Belen Villalonga

Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32; G34

Does Diversification Create Value in the Presence of External Financing Constraints? Evidence from the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis

We examine whether and why the value of diversification changed during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We find that diversified firms increased in value relative to single-segment firms during the crisis, a result that is not driven by the endogeneity of either financing constraints or firms’ diversification choices. We also find that the increase did not simply reflect changes in investor perceptions but real differences in corporate finance and investment, through two different channels: a “more money” effect arising from the debt coinsurance feature of conglomerates, and a “smarter money” effect arising from more efficient internal capital allocation.

The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Corporate Diversification

Using a large sample of diversified firms from 38 countries we investigate the influence of several national-level institutional factors or ‘institutional voids’ on the value of corporate diversification. Specifically, we explore whether the presence of frictions in a country’s capital markets, labor markets, and product markets, affect the excess value of diversified firms. We find that the value of diversified firms relative to their single-segment peers is higher in countries with less efficient capital and labor markets, but find no evidence that product market efficiency affects the relative value of diversification. These results provide support for the theory of internal capital markets that argues that internal capital allocation would be relatively more beneficial in the presence of frictions in the external capital markets. In addition, the results show that diversification can be beneficial in the presence of frictions in the labor market.

What Are Boards For? Evidence from Closely Held Firms

Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice, and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders impact the tradeoffs between control, liquidity, and growth, and ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.