Barbara Vis

The comparative advantages of fsQCA and regression analysis for moderately large-n analyses

This article contributes to the literature on comparative methods in the social sciences by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of regression analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) for studies with a moderately large-n (between approximately 50 and 100). Moderately large-n studies are interesting in this respect since they allow for regression analysis as well as fsQCA analysis. These two approaches have a different epistemological foundation and thereby answer different, yet related, research questions. To illustrate the comparison of fsQCA and regression analysis empirically, I use a recent data set (n = 53) that includes data on the conditions under which governments in Western democracies increase their spending on active labor market policies (ALMPs). This comparison demonstrates that while each approach has merits and demerits, fsQCA leads to a fuller understanding of the conditions under which the outcome occurs.

Why and how do Political Actors Pursue Risky Reforms

Why and how do political actors pursue risky welfare state reforms, in spite of the institutional mechanisms and political resistance that counteract change? This is one of the key puzzles of contemporary welfare state research, which is brought about by the absence of a complete account that identifies both the cause and causal mechanisms of risky reforms. In this article we offer a remedy for this lacuna. Prospect theory teaches us that political actors will only undertake risky reforms if they consider themselves to be in a losses domain, that is when their current situation is unacceptable. Next, we discuss the strategies that political actors use to avoid the blame associated with risky reforms. These provide the causal mechanisms linking cause and effect. The sudden outburst of risky reforms in formerly ‘immovable’ Italy provides an empirical illustration of our account.

Why do parties change position? Party organization and environmental incentives

What motivates parties to change their positions? Earlier studies demonstrate that parties change their position in response to environmental incentives, such as voter shifts. Yet, this work also suggests that parties differ in their responses. What accounts for this variation? We argue and empirically substantiate that differences in party organization explain the divergent responses of parties to environmental incentives. By means of a pooled time-series analysis of 55 parties in 10 European democracies between 1977 and 2003, this study demonstrates how the party organizational balance-of-power between party activists and party leaders conditions the extent to which environmental incentives (mean voter change, party voter change, and office exclusion) drive party-position change. The study’s findings have important implications for our understanding of parties’ electoral strategies as well as for models of representation.

States of welfare or states of workfare? Welfare state restructuring in 16 capitalist democracies, 1985-2002

Did welfare states change radically from welfare towards workfare, or was such a shift absent and was welfare state change regime-specific instead? This article assesses this question for 16 advanced capitalist democracies for the period 1985-2002, using an innovative method: fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. This study shows that the mainstream welfare state literatures prediction of no radical and regime-specific change holds for most countries. The regulation literatures prediction of radical change from welfare towards workfare is supported fully only in Ireland and moderately in Denmark. Furthermore, other interesting patterns are revealed in six countries.

Politics of Risk-taking : Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies

In Politics of Risk-taking: Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies beschrijft Barbara Vis dat regeringen hun vingers alleen durven te branden aan hervormingen van de welvaartsstaat als het sociaaleconomisch slecht gaat. Barbara Vis baseert haar onderzoek op een nieuwe theoretische invalshoek uit de psychologie: de Prospect Theorie. Volgens deze theorie passen mensen hun gedrag aan aan de situatie (van winst of verlies) waarin ze zich bevinden. Zo toont Vis aan dat de context waarin regeringen zich bevinden (electoraal verlies of winst) hun risicohouding beinvloedt en daarmee de mate van hervormingen. Onder slechte sociaaleconomische omstandigheden en bij politiek verlies accepteren regeringen het electorale risico van impopulaire hervormingen; bij politieke winst houden zij zich hier verre van. Deze nieuwe invalshoek en innovatieve methodologische aanpak maken Politics of Risk-Taking tot een must read voor beleidsmakers, wetenschappers en studenten geinteresseerd in de politieke discussie over de hervorming van de verzorgingsstaat.

Comparative welfare state politics: Development, opportunities, and reform

Introduction. The political opportunities and constraints of welfare state reform 1. The welfare state: dynamic development, crisis, resilience, and change 2. The logics of the welfare state: why did we need a welfare state in the first place and how did we get it? 3. Welfare state regimes: why did we get different worlds of welfare and do we still have them? 4. What do welfare states actually do? How welfare states protect against social risks and fight poverty and inequality 5. Toward an open functional approach to welfare state reform 6. Why do we need to reform the welfare state?: Part I. Globalization as a functional pressure coming from the outside 7. Why do we need to reform the welfare state: Part II. Post-industrial society and the functional pressures to reform coming from within 8. Why do politicians and governments pursue risky reforms? 9. Can and will the welfare state survive the great recession?

The importance of socio-economic and political losses and gains in welfare state reform

When do governments pursue unpopular reform, such as cutting benefits? And when do they engage in not-unpopular reform, such as activation? Current approaches in welfare state research cannot systematically explain the cross-government variation in the two types of reform. Based on insights from prospect theory, a psychological theory of choice under risk, this article complements existing theories by arguing that losses and gains matter crucially for welfare state reform. A fs/QCA analysis of labour market reforms pursued by 23 Danish, German, Dutch and British Cabinets between 1979 and 2005 corroborates this hypothesis. Specifically, it shows that an improving political position (a gain) is the necessary condition for not-unpopular reform while for unpopular reform it is a deteriorating socio-economic situation (a loss). This finding helps account for the puzzling cross-government variation in different types of welfare state reform.

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

Abstract This article takes stock of and reviews the comparative literature on blame avoidance strategies in social policy reform to identify the conditions under which blame avoidance strategies are necessary (or not). This helps to solve the seemingly contradictory findings that blame avoidance strategies may not (always) be necessary while they are often employed. Moreover, it proposes that experimental designs help to establish the effect of blame avoidance strategies and presents an approach for assessing systematically the employment and success of blame avoidance strategies. Hereby, the article outlines a research agenda for comparative theory development.

Prospect Theory and Political Decision Making

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theorys central finding is that individuals’ attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not.

Under which conditions does spending on active labor market policies increase? A FsQCA Analysis of 53 governments between 1985 and 2003

This article examines the conditions under which governments increase spending on active labor market policies (ALMPs), as the European Union and the organization of economic co-operation and development recommend. Given that ALMPs are usually expensive and unlikely to win a government many votes, this study hypothesizes that an improving socio-economic situation is a necessary condition for increased spending. On the basis of the data of 53 governments from 18 established democracies between 1985 and 2003, the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis shows that there are different combinations of conditions, or routes, toward activation and that an improving socio-economic situation is needed for each of them. Specifically, the analysis reveals that governments activate under decreasing unemployment combined with (1) trade openness, or (2) the absence of corporatism in the case of leftist governments, or (3) the presence of corporatism in the case of rightist governments. These findings advance our understanding of the politics of labor market reform.