Barry M. Mitnick

The theory of agency

ConclusionIn conclusion, we have developed a model of policing in the context of agency relations and managerial discretion. The model had three stages: 1) diversion of resources to policing or other uses; 2) implementation of policing mechanism; and 3) agents reaction to policing. We then applied the model to the case of regulatory behavior. We argued in part that public interest groups are constrained (and perhaps in some cases may elect) to police the manifestations of agent fidelity in the regulatory agencies rather than adherence to public interest criteria. This has possibly paradoxical consequences in that return to public interest criteria may thereby be reduced.

Commitment, Revelation, and the Testaments of Belief: The Metrics of Measurement of Corporate Social Performance

Three characteristic problems in the measurement of corporate social performance (CSP) center around the need to measure three “metrics”: the metric of performance evaluation (M1), the metric of performance measurement (M2), and the metric of performance perception and belief (M3). The central issues in each metric are commitment, revelation, and belief, respectively. This article discusses each metric and provides sets of theoretical propositions under M2 and M3 describing behavior in those contexts. Some of the propositions inM2form an explicit partial theory of factors affecting the likelihood of CSP measurement. Those under M3 are developed from more general ones in the theory of testaments.

Corporate political agency : the construction of competition in public affairs

PART ONE: AGENCY AND COMPETITION Choosing Agency - Barry M Mitnick Political Contestability - Barry M Mitnick PART TWO: BASIC CONTEXTS FOR CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY: CREATING AGENTS The Strategic Uses of Regulation - And Deregulation - Barry M Mitnick Strategic Behavior and the Creation of Agents - Barry M Mitnick The Efficacy of Business Political Activity - Gerald D Keim and Barry D Baysinger Competitive Considerations in a Principal-Agent Context PART THREE: CHOICES OF INSTITUTIONAL SETTING Selecting an Organizational Structure for Implementing Issues Management - Allen M Kaufman, Ernest J Englander and Alfred A Marcus A Transaction Costs and Agency Theory Perspective Agents in Analysis - Barry M Mitnick The Advisory Role in Public Affairs Management PART FOUR: CHOICES OF MACRO-LEVEL STRATEGIES AND OF MICRO-LEVEL TACTICS Shaping Issues/Manufacturing Agents - John F Mahon Corporate Political Sculpting Strategy and Tactic Choice in an Institutional Resource Context - William D Oberman Selecting Corporate Political Tactics - Kathleen A Getz PART FIVE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY Assessing the Effectiveness of Corporate Public Affairs Efforts - Craig S Fleisher

Systematics and CSR The Theory and Processes of Normative Referencing

This article examines the theoretical status of the three CSR models of William C. Frederick. Using the method of systematics, it disaggregates the elements of the three models and suggests one integrative means of re-sorting them. The article argues the need to develop a theoretical logic to understand behavior in this area and supplies one in the form of the beginnings of an explicit theory of normative referencing. The processes of normative referencing, including normative selection, normative commitment, normative instruction, normative implementation, normative administration, normative outcomes production, normative accounting, and normative adjustment are described.

Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account By One of the Theory's Originators

The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to actually begin its creation, were Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick, independently and roughly concurrently. Ross is responsible for the origin of the economic theory of agency, and Mitnick for the institutional theory of agency, though the basic concepts underlying these approaches are similar. Indeed, the approaches can be seen as complementary in their uses of similar concepts under different assumptions. In short, Ross introduced the study of agency in terms of problems of compensation contracting; agency was seen, in essence, as an incentives problem. Mitnick introduced the now common insight that institutions form around agency, and evolve to deal with agency, in response to the essential imperfection of agency relationships: Behavior never occurs as it is preferred by the principal because it does not pay to make it perfect. But society creates institutions that attend to these imperfections, managing or buffering them, adapting to them, or becoming chronically distorted by them. Thus, to fully understand agency, we need both streams -- to see the incentives as well as the institutional structures. This paper describes the origin and early years of the theory, placing its development in the context of other research in this area.

A Typology of Conceptions of the Public Interest

A typology of conceptions of the public interest is presented, and the occurrence of public interest rhetoric is discussed. Classifying dimensions of the typology include (1) number of sets of preferences and agreement among them, (2) the existence and level of the actor holding the preferences, (3) whether determination of the public interest requires participation of units of the polity in certain acts, or is merely passive or investigatory in nature, and (4) whether determination of the public interest is or is not rule-determined. Reasons suggested for the occurrence of public interest rhetoric include the avoidance of protest, the constraints of general value consensus, and the behavior of fiduciaries. It is argued that development of a general theory relating public interest conceptions to behavior may be aided by construction of typologies like the present one.

The siting impasse and a rational choice model of regulatory behavior: An agency for power plant siting☆

Abstract Reasons for the current siting impasse, including participatory activism, regulatory failure, the multiplication of considered interests, and the “investigative caveat,” are reviewed, and the existing logic of regulator behavior, viewed as a rational choice model, is summarized. Three sets of goals for agency participants are identified: personal goals of agency decision-makers, organizational goals of the agency as a whole, and goals of agency clients; and the incentive system of a new administrative agency structured so as to make satisfaction of these goals contribute toward informed and impartial decision-making. Major structural components of the agency would be a Director, a Corps of Examiners, counsel(s) for special interest(s) of special merit, a Public Counsel, and a Research and Information Office. The model is applied to the case of a regional or state-level agency to handle power plant siting.

On making meanings: Curators, social assembly, and mashups

The central argument of this article is that institutional theory is fundamentally concerned with the creation, distribution, and application of meaning. The field today only recognizes two of these three collective practices: what we term meaning-evangelizing, concern for how actors and institutions distribute and contest meanings; and meaning-applying, how and to what end actors apply existing, established categorical systems and logics to token objects, actors, organizations, and so on. This essay focuses on the third, less studied leg: meaning-making, the construction of the meanings that guide social actors. This essay offers a theoretical path for exploring meaning-making by discussing its actors, actions, and outcomes: the institutional actors who create meanings (such as curators), how they do it (social assembly), and what is made (social mashups, i.e., candidate meanings).

The Distinction of Fields

The concept of scientific field lacks a definition in a form allowing the distinction of whether a particular academic area of study is or is not a true scientific field. Starting with the classic definition by Whitley of a field as a “reputational work organization,” this essay extracts eleven explicit and implied features of a field from Whitley’s definition and discussion, extending his analysis. The article reviews Hambrick and Chen’s model of field formation as an “admittance-seeking social movement.” Hambrick and Chen argue that strategic management followed that model with success, offering the SIM Division of the Academy of Management as an unsuccessful example. The article notes errors in their assessment of SIM, argues that Hambrick and Chen are really offering a model of what I term condensation and promulgation of a field and that their model cannot be used to determine whether a field exists. The article applies the extended Whitley model of a field to examine three candidate fields within SIM: corporate social responsibility (CSR)/corporate social performance (CSP), stakeholder theory, and corporate political activity (CPA). I conclude that none is technically a field, and considering as well the comments of three senior scholars who contributed to the symposium, the article discusses the potential trajectory of fields in SIM.

SIM as a Generator of Systematics and Theory Logics, and a Science of Design and Repair

In Sandra Waddock’s article “Taking Stock of SIM” in this journal, she identifies key issues in the work of the Social Issues in Management (SIM) Division of the Academy of Management. This article challenges her analysis of SIM scholarship and her arguments of what is necessary for the division to progress. Scholarship in SIM should emphasize two key streams: First, scholars in SIM should seek to develop a science of social forensics, design, and social repair—in essence, develop a method of problem diagnosis, an approach to practical solution design, and a systematic understanding of the selection and implementation of social repair—in other words, seek to understand how to systematically troubleshoot and engineer solutions to fundamental issues in the business and society interface. The second stream, which informs the first, involves the development of original, core, transferable systematics that can “travel”—be the source of understanding-generating analysis—in other disciplines, including the topical regions of the Academy of Management. The article argues that laying claim to and developing true normative theory applicable across disciplines should be a distinctive identifier of work in SIM. The article concludes with an illustration of how systematics can be applied to address the literature’s failure to even seek to understand the logic underlying the standard ethical theories. These theories are properly seen as complements rather than substitutes. We need to ask and answer the “fundamental question of business ethics”: What should I do? .We suggest an approach labeled “integrative ethics,” employing ethical frames/injunctive formats, framed contexts for action, and the distribution of desires.