Bas Jacobs

Guide to Reform of Higher Education: A European Perspective

Although there are exceptions, most European universities and institutions of higher education find it difficult to compete with the best universities in the Anglo-Saxon world. Despite the Bologna agreement and the ambitions of the Lisbon agenda, European universities are in need of fundamental reforms. We look at structural reforms of higher education and propose more effective use of public subsidies, more efficient modes of financing institutions of higher education, more diversity, competition and transparency, and larger private contributions through income-contingent student loans. In the process we discuss the nature of an institution of higher education, grade inflation, fair competition, private and social returns to education, income-contingent loans, student poverty and transparency. We sum up with seven recommendations for reform of higher education.

Sectoral Productivity Growth and R&D Spillovers in the Netherlands

This paper assesses empirically whether R&D spillovers are important and whether they originate from domestic or foreign activities. Data for eleven sectors are used to explain the impact on total factor productivity of R&D by the sector itself, by other Dutch sectors and by foreign sectors. We find that both domestic and foreign R&D are significant for the Dutch economy. The elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to R&D is approximately 37% for R&D by a sector, 15% for R&D by other Dutch sectors and 3% for R&D by foreign sectors. Our findings suggest moreover that more R&D speeds up the adoption of foreign technologies. Thus, even for a small open economy as the Netherlands, promoting investment in R&D is appropriate as it both stimulates adoption and generates spillovers.

The lost race between schooling and technology

We study the evolution of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in the Netherlands for the years 1969-2020. Our analysis is based on estimates of the production structure in the Netherlands, projections of the relative supply of skilled workers, and projections regarding shifts in relative demand for skilled workers. Wage inequality will increase under plausible assumptions because relative demand for skilled workers will increase more rapidly than the relative supply of skilled workers. We study the potential of education subsidies to higher education in order to stimulate the supply of skilled workers thereby off-setting the increase in projected wage inequality. Our findings suggest that education subsidies are not very effective in combatting increases in wage inequality.

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital

In a model with ex-ante homogenous households, earnings risk and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work and to invest in human capital. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but are only targeted at off-setting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, since education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non-tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education due to risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than without education subsidies.

Capital Market Failure, Adverse Selection and Equity Financing of Higher Education

We apply theories of capital-market failure to analyze optimal financing of risky higher education. In the market solution, students can only finance theireducation through debt. There is underinvestment in human capital because some students with socially profitable investments in human capital will not invest in education, due to adverse-selection problems in debt markets and because insurance markets for human-capital-related risk are absent. Legal limitations on the use of human capital in financial contracts cause this underinvestment; without them, private markets would optimally finance these risky investments through equity rather than debt and supply income insurance. The government, however, can circumvent this problem and implement equity and insurance contracts through the tax system by using a graduate tax. This paper shows that public equity financing of education coupled to provision of some income insurance is the optimal way to finance education when private markets fail due to adverse selection. We show that education subsidies to restore market inefficiencies are suboptimal.

A general purpose Technology Explains the Solow Paradox and Wage Inequality

We analyze the consequences of a general purpose technology (GPT) on output, productivity, and wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Our endogenous growth model matches three key empirical facts during the 1980s and 1990s: an increasing skill premium, a fall in the real wages of unskilled workers and a slowing down of economic growth after the introduction of a GPT.

Is a Minimum Wage an Appropriate Instrument for Redistribution

We analyze the redistributive (dis)advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets. A minimum wage causes more unemployment, but also leads to more skill formation as unemployment is concentrated on low-skilled workers. A simple condition based on three sufficient statistics shows that a minimum wage is desirable if the social welfare gains of more skill formation outweigh the social welfare losses of increased unemployment. Using a highly conservative calibration, a minimum wage decrease is shown to be part of a Pareto-improving policy reform for all countries under consideration, except possibly the United States.

The marginal cost of public funds is one at the optimal tax system

This paper develops a Mirrlees framework with skill and preference heterogeneity to analyze optimal linear and nonlinear redistributive taxes, optimal provision of public goods, and the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). It is shown that the MCF equals one at the optimal tax system, for both lump-sum and distortionary taxes, for linear and nonlinear taxes, and for both income and consumption taxes. By allowing for redistributional concerns, the marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes is shown to be equal to the marginal distributional gain at the optimal tax system. Consequently, the modified Samuelson rule should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds. Outside the optimum, the marginal cost of public funds for distortionary taxes can be either smaller or larger than one. The findings of this paper have potentially important implications for applied tax policy and social cost–benefit analysis.

Should the government stimulate enrolment in science and engineering studies

In many countries there is a deep concern about shortages of Science and Engineering workers (S&E). This article focuses on the effectiveness of policies aimed at stimulating the supply of S&E workers in the Netherlands. Despite the ‘common wisdom’ of severe and increasing shortages, we do not find evidence for a tight labour market of S&E workers. Instead, the data suggest that S&E workers have become less scarce since 1996. Stimulating enrolment in S&E studies may not be an effective policy for increasing R&D activity in the Netherlands because the majority of Dutch S&E freshmen do not end up working in R&D. They drop out during their S&E study or choose other jobs. In addition, the internationalization of the market for S&E workers tends to counter the effects of supply-side policies because the growing supply of foreign S&E graduates puts downward pressure on wages. As a result, demand-side policies may be more effective because they are directly targeted at fostering R&D.

Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and Credit Constraints

We study optimal linear income taxation in a model with heterogeneous agents where earnings potentials are endogenously determined through human capital accumulation. Agents differ in initial conditions and ability to learn. Capital market imperfections prevent poor agents to invest optimally in human capital. We show that optimal linear tax rates on human capital are positive, even in absence of redistributive preferences of the government. A more progressive tax system has efficiency gains because credit constraints are relaxed. Numerical calculations show that optimal linear tax rates are significantly increased when capital market imperfections are present.