Bård Harstad

Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy

Free-riding is at the core of environmental problems. If a climate coalition reduces its emissions, world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more; they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology. The coalition’s second-best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent. However, suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil-fuel deposits: As soon as the market clears, the above-mentioned problems vanish and the first-best is implemented. In short, the coalition’s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them.

Majority Rules and Incentives

A clubs majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo. Since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers, it also determines the incentives to invest in order to become a winner of anticipated projects. If the required majority is large, members invest too little because of a holdup problem; if it is small, members invest too much in order to become a member of the majority coalition. To balance these opposing forces, the majority rule should increase in the projects value and the clubs enforcement capacity but decrease in the heterogeneity in preferences. Externalities can be internalized by adjusting the rule. With heterogeneity in size or initial conditions, votes should be appropriately weighted or double majorities required.

Organizational Form and the Market for Talent

This article brings together the market for products, the market for talent, and firms’ organizational form. While the organizational design determines the allocation of blame and fame within the firm, the value of a good reputation depends on the market structure. Consequently, the market structure dictates the optimal organizational design. If competition becomes tougher and the market thicker, transparent firms decentralize while nontransparent firms concentrate control, transparency itself is improved, corporations switch from unitary to multidivisional form, and the turnover of managers increases. The model rationalizes recent trends in both executive pay and organizational design.

Games and Resources

This article presents a sequence of simple and related models to analyze the strategic use of natural resources. Game theory is the natural tool for such an analysis, whether the resource is private or publicly owned, whether it is renewable or exhaustible, whether the game is static or dynamic, and whether or not the users can strategically invest in technologies. Equilibrium extraction is too large and comes too early for public resources, but the opposite is true for private resources. The effects add up nicely when the resource has both private and public-good aspects.

The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages

A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller does conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the conservation value is low, the consumption value high, and the buyer’s protection cost large. The theory explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation abroad is leased, while domestic conservation is bought.

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor’s presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself.

Private Politics and Public Regulation

We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to raise the likelihood of self-regulation. Results are reversed when the regulator is present: the firm then self-regulates to preempt public regulation, while activists start and continue boycotts to raise the likelihood of such regulation. Our analytical results describe when a boycott is likely, and when it may be expected to be short and/or successful. The model generates a rich set of testable comparative statics.

Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting and investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second-best equilibrium when they are not. This equilibrium is distorted in that countries over-invest in technologies that are “green�? (i.e., strategic substitutes for polluting) but under-invest in adaptation and “brown�? technologies (i.e., strategic complements to polluting). Particularly countries that are small or benefit little from cooperation will be required to invest in this way. With uncertainty, such strategic investments reduce the need for a long, costly punishment phase and the probability that it will be triggered. The framework is consistent with the evolution from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments

Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier than efficient instruments to repeal. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument.