new importance of the relationship between formality and informality

Arguing that the fruitful approach to a reworking of the social depends upon forging an alliance between sociological theory and feminist theory, the paper analyses strands in sociological thinking which are responsible for renewed interest in the ‘social’. The first perspective, as developed by Touraine, Urry, Bauman and Castells, formulates a new agenda for ‘sociology beyond the social’ and emphasizes the limitations of the concept of ‘the social as society’. The second orientation, represented here by Richard Sennett, tracks the shifting relationships between public and private. The third strand, illustrated by the recent work of Robert Putnam, focuses on the notion of social capital. A comparison between these perspectives introduces my argument that we should search for a new balance not only between local and global, and private and public, but also between formality and informality as only such an approach has the potential to capture the complexity of and the interdependence between conditions responsible for the production of demands for trust and ways of generating trust. The paper argues that how actors strike the optimal balance between formality and informality in interactions depends on the specific characteristics of different realms of interaction. Therefore, in conclusion, I describe three styles of interaction: civility, sociability and intimacy, which represent the essential basis for an enhanced quality of social and personal life.

The idea of dignity Its modern significance

The aim of this article is to bring to social theorists’ attention the growing visibility of the notion of dignity within human rights legislation, bioethics and public discourse generally, as well as to evaluate this term’s potential to enhance our capacities to respond to old and new challenges. The article starts with a short presentation of the career of the concept and discussion of the various impasses and conceptual tensions connected with the notion of human dignity. It is followed by an exploration of how the idea of human dignity has become one of the main achievements of modern times. The question of how respect for human dignity has turned out to be the fundamental feature of democratic society is addressed with help from both Waldron’s perspective on human dignity as the ground of human rights and Habermas’s approach that stresses the moral content of human rights. The final part of the article examines the value of the notion of dignity for social theorizing by looking at ways the employment of the concept may contribute to sociological thought and enquiry.

Must Eastern Europe follow the Latin American way

Almost a decade after the wave of transformations from authoritarian to democratic regimes started in Latin America, Eastern European countries, one after another, entered the path leading towards democracy. The end of 1989 and the first part of 1990 saw unheard of numbers of free elections in ten Latin American and all East European countries (with the exception of Poland, where freedom of the first election was limited). Moreover, all the newly elected rulers won office on a promise to liberalise their economies. However, many commentators and scholars fear the impact on populations of painful structural reform policies and predict that new democracies in both regions either will not stay democratic for long or will not carry out a full package of economic reforms. They predict that half-hearted efforts at stabilisation will be followed by overwhelming political resistance which will provoke a reversal of economic policies. Each failure will reduce the credibility of successive reform attempts, the ultimate consequence being not merely economic disarray but an almost total loss of faith in democratic political institutions.

Trust: Acceptance of, Precaution against and Cause of Vulnerability

The paper offers a conceptual analysis of the relationship between trust and vulnerability. It argues that sorting out the meaning of both terms and developing further our understanding how they are connected are one of the important tasks of the social science. Trust is usually defined as confidence that partners will not exploit each others’ vulnerability. While stressing that vulnerability cannot be conceived as a single continuum, the paper views vulnerability as irreducibly plural and rooted in the human condition of dependence on others, in the unpredictability of action and in the irreversibility of human experiences. There are three trust-related mechanisms that lower these types of vulnerability, yet trust is not only a remedy for vulnerability, but trust itself is vulnerable to the universal condition of our humanity. The first type of vulnerability can be reduced by responsibility; the second type by promising; and the third by forgiveness. The paper’s conceptual discussion bridges theories of trust based on rational choice and those based on normative routines and stresses the interdependence between trust and vulnerability: trust is a remedy for vulnerability, but trust itself is vulnerable to the universal condition of our humanity.