Ben Kotzee

Seven Posers in the Constructivist Classroom.

In education, ‘constructivism’ constitutes the ‘grand unified theory’ of the moment. In this article, I maintain that constructivism as a theory of knowledge and constructivism as pedagogy are distinct and that the question of what constructivism about knowledge implies for teaching is under‐theorised. Seven classroom scenarios are sketched that illustrate the problems that a constructivist view of knowledge can create in the classroom. It is concluded that constructivist epistemology undermines effective teaching; as such, realistic teaching practice cannot proceed from constructivist assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge. The conclusion, however, is neutral regarding teaching practice: constructivist epistemology is neither sufficient nor necessary for what is called ‘constructivist’ teaching practice.

Private practice: exploring the missing social dimension in ‘reflective practice’

In professional education today, Schöns concept of ‘reflective practice’ underpins much thinking about learning at work. This approach – with its emphasis on the inner life of the professional and on her own interpretations of her learning experiences – is increasingly being challenged: often cited objections are that the model ignores factors like power and ideology and that it is too individualistic in its conception of learning. One line of criticism is that Schöns focus on reflection is too individualistic. Another possible fault is that Schön conceives of a practice in an overly individualistic fashion. This is the criticism that I will explore in this paper. Ultimately, a social view is need to explain wherein a practice consists; such a view also throws light on the limitations of relying on reflection to develop professional expertise.

Expertise, fluency and social realism about professional knowledge

In recent years, the sociology of education has seen a renewed interest in realist accounts of knowledge and its place in education. Inspired by ‘social realist’ thinking, a body of work has emerged that criticises the dominance of generic and process-based thinking about (especially) professional education and advocates instead a revaluation of discipline-based and theoretical knowledge. In this paper, I discuss the role of the concept of expertise in professional education. Following Winch, I situate the dominant theories of expertise in the field today as ‘fluency’ accounts of expertise – such theories focus more on the fluency or automaticity with which the expert acts than on the content of what the expert can do. As an alternative, I investigate Collins and Evans’s recent work on expertise in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Similar to what Collins and Evans suggests for science studies, I hold that education would benefit from consideration of the developing ‘third wave’ of thinking about the nature of expertise and I sketch the main features of a social realist view of the nature of expertise for professional education.

Can virtue be measured

This article explores some general considerations bearing on the question of whether virtue can be measured. What is moral virtue? What are measurement and evaluation, and what do they presuppose about the nature of what is measured or evaluated? What are the prospective contexts of, and purposes for, measuring or evaluating virtue, and how would these shape the legitimacy, methods, and likely success of measurement and evaluation? We contrast the realist presuppositions of virtue and measurement of virtue with the behavioral operationalism of a common conception of measurement in psychometrics. We suggest a realist and non-reductive conceptualization of the measurability of virtue. We then discuss three possible educational contexts in which the measurement of virtue might be pursued: high-stakes testing and accountability schemes, the evaluation of programs in character education, and routine student evaluation. We argue that high-stakes testing of virtue would be ill-advised and counterproductive. We make some suggestions for how program evaluation in character education might proceed, and offer some examples of evaluation of student virtue-related learning. We conclude that virtue acquisition might be measured in a population of students accurately enough for program evaluation while also arguing that student and program evaluation do not require comprehensive evaluations of how virtuous individual students are. Routine student evaluation will typically focus on specific aspects of virtue acquisition, and program evaluations can measure the aggregate progress of virtue acquisition in all its aspects while evaluating only limited aspects of the learning of individual students.

Education and the growth of knowledge : perspectives from social and virtue epistemology

Notes on Contributors vii Introduction Education, Social Epistemology and Virtue Epistemology Ben Kotzee 1 1 Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond Sanford Goldberg 14 2 Learning from Others David Bakhurst 36 3 Anscombe s Teachers Jeremy Wanderer 55 4 Can Inferentialism Contribute to Social Epistemology? Jan Derry 76 5 Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education Duncan Pritchard 92 6 Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice Jason Baehr 106 7 Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF Heather Battaly 124 8 Three Different Conceptions of Know-How and Their Relevance to Professional and Vocational Education Christopher Winch 145 9 The Epistemic Value of Diversity Emily Robertson 166 Index 179

Measuring ‘virtue’ in medicine

Virtue-approaches to medical ethics are becoming ever more influential. Virtue theorists advocate redefining right or good action in medicine in terms of the character of the doctor performing the action (rather than adherence to rules or principles). In medical education, too, calls are growing to reconceive medical education as a form of character formation (rather than instruction in rules or principles). Empirical studies of doctors’ ethics from a virtue-perspective, however, are few and far between. In this respect, theoretical and empirical study of medical ethics are out of alignment. In this paper, we survey the empirical study of medical ethics and find that most studies of doctors’ ethics are rules- or principles-based and not virtue-based. We outline the challenges that exist for studying medical ethics empirically from a virtue-based perspective and canvas the runners and riders in the effort to find virtue-based assessments of medical ethics.

Who Should Go to University? Justice in University Admissions

Current debates regarding justice in university admissions most often approach the question of access to university from a technical, policy-focussed perspective. Despite the attention that access to university receives in the press and policy literature, ethical discussion tends to focus on technical matters such as who should pay for university or which schemes of selection are allowable, not the question of who should go to university in the first place. We address the question of university admissions—the question of who should go to university—from an ethical perspective. We find that most discussions draw on a generic conception of what the university is good for that is too thin to provide deliberative guidance and hold that a full account of the ethics of admissions needs to take into account the distinctive good that the university provides—knowledge and understanding. This view, we hold, does not imply that measures should not be taken to widen access to university; however, the basis for such measures should be grounded in that distinctive good in the first instance.

Virtue in Medical Practice: An Exploratory Study

Virtue ethics has long provided fruitful resources for the study of issues in medical ethics. In particular, study of the moral virtues of the good doctor—like kindness, fairness and good judgement—have provided insights into the nature of medical professionalism and the ethical demands on the medical practitioner as a moral person. Today, a substantial literature exists exploring the virtues in medical practice and many commentators advocate an emphasis on the inculcation of the virtues of good medical practice in medical education and throughout the medical career. However, until very recently, no empirical studies have attempted to investigate which virtues, in particular, medical doctors and medical students tend to have or not to have, nor how these virtues influence how they think about or practise medicine. The question of what virtuous medical practice is, is vast and, as we have written elsewhere, the question of how to study doctors’ moral character is fraught with difficulty. In this paper, we report the results of a first-of-a-kind study that attempted to explore these issues at three medical schools (and associated practice regions) in the United Kingdom. We identify which character traits are important in the good doctor in the opinion of medical students and doctors and identify which virtues they say of themselves they possess and do not possess. Moreover, we identify how thinking about the virtues contributes to doctors’ and medical students’ thinking about common moral dilemmas in medicine. In ending, we remark on the implications for medical education.

Towards an Empirically Informed Account of Phronesis in Medicine

In the field of medical virtue ethics, the concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, plays a crucial role. In recent years a number of important theoretical questions have been identified in this regard: (1) is phronesis more akin to thinking or theorizing, or to feeling and intuiting? (2) can phronesis be communicated and explained, or is it individual and personal? and (3) is phronesis needed in all decision-making in medicine, or only in the making of decisions that are ethically fraught? In this paper we argue that, while these questions have received attention on the theoretical level, empirical investigation has the potential to shed light on these questions from the perspective of medical practice in the real world. Indeed, because virtue ethics insists that virtuous action can only be understood properly in the context of real decisions (and not in the abstract), there are good grounds for thinking that understanding phronesis must involve attention to real-world particulars. Empirical investigation, involving in-depth narrative interviewing and analysis, has the potential to shed light on these theoretical questions relating to phronesis.

Introduction: A Thicker Epistemology?

Abstract The distinction between thick and thin concepts has been a central part of recent discussion in metaethics. Whilst there is a debate regarding how best to characterise the distinction, it is commonly accepted that ethical theorising traditionally focuses on the thin, leading some to contend that moving from considering thin to thick concepts leads to a very different, and preferable, conception of ethics. Not only does a similar distinction between thick and thin concepts suggest itself within epistemology, traditional discussion within epistemology also seems to focus on the thin in a similar manner. The question of a possible parallel beckons: Is there a comparable distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts? Would a move from thin to thick lead to an alternative and/or preferable epistemology?