Bartley R. Danielsen

Short Sale Constraints, Differences of Opinion, and Overvaluation

Miller (1977) hypothesizes that dispersion of investor opinion in the presence of short-sale constraints leads to stock price overvaluation. However, previous empirical tests of Millers hypothesis examine the valuation effects of only one of these two necessary conditions. We examine the valuation effects of the interaction between differences of opinion and shortsale constraints. We find robust evidence of significant overvaluation for stocks that are subject to both conditions simultaneously. Stocks are not systematically overvalued when either one of these two conditions is not met.

Why Do Option Introductions Depress Stock Prices? A Study of Diminishing Short-Sale Constraints

Early studies find that option introductions tend to raise the price of underlying stocks. More recent research indicates that post-1980 option introductions are associated with negative abnormal returns in underlying stocks. Other studies document increased short sale activities following option listing. This paper provides evidence that the documented abnormal returns and changes in short interest around option listings are consistent with the mitigation of short sale constraints resulting from the option introduction, and that both the abnormal returns and short interest changes around listing dates can be predicted using ex ante characteristics of the underlying stock.

Reassessing the Impact of Option Introductions on Market Quality: A Less Restrictive Test for Event-Date Effects

Prior research concludes that option introductions improve the average liquidity of the underlying stocks. We develop an improved, generalizable test to assess whether market quality changes occur on or near an event date. Applying this method to option listing events, we conclude that options do not systematically improve the market quality of the underlying security; rather, the market quality of the underlying security improves before the listing decision. Hazard model tests indicate that improving liquidity is a selection criterion in the option listing decision. Moreover, these tests suggest that the size of a stocks bid-ask spread is the single most important option listing determinant.

Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency

Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firms financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the markets perception of the firms transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Single Stock Futures as a Substitute for Short Sales: Evidence from Microstructure Data

We examine how the introduction of single-stock futures impacts short sale costs and short interest levels in the underlying spot market. We find that short selling in the underling securities declines, after futures are introduced, the cost of borrowing stock for short sales declines and the available unborrowed supply of lendable shares increases. These results are consistent with futures exchanges providing a low-cost substitute market for establishing short positions. Microstructure evidence also suggests that the lower cost and greater ease of short selling via futures markets draws informed traders from the spot market. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

REIT Auditor Fees and Financial Market Transparency

This article examines the relationship between overinvestment in audit services, abnormal nonaudit fees paid to the auditor and market-based measures of firm transparency. Because real estate investment trusts (REITs) must distribute 90% of their earnings as dividends, many are repeat participants in the seasoned equity market. Thus, REITs have unusually strong incentives to strive for security market transparency. We find that the capital markets reward REITs that overinvest in audit services with better liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads. However, firms with abnormally high nonaudit expenditures appear to be penalized with wider spreads, consistent with the notion that such fees may compromise auditor independence.