Basil E. Ugochukwu

The Pathology of Judicialization: Politics, Corruption and the Courts in Nigeria

Judicialization of politics, the practice whereby judicial power is expanded well beyond adjudication in purely orthodox terms to embrace the core of politics and governmental policy is becoming a global phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that despite its growing popularity and acceptability, the process of political judicialization should be contextually detailed. Using Nigeria as an example, I assert that, although there might be justification for judicial intervention in the countries of Africa, the prevalence of corruption in the judiciaries makes such intervention a double-edged sword, deserving adroit handling. I also argue that the judicialization of politics on the continent is fuel for corruption. As such, removing political questions from the courts, difficult as this might be, could be an important anti-corruption strategy.Judicialization of politics, the practice whereby judicial power is expanded well beyond adjudication in purely orthodox terms to embrace the core of politics and governmental policy is becoming a global phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that despite its growing popularity and acceptability, the process of political judicialization should be contextually detailed. Using Nigeria as an example, I assert that, although there might be justification for judicial intervention in the countries of Africa, the prevalence of corruption in the judiciaries makes such intervention a double-edged sword, deserving adroit handling. I also argue that the judicialization of politics on the continent is fuel for corruption. As such, removing political questions from the courts, difficult as this might be, could be an important anti-corruption strategy.

Poverty in the Human Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts (1999-2011)

The major objective of this article is to examine the extent to which the human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian appellate courts has been sensitive and/or receptive to the socio-economic and political claims of Nigeria’s large population of the poor and marginalized. In particular, the article considers: the extent to which Nigerian human rights jurisprudence has either facilitated or hindered the efforts of the poor to ameliorate their own poverty; the kinds of conceptual apparatuses and analyses utilized by the Nigerian courts in examining the issues brought before it that concerned the specific conditions of the poor; and the key biases that are embedded in and shape Nigeria’s jurisprudential orientation. The line of cases analysed in the article indicate that the Nigerian appellate courts, as elsewhere, possess great capacity, for good or ill, to impact public policy in the field of poverty reduction.

Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor 'Struggles' in the Human Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-2011

This article deals with the question whether the jurisprudence of Nigeria’s appellate courts has helped advance or impede the struggles of the poor to assert their human rights in the country. The article begins by defining, delimiting, and situating the concepts “struggle” and “human rights as struggle.” It then moves on to identify and discuss the factors that make the struggles that the poor and the subaltern must wage to realize their human rights a tough one. Following this discussion, the article turns its attention to its main focus, i.e., an analytical examination of the ways in which the corpus of human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian appellate courts has either aided and/or inhibited the struggles of the poor and the subaltern in that country during the period under study. The latter discussion is sub-divided into two segments: the first is focused on the engagement of these courts with the pro-poor struggles of Nigerian Labour, while the second is devoted to an analysis of the attitude of the courts to other kinds of pro-poor human rights struggles in Nigeria. In both cases, given space and other constraints, only small but representative samples of the relevant cases are discussed.

From Reaction to Agency: A 'Subaltern' Response to William Twining's Globalisation and Legal Scholarship

Abstract In this essay, it is contended that by welcoming a cosmopolitan discipline of law that encompasses ‘all levels of social relations and legal orderings’ (both dominant and peripheral) as well as by suggesting that the intellectual heritage of Western jurisprudence be adapted ‘to the new predicament of global law’, William Twining offers a platform to the worlds marginalised legal systems and formations to assert their relevance in the advancement of legal theory. In developing this argument, I will first examine what opportunities exist within Twinings theorising to reclaim and de-marginalise non-Western understandings of the law and its social value within the context of pluralism and globalisation. Secondly, I discuss what could be the lessons and implications of his proposals for a globalised legal theory on legal education and scholarship in the less dominant or ‘subaltern’ legal systems. I also suggest how scholars from subaltern territories could effectively insert their voices in the diversification and pluralisation of global legal theory.

Unpacking the Universal: African Human Rights Philosophy in Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart

Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart appears to attract significant criticism for its seemingly negative offerings to human rights than for contributions to that cause that could be considered positive. My goal in this chapter is to reconstruct this image of that popular novel using the law and literature framework. I will do so at two levels. As an initial concern, I will demonstrate that Things Fall Apart offered positively to the human rights discourse contrary to persisting criticisms. Secondly, my analyses will add to the debate regarding the existence or otherwise of human rights values in Africa’s pre-colonial cultures. Despite having what could be regarded as neo-patriarchal characteristics (in spite of its ‘transformative power’), I will argue that the Things Fall Apart narrative is indeed a valid and credible refutation of the view that human rights is not an African value. And while it is possible to present a human rights content analysis of the book through several themes, I will place special emphasis on its treatment of the right to life, the rights of women and the right to fair hearing and a fair administration of justice.

Group Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:

It is particularly meet, on the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to re-examine the ways in which its group rights provisions has been interpreted and applied. What is the concept of group rights that animates the “peoples’ rights” provisions in the African Charter? How have these group rights been actually interpreted and applied in the jurisprudential praxis of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which (despite the establishment of the as yet young, and in any case, soon to be replaced African Court of Human Rights) remains to date its main interpretive body? And what are the future prospects of these provisions in that jurisprudence? These are the main questions that this chapter tackles through analytical examinations of the African Charter itself, the relevant primary and secondary literature, and the jurisprudence of the African Commission. To this end, section 2 examines the general debate regarding the concept of group rights and its place in international human rights praxis. Section 3 briefly considers the conception of group rights that animated the “peoples’ rights” provisions in the African Charter. In section 4, a fairly detailed examination of the jurisprudence of the African Commission with respect to each one of the major group rights provisions of the Charter is conducted. Following that tour d’ horizon, some brief more general closing thoughts on the future of group rights in the African Human Rights System are offered in section 5.