Bashshar Haydar

The Ethics of Fighting Terror and the Priority of Citizens

This paper provides a critical commentary on Kasher and Yadlins article. I start with a few remarks regarding the authors’ claim about the uniqueness of fighting terrorism and their proposed definition of acts of terrorism. The main part of my commentary, however, is devoted to discussing Kasher and Yadlins Principle of Distinction (Part II of their paper). There, I raise several objections to their proposed ranking of state duties and to the way they use the ranking to justify what they call targeted prevention of terror. Finally, I make a few remarks pertaining more specifically to the Israeli–Palestinian situation.

Literature, Knowledge, and Value

Many of the terms we use to assess works of literature are cognitive in nature. we say that a work is profound, insightful, shrewd, well-observed, or perceptive, and conversely that it is shallow, or sentimental, or impercipient. a common thread running throughout this terminology is that works of literature are ascribed cognitive features affecting the value of those works qua literature. use of this terminology therefore implies adherence to a substantial philosophical theory, cognitivism, the thesis that (1) works of literature have cognitive content, and (2) this content enhances their value as works of literature. note that cognitivism is not the thesis that literature’s value resides in its causing us to acquire knowledge, but rather in its displaying such knowledge. a given work’s displaying knowledge does not of course entail that it causes us to acquire it. while cognitivism appears consistent with literary critical practice, it is open to a number of objections. in this paper we aim to defend cognitivism and in the process refine it. Broadly, objections to cognitivism deny either (1) the thesis that works of literature contain any cognitive content, or (2) the thesis that such content can be aesthetically relevant in the sense of being relevant to the evaluation of works of literature qua literature. the principal objection is to (2), for it is difficult to deny that no knowledge whatsoever can be obtained from works of art. For example, the Iliad sheds light on values, habits and customs of ancient greeks, and nineteenth-century russian novels may inform us about contemporary debates concerning the emancipation of the serfs. it is the relevance of such knowledge to the artistic value of the literature that is in issue.

Literature, Politics, and Character

What is the relationship between literature and politics? We might interpret this question in terms of causality. For example, we might ask whether literature has any effects in the world of politics and if so how. auden famously proclaimed that poetry makes nothing happen, while it was central to Brecht’s dramaturgy that theatre has certain political effects on its audience. Conversely, we might see literature as an effect of political causes and claim that certain political environments give rise to certain types of literature, and that those political backgrounds thereby explain certain aspects of literary phenomena. Both kinds of causal relationship are at the heart of Marxist literary criticism, and of the many schools of academic criticism which share the Marxist assumption that individual consciousness, and its literary manifestations, are subordinate to political environment. these causal questions are important and interesting, particularly if approached with requisite critical tact. However, in this paper we would like to focus on the epistemological and normative questions of whether literature is suited to communicate political knowledge or insights, and whether we value, or rather ought to value, literature for such communication. these two questions are in our view intimately related. While there is no doubt that literary works can be made to communicate virtually all kinds of knowledge, from knowledge about the Big Bang to knowledge how to smuggle illegal immigrants into First World countries, these kinds of knowledge are not what we go to literature for. We go to literature and value it for giving us knowledge which it is peculiarly suited to communicate. it is natural to praise a novel for its insight into, say, character but odd to praise a novel for its

Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction

This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the incompatibility thesis, namely the underlying conception of responsibility. There are, I contend, two relevant conceptions of responsibility, the globalist and the localist . In order for the compatibilist argument to go through, the globalist conception must be adopted. I aim to provide a formulation and defence of the dependency of the compatibilist view on the globalist conception of responsibility. I will not, however, argue for one conception of responsibility over the other.

The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction

The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, then we should also accept the claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm allowing. Those who want to reject the conclusion of the above argument usually do so by defending the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, I argue that the argument fails due to internal inconsistency. I argue that, once we reject the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing.