Barry Sopher

Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study

We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in “intergenerational games” or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping “generations” of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation \documentclass{aastex} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{bm} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{pifont} \usepackage{stmaryrd} \usepackage{textcomp} \usepackage{portland,xspace} \usepackage{amsmath,amsxtra} \usepackage[OT2,OT1]{fontenc} \newcommand\cyr{ \renewcommand\rmdefault{wncyr} \renewcommand\sfdefault{wncyss} \renewcommand\encodingdefault{OT2} \normalfont \selectfont} \DeclareTextFontCommand{\textcyr}{\cyr} \pagestyle{empty} \DeclareMathSizes{10}{9}{7}{6} \begin{document} \landscape

Intransitive cycles: Rational choice or random error? An answer based on estimation of error rates with experimental data

t+1.

Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity

\end{document} What we find is that word‐of‐mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory “parents” to laboratory “children”) can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions.

Violations of Present-value Maximization in Income Choice

In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice has a dramatic impact on the behavior of subjects. It diminishes the variance of offers made over time, lowers their mean, and causes Receivers to reject low offers with higher probability. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.

An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

The paper presents results from two new experiments designed to test between the ‘rational choice’ hypothesis and the ‘random error’ hypothesis for intransitive choice. Error probabilities and population shares for transitive and intransitive preference types are estimated from data collected in the first experiment. An unrestricted model (which treats intransitive patterns as true patterns) performs no better than a model that is restricted to transitive patterns. Analysis of the conditional distributions of choice patterns, using data from the second experiment, confirms more directly the main results of the first experiment: that observed intransitive choice patterns are due to random error.

Stochastic choice and consistency in decision making under risk : An experimental study

In two experiments we test Machinas Hypothesis II (fanning-out). In each experiment we analyze patterns of responses to hypothetical lottery choice questions within a Marschak-Machina triangle. One set of questions involves lotteries on the border of the triangle, an the other set of questions involves lotteries in the interior of the triangle (off the border). Our results show that a large proportion of the observed patterns in the on-border treatment support Hypothesis II, with a considerable amount of fanning-out behavior observed. The patterns observed in the off-border treatment are significantly different from those in the on-border treatment. Hypothesis II performs well in the off-border treatment because expected utility theory itself, which satisfies the restrictions of Hypothesis II, performs well.

Concession Behavior in a Bargaining Game: A Laboratory Test of the Risk Dominance Principle

Abstract The present study attempts to connect cooperative behavior in the repeated play prisoners dilemma (RPPD) with “trusting” and “reciprocal” behavior. Our goal is to see if people with different propensities to cooperate exhibit differing degrees of trust and reciprocity. We find the subjects who choose to cooperate in a RPPD game exhibit higher levels of trust. However when it comes to reciprocal behavior, cooperating subjects do not behave differently than subjects who choose to defect.

Learning and Decision Costs in One-Person Games

We report results of an experiment testing for present-value maximization in intertemporal income choice. Two-thirds of subjects did not maximize present value. Through a series of experimental manipulations that impose costs on non-present value maximizers, we are able to reduce the level of violations substantially. We find, however, that a sizeable proportion of subjects continue to systematically violate present-value principles. Our interpretation is that these subjects either cannot or choose not to distinguish between t income and t expenditure in making their choices. Self-management, bounded rationality, and sequence preference are suggested as possible explanations for such behavior.