Bas C. van Fraassen

Quantum mechanics : an empiricist view

Part 1 Determinism and inderterminism in classical perspective: determinism indeterminism and probability. Part 2 How the phenomena demand quantum theory: the empirical basis of quantum theory new probability models and their logic. Part 3 Mathematical foundations: the basic theory of quantum mechanics composite systems, interaction, and measurement. Part 4 Questions of interpretation: critique of the standard interpretation modal interpretation of quantum mechanics EPR - when is a correlation not a mystery? the problem of identical particles indentical particles - individuation and modality.

The Charybdis of realism: Epistemological implications of bell's inequality

In scepticism and realism, empiricist epistemology has its Scylla and Charybdis. The main role of scepticism today is in reductio: if a position is shown to lead to scepticism, it is thereby refuted. But fleeing from that danger, we are hard put to steer clear of the metaphysical rocks and shoals of realism. I shall leave the first danger aside for now. 1 Concerning epistemic realism I shall argue that, given one plausible way to make it precise, it is refuted by Bell s Inequali ty Argument. Realists will presumably wish to formulate their views on epistemology so as to avoid this refutation, and I shall end with some helpful suggestions.

The Logic of Conditional Obligation

Various paradoxes in deontic logic have led to the introduction of concepts of conditional obligation. The aim of this paper is to develop a semantic theory of conditional obligation, a complete logical system pertaining thereto, and a translation into modal logic analogous to that provided by Anderson for normal deontic logics.

Probabilities of Conditionals

Both conditionals and probabilities have been the subject of lively philosophical debate. Lately their interaction has been in the limelight, through the disputed thesis that Ρ(Α→Β)=P (Β/Α), the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability (of consequent on antecendent). This thesis is tenable for the Stalnaker conditional if nesting of arrows is not allowed; for nested arrows I have weaker results. For ease of reading, I have limited the body of this paper to an exposition of the philosophical disputes, while the technical results are collected in a many- sectioned appendix.1

Semantic Analysis of Quantum Logic

This paper has a beginning, a middle, and an end. If these parts are to follow the dramatic unities, they will lead from suffering through recognition to reversal; but of this ideal they may fall short.

Structure: its shadow and substance

Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worralls and Ladymans versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in which we can do justice to Worralls original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedmans) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. 1. Planck against the heretics 1.1Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwells equations 1.2Two responses: reification and structuralism2. On the road to structuralism 2.1The microscope 2.2Mathematization of the world picture 2.3The 18th–20th century3. The new structural realism 3.1From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3How is structural realism supported?4. An empiricist structuralism 4.1Royal succession in science 4.2Defence of the empiricist version 4.3Structure: an empiricist view Planck against the heretics 1.1Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwells equations 1.2Two responses: reification and structuralism 1.1Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwells equations 1.2Two responses: reification and structuralism On the road to structuralism 2.1The microscope 2.2Mathematization of the world picture 2.3The 18th–20th century 2.1The microscope 2.2Mathematization of the world picture 2.3The 18th–20th century The new structural realism 3.1From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3How is structural realism supported? 3.1From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3How is structural realism supported? An empiricist structuralism 4.1Royal succession in science 4.2Defence of the empiricist version 4.3Structure: an empiricist view 4.1Royal succession in science 4.2Defence of the empiricist version 4.3Structure: an empiricist view

Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief

Personal or subjective probability entered epistemology as a cure for certain perceived inadequacies in the traditional notion of belief. But there are severe strains in the relationship between probability and belief. They seem too intimately related to exist as separate but equal; yet if either is taken as the more basic, the other may suffer.

Meaning Relations among Predicates

The point of departure of this paper is a traditional distinction between two kinds of meaning relations, which we shall call relations of content and relations of intent. The subject of relations of intent has so far remained relatively unexplored. We intend to argue briefly that this subject fonns a legitimate and in all likelihood fruitful field of semantic inquiry, to explore the means whereby relations of intent may be formally represented, and to describe and investigate a class of artificial languages (semiinterpreted languages) in which statements concerning relations of intent may be formulated.

The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories

The purpose of this paper is not to be new or original, but to provide a concise exposition of a certain approach in philosophy of science, at the hands of a loosely associated group of contemporary philosophers.* I do not want anyone to suffer from guilt by asociation, so I should emphasize that any two authors mentioned here may agree on only a few aspects of the discussed approach, and disagree on others.

Structure and Perspective: Philosophical Perplexity and Paradox

My topic today is structuralism in the philosophy of science. The name “structuralism” is often used in a narrow sense to denote specific programs, such as Bourbaki’s in mathematics and the approach to science due to Sneed and Stegmuller. I will use it in a broad sense, for any of a variety of views to the effect that science describes only structure, that scientific theories give us information only about the structure of processes in nature, or even that all we can know is structure. Since the very term “structuralism” comes from a by now fragile traditional distinction between form and structure, I will focus on the precise formulation of such views, with little regard to whether they honor that putative distinction. I shall describe some of the history of the general idea and its problems, and then ask what form of structuralism could be viable today.