Barbara Koremenos

The Rational Design of International Institutions

Why do international institutions vary so widely in terms of such key institutional features as membership, scope, and flexibility? We argue that international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. In this article we introduce the theoretical framework of the Rational Design project. We identify five important features of institutions—membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility—and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. We draw on rational choice theory to develop a series of empirically falsifiable conjectures that explain this institutional variation. The authors of the articles in this special issue of International Organization evaluate the conjectures in specific issue-areas and the overall Rational Design approach.

Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility

How can states credibly make and keep agreements when they are uncertain about the distributional implications of their cooperation? They can do so by incorporating the proper degree of flexibility into their agreements. I develop a formal model in which an agreement characterized by uncertainty may be renegotiated to incorporate new information. The uncertainty is related to the division of gains under the agreement, with the parties resolving this uncertainty over time as they gain experience with the agreement. The greater the agreement uncertainty, the more likely states will want to limit the duration of the agreement and incorporate renegotiation. Working against renegotiation is noise—that is, variation in outcomes not resulting from the agreement. The greater the noise, the more difficult it is to learn how an agreement is actually working; hence, incorporating limited duration and renegotiation provisions becomes less valuable. In a detailed case study, I demonstrate that the form of uncertainty in my model corresponds to that experienced by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, who adopted the solution my model predicts.

If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?

An examination of a random sample of international agreements that are conditional on four issue areas shows that only about one out of every two agreements has any dispute resolution provision. This observation begs for an explanation, and which half needs explaining depends on where one is sitting. Do power politics dominate international law, or does the law provide a fundamental order? Employing a rational choice framework, I focus on a set of independent variables that capture the cooperation problem being addressed by members to an agreement and put forth conjectures explaining the inclusion of dispute resolution provisions. Using newly collected data, I find that agreements that address complex cooperation problems, that is, problems characterized by uncertainty, prisoners dilemma–like incentives to defect, and/or time inconsistency, are more likely to include such provisions. I therefore suggest that international law is quite efficient, with states not creating and/or delegating dispute resolution authority when it is unlikely to be needed.

Rational design: Looking back to move forward

In this article we summarize the empirical results of the Rational Design project. In general the results strongly support the Rational Design conjectures, especially those on flexibility and centralization; some findings are inconclusive (in particular, those addressing scope) or point toward a need for theoretical reformulation (in particular, the membership dimension). We also address the broader implications of the volumes findings, concentrating on several topics directly related to institutional design and its systematic study. First, we consider the trade-offs in creating highly formalized models to guide the analysis. Second, our discussion of the variable control is a step toward incorporating “power” more fully and explicitly in our analysis. We also consider how domestic politics can be incorporated more systematically into international institutional analysis. Finally, we initiate a discussion about how and why institutions change, particularly how they respond to changing preferences and external shocks. We conclude with a discussion of the forward-looking character of rational design.

The Continent of International Law

This article introduces the Continent of International Law (COIL) research project on international agreement design. COIL stems from the conviction that the International Organization subfields focus on the couple hundred international organizations with physical headquarters had to be broadened to include the tens of thousands extant international agreements, that is, international law. Each piece of international law can and should be studied as an institution. Together, this set of institutions, which truly is a “continent,” is theoretically very interesting and empirically very diversified. COILs basic theoretical premise is that international agreement design and comparison across agreements begins by understanding the underlying cooperation problem(s) the agreements are trying to solve. COIL identifies 12 distinct and recurrent cooperation problems, which may occur alone or in combinations. The data collection features a random sample of international agreements conditional on the issue areas of economics, environment, human rights, and security. The first large-n, systematic operationalization of the cooperation problems underlying real international agreements is highlighted, and descriptive statistics are presented – some of which challenge conventional wisdom. For instance, enforcement problems (Prisoners Dilemma-like situations) are important, but far from universal, with 30% of the agreements characterized by that underlying problem. The numerous and diverse COIL variables allow for a multi-dimensional operationalization of the difficult-to-measure concept of the “incomplete contract.” Hypotheses from contract theory are tested, confirming the appropriateness of the new measure, the weakness of measures based on number of pages, and most significant, the rationality and efficiency of the continent of international law.

Moving Forward, One Step at a Time

We reply to John Duffields critique of the Rational Design project, a special issue of International Organization that explains the features of international institutions from a game-theoretic perspective. The project was deliberately limited to the analysis of explicit and observable institutional arrangements, and focused on the specific institutional properties of centralization, membership, scope, control, and flexibility. Its empirical contribution relies on case studies, but it is significantly amplified by the tight connections provided by a common theoretical perspective that is oriented toward testing a set of specific conjectures about institutional design. The results raise further issues of measurement and cross-case comparisons that provide valuable lessons for future work on institutional design. Although all of these research design choices are worth revisiting and questioning, as Duffield does, the initial results of the Rational Design project show that it provides a good basis from which to explore alternative research design decisions.

Can Cooperation Survive Changes in Bargaining Power? The Case of Coffee

Most efforts at international cooperation are heavily conditioned by the relative bargaining power of the states involved. But often states expect their bargaining power to change over time. Can cooperation survive such changes—especially when they are unpredictable? I argue that the detailed provisions of international agreements, when chosen carefully, can help states take account of such changing political realities. In particular, I present a theory of optimal duration and renegotiation provisions in light of shocks to relative bargaining power. I then consider cooperation in the international coffee market, thereby illustrating two of the substantive implications of the theory, and briefly discuss other international agreements. Finally, I draw conclusions about the conditions under which international law can affect international cooperation, a topic hotly debated by international law scholars and political scientists.

Institutionalism and International Law

This paper surveys the Institutionalist literature in International Relations and its intersection with International Law scholarship. The Rational Design research agenda and the follow-up project, “The Continent of International Law,” are highlighted, given that they aim to be genuinely interdisciplinary. The premise of this agenda is that the details of international law are indeed important and should be studied, but we cannot understand international agreement design and compare across agreements without understanding the underlying cooperation problems the actors are trying to solve – that is, all the stuff international politics is made of (enforcement problems, uncertainty problems, distributions problems, etc). Three areas of international relations are covered: the making, interpretation, and enforcement of law. Perhaps more than any other of the main theories of International Relations, Institutionalism speaks rigorously to all three of these topics. Moreover, connections to the literature in International Law are pointed out. However, the Institutionalist literature would also benefit from a more extensive dialogue with other theoretical approaches, and several opportunities for such mutual enrichment are pointed out in the paper. Finally, the paper charts an agenda for future work in the Institutionalist framework.

Leadership and Bureaucracy The Folk Theorem and Real Folks

In the midst of state budget cuts, Director Victor Wirth transformed the Illinois Department on Aging (IDOA) from a demoralized agency drowning in the paperwork of a massive compliance system into a cooperative organization devoted to service quality. I develop and apply a game-theoretic model of IDOA that shows how and why the management strategies pursued by Wirth brought about this transformation. Combining the model with detailed empirical evidence, I identify the key factors that allowed Wirth to lead the agency to a new equilibrium. His detailed knowledge of the strategic structure of IDOA allowed him to choose a new equilibrium. His desire and ability to communicate with every level involved in the implementation of the CCP as well as his considerable autonomy from the governor enabled him to create, articulate, and implement the strategies necessary to change the equilibrium. And finally his reputation in the aging field served as a bond that allowed him to enforce the new agency equilibrium, thereby overcoming problems of renegotiation proofness. This article also provides an empirical illustration of the folk theorem.

The COIL sample

This chapter introduces the data dimension of COIL. COILs empirical focus is on the tens of thousands of extant international agreements (international treaty law) that govern day-to-day international cooperation. Each piece of international law can and should be studied as an institution. Together, this set of institutions, which truly is a “continent,” is theoretically interesting and empirically diversified. Our intuitions about international cooperation often follow from a few well-studied agreements. Often, the conventional wisdom about international cooperation is shaped and “tested” by these relatively few agreements. The multitude of studies that focus on the WTO as the canonical economics agreement often gives false confirmation that an underlying prisoners’ dilemma-like structure is omnipresent in economic cooperation. Likewise, disproportionate focus on a select few multilateral human rights agreements, like the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), falsely suggests that the prisoners’ dilemma is absent in the whole of the human rights issue area. In reality, however, international cooperation is far more diverse than these cases would suggest, both across and within issue areas. COIL aims to showcase and harness this diversity. The COIL data set is thus composed of a random sample of international agreements registered with the UN across the broad issue areas of economics, environment, human rights, and security. The data set features bilateral and multilateral agreements, with members representing almost every kind of regime and every part of the world. Some of the COIL agreements are short; some are extremely long. Some call for the creation of multiple intergovernmental bodies, while some create none at all. For each agreement in the sample, hundreds of institutional design variables are coded. Several of these serve as the dependent variables in the analyses in Parts II and III that follow. In this chapter, I first briefly review the theoretical motivation for the COIL data set and discuss the unique questions it can answer. I highlight some of the main features of the data collection, especially those that might distinguish it from other data sets in existence. I then locate COIL on the spectrum of other international cooperation data sets and discuss complementarities among them. Some of the conventional wisdom is challenged by the first large-n, systematic operationalization of the cooperation problems underlying real international agreements.