Basel Katt
University of Innsbruck
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Publication
Featured researches published by Basel Katt.
symposium on access control models and technologies | 2008
Basel Katt; Xinwen Zhang; Ruth Breu; Michael Hafner; Jean-Pierre Seifert
The usage control model (UCON) has been proposed to augment traditional access control models by integrating authorizations, obligations, and conditions and providing the properties of decision continuity and attribute mutability. Several recent work have applied UCON to support security requirements in different computing environments such as resource sharing in collaborative computing systems and data control in remote platforms. In this paper we identify two individual but interrelated problems of the original UCON model and recent implementations: oversimplifying the concept of usage session of the model, and the lack of comprehensive ongoing enforcement mechanism of implementations. We extend the core UCON model with continuous usage sessions thus extensively augment the expressiveness of obligations in UCON, and then propose a general, continuity-enhanced and configurable usage control enforcement engine. Finally we explain how our approach can satisfy flexible security requirements with an implemented prototype for a healthcare information system.
EternalS'12 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Trustworthy Eternal Systems via Evolving Software, Data and Knowledge | 2012
Matthias Gander; Michael Felderer; Basel Katt; Adrian Tolbaru; Ruth Breu; Alessandro Moschitti
Cloud computing is now on the verge of being embraced as a serious usage-model. However, while outsourcing services and workflows into the cloud provides indisputable benefits in terms of flexibility of costs and scalability, there is little advance in security (which can influence reliability), transparency and incident handling. The problem of applying the existing security tools in the cloud is twofold. First, these tools do not consider the specific attacks and challenges of cloud environments, e.g., cross-VM side-channel attacks. Second, these tools focus on attacks and threats at only one layer of abstraction, e.g., the network, the service, or the workflow layers. Thus, the semantic gap between events and alerts at different layers is still an open issue. The aim of this paper is to present ongoing work towards a Monitoring-as-a-Service anomaly detection framework in a hybrid or public cloud. The goal of our framework is twofold. First it closes the gap between incidents at different layers of cloud-sourced workflows, namely we focus both on the workflow and the infrastracture layers. Second, our framework tackles challenges stemming from cloud usage, like multi-tenancy. Our framework uses complex event processing rules and machine learning, to detect populate user-specified metrics that can be used to assess the security status of the monitored system.
electronic healthcare | 2008
Basel Katt; Ruth Breu; Micahel Hafner; Thomas Schabetsberger; Richard Mair; Florian Wozak
Electronic Health Record (EHR) is the heart element of any e-health system, which aims at improving the quality and efficiency of healthcare through the use of information and communication technologies. The sensitivity of the data contained in the health record poses a great challenge to security. In this paper we propose a security architecture for EHR systems that are conform with IHE profiles. In this architecture we are tackling the problems of access control and privacy. Furthermore, a prototypical implementation of the proposed model is presented.
OTM '09 Proceedings of the Confederated International Conferences, CoopIS, DOA, IS, and ODBASE 2009 on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: Part II | 2009
Basel Katt; Xinwen Zhang; Michael Hafner
In this paper we propose a novel usage control policy specification based on Coloured Petri Nets formalism. Recently, usage control has been proposed in order to overcome the shortcomings of transitional access control that fails to meet new security requirements of todays highly dynamic and distributed systems. These new environments require for example (i) a continuity of control, (ii) fulfillment checks of obligatory tasks, during or after the usage end, (iii) an integration between functional behavior and security policy, and (iv) the management and control of concurrent and parallel usages by different subjects. Taking all these requirements into consideration, our usage control policy includes three main rule types: behavioral, security and concurrency rules. Security rules, can be further classified either into instant-, -ongoing, and post rules or into authorization and obligation rules. Instant rules must be checked before the execution of an action is granted, ongoing rules are checked during the execution of an action, and finally post rules are checked after the execution is finished. Therefore, post rules are only of type obligation. Coloured Petri nets are used because of their powerful modeling capabilities of distributed and concurrent systems and their efficiency for specification of systems by embodying the support of ML functional programming language.
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering | 2014
Michael Felderer; Basel Katt; Philipp Kalb; Jan Jürjens; Martín Ochoa; Federica Paci; Le Minh Sang Tran; Thein Than Tun; Koen Yskout; Riccardo Scandariato; Frank Piessens; Dries Vanoverberghe; Elizabeta Fourneret; Matthias Gander; Bjørnar Solhaug; Ruth Breu
Security is an important quality aspect of modern open software systems. However, it is challenging to keep such systems secure because of evolution. Security evolution can only be managed adequately if it is considered for all artifacts throughout the software development lifecycle. This article provides state of the art on the evolution of security engineering artifacts. The article covers the state of the art on evolution of security requirements, security architectures, secure code, security tests, security models, and security risks as well as security monitoring. For each of these artifacts the authors give an overview of evolution and security aspects and discuss the state of the art on its security evolution in detail. Based on this comprehensive survey, they summarize key issues and discuss directions of future research.
formal methods | 2011
Basel Katt; Matthias Gander; Ruth Breu; Michael Felderer
Security requirements are typically defined at a business abstract level by non-technical security officers. However, in order to fulfill the security requirements, technical security controls or mechanisms have to be considered and deployed on the target system. Based on these security controls security patterns have to be selected. The MDS (Model Driven Security) approach uses security requirement models at a high level of abstraction to automatically generate security artefacts that configure security services. The main drawback of the current MDS solutions is that they consider just one security pattern for each security requirement. Current SOA and cloud services are scattered across multiple heterogeneous security domains. Partners and clients with different security infrastructures are changing continuously, which requires the support of multiple patterns for the same security service. The challenge is to provide configurable security services that can support different patterns. In order to overcome this shortcoming we propose a framework that integrates pattern refinement to the MDS approach. In this approach a security pattern refinement layer is added to the traditional MDS layers. The pattern refinement layer supports the configuration of one security service with different patterns, which are stored in a pattern catalog. For example, our approach enables the generation of security artefacts that configure a non-repudiation service to support both fair non-repudiation and naive non-repudiation patterns.
electronic healthcare | 2011
Thomas Trojer; Basel Katt; Thomas Schabetsberger; Richard Mair; Ruth Breu
Discussions about appropriate security controls to protect medical records led to the understanding that the patient her-/himself plays a crucial role in networked electronic health-care. Patients have individual privacy concerns and may want to execute their personal right of self-determination on access and usage of their medical records. The ability for patients to have control over their personal medical data is the essence of patient-centric networked electronic health-care, but poses challenges regarding its tool support. Since patients can be generally treated as non-security experts as well as non-health-care domain experts, usability-supporting factors of authoring tools for privacy preferences have to receive major attention by implementers. Additionally, domain characteristics have to influence the design of such authoring applications. Finally expressed privacy preferences have to be analysed to inform the patient-author and guide her/him in the policy authoring process. In this paper we discuss the process of authorization policy authoring for shared electronic health records which we use to implement patient-controlled access control authoring tools. Further a use-case in the context of a specific health-care infrastructure is presented.
international conference on move to meaningful internet systems | 2010
Patrick Rempel; Basel Katt; Ruth Breu
The rule-based RBAC (RB-RBAC) model has been proposed to dynamically assign users to roles based on a set of rules. We identify two problems of this model: simplified rule language with limited expressiveness and the lack of rule reasoning capabilities. In this paper we propose an expressive and extensible provisioning framework that overcomes these drawbacks. Our framework supports complex user-role assignment rules and provides rule reasoning capabilities using OWL DL and F-Logic. Furthermore, we show how our approach supports (i) weak and strong negation to enhance expressiveness and strictness, (ii) defining static SoD constraints, and (iii) detecting conflicts. Finally, the paper describes a mechanism to deduce well-formed SPML requests from rules to provision policy systems with entitlements.
electronic healthcare | 2010
Thomas Trojer; Basel Katt; Florian Wozak; Thomas Schabetsberger
Traditionally, the definition and the maintenance of security and access control policies has been the exclusive task of system administrators or security officers. In modern distributed and heterogeneous systems, there exist the need to allow different stakeholders to create and edit their security and access control preferences. In order to solve this problem two main challenges need to be met. First, authoring tools with different user interfaces should be designed and adapted to meet domain background and the degree of expertise of each stakeholder. For example, policy authoring tools for a patient or a doctor should be user friendly and not contain any technical details, while those for a security administrators can be more sophisticated, containing more details. Second, conflicts that can arise among security policies defined by different stakeholders must be considered by these authoring tools on runtime. Furthermore, warnings and assisting messages must be provided to help defining correct policies and to avoid potential security risks. Towards meeting these challenges, we propose an authoring framework for security policies. This framework enables building authoring tools that take into consideration the views of different stakeholders.
hawaii international conference on system sciences | 2014
Thomas Trojer; Basel Katt; Tülay Özata; Ruth Breu; Patrick Mangesius; Thomas Schabetsberger
Information systems in electronic healthcare have the potential to support a variety of medical stakeholders in performing their regular daily working activities. Still with the growing amount of electronically available health-related data on patients, aspects of data privacy have to be considered, e.g., by improving the transparency of healthcare processes or by offering methods to allow patients to self-determine controls for their data. In this work we present the results of a study we conducted in Austria about the general desire of patients to self-control access to their health records as well as to elicit typical factors for access control they personally consider as important. The results we present in this work are intended to support the requirements analysis and development of patient-centric healthcare management applications. As our results clearly indicate that patients have varying conceptions regarding privacy we also elaborate on the proper integration of access control factors to satisfy individual informational requirements.