Ben Wubs

Multinationals and the Dutch Business System: The Cases of Royal Dutch Shell and Sara Lee

The impact of the strategies of multinational companies on the Dutch business system during the twentieth century is described in relation to two fi rms. The fi rst case examines the attitude of the Dutch (in this example, Anglo-Dutch) parent company Royal Dutch Shell toward its international subsidiaries. The second looks at the approach taken by the American company Sara Lee toward its Dutch subsidiary, Douwe Egberts. Until the 1980s, both companies were prepared to adjust their organizations to national traditions and ambitions. However, when these nationally based global fi rms came under pressure during that decade, both changed their organizational structures. Their actions can be seen both as responses to globalization and as attempts to advance that process by simultaneously building international institutions and changing elements of the national business system in the Netherlands.

Property, control and room for manoeuvre: Royal Dutch Shell and Nazi Germany, 1933–1945

Abstract Nationalistic Nazi politics created huge problems for foreign multinational firms in Germany. Business during the Nazi period has been characterised as either state controlled, complacent or complicit. Yet, some cases show that local management had considerable room for manoeuvre and acted primarily with the integrity and long-term interest of the company in mind. This article questions to what extent Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) controlled its assets in Nazi Germany and what its room for manoeuvre was. Although RDS lost control over its subsidiary over the course of the 1930s, the local management retained considerable room for manoeuvre well into the war.

Beyen at Bretton Woods: “Much More Significant Under the Surface…”

An interesting perspective on Bretton Woods is the input of nations other than the USA or Britain. A good example is the input of the Dutch delegation, in particular its leader Jan Willem Beyen, the Former President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). He was actively engaged in many discussions during the conference. Coming from the world of big finance and multinational enterprise, he looked much further than the national interest of his own nation. His behavior often led to discontent, irritation, and distrust from the American delegation. Beyen, however, saw off the US attack on the BIS, which aimed to liquidate the ‘banker’s bank’ in Basel for its role in the transfer of the gold reserves of occupied European nations to Nazi Germany.

Building Competing Fashion Textile Fairs in Europe, 1970–2010: Première Vision (Paris) vs. Interstoff (Frankfurt)

Interstoff (launched in 1959 by Messe Frankfurt) and Première Vision (launched in 1972 in Lyon) became “information dissemination gathering locations” for the fashion and textile industries all over the world. The two events mobilized the fashion prediction methodology as a key tool to impose themselves as the favorite information gatekeeper for the industry. Their goal was to complement the trading of goods with the exchange of adequate and strategic information for companies that were dramatically constrained by immediate global competition and rapidly changing seasonal models. As a result the two trade fairs progressively adopted a new information-centric model and contributed to maintain Western Europe as the central location for the dissemination of fashion trends worldwide. Messe Frankfurt also pursued an alternative geographical strategy. It did this by following the global relocation of textile manufacturing and setting up fairs around the world, particularly in China, before ultimately ending the Interstoff event in Frankfurt in 1999.

Unilever’s Struggle for Control

This article examines the effects of Germanys occupation of the Netherlands on the corporate governance structure of the Anglo-Dutch Unilever company, which had huge interests on both sides ofWorldWar II. It focuses on the continental side of the business, in particular on the Netherlands and Germany, at the highest corporate level. I argue here that Unilever survived various serious threats by the German occupation because the group had prepared itself legally well in advance of the war. Its highly decentralised operating structure helped the company to survive the ambitions of some parts of the Nazi State. However, the infighting between various German agencies prevented a complete sequestration of the continental business. In the end the appointment of a special Reichs Commissioner for the Unilever group as well as the deteriorating war conditions for Nazi Germany eventually worked to the advantage of Unilever. S the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War increasing numbers of companies have allowed and often commissioned academics to study their history during the Third Reich. 1 The end of the Cold War has reduced the fear that industrys relationship with the Nazi regime would discredit a companys name. Most monographs treat the behaviour of German companies in the Third Reich and little has been written about the international dealings of these companies. Even fewer studies deal with, for example, American, British and Dutch multinationals which had subsidiaries in Nazi Germany. In the 2000s, however, a few studies were published that also dealt 1 I am indebted to Geoffrey Jones (Harvard Business School) and Hein Klemann (Erasmus University Rotterdam) for their excellent PhD supervision over the past few years. This article is only a part of the result of my research into Unilever. In addition, I thank Keetie Sluyterman (Utrecht University) and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on the first draft of this article. Finally, I am grateful to Unilever, and Ton Bannink (Head of Historical Archives) in particular, for their welcoming and open attitude towards my research. 2 Examples of excellent academic monographs: Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology. I. G. Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge 1987; Hans Mommsen, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf 1996; Neil Gregor, Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich, New Haven 1998; Gerald D. Feldman, Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945, Cambridge 2001;Werner Abelshauser et. al., German Industry and Global Enterprise. BASF: The History of a Company, Cambridge 2004; Harold James, The Nazi Dictatorship and the Deutsche Bank, Cambridge 2004; Peter Hayes, From Co-operation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich, Cambridge 2004; Stephan H. Lindner, Hoechst. Ein I.G.Farben Werk im Dritten Reich, Munich 2005. 3 Some exceptions of general studies of M N E s based in Allied countries which also deal with the war period include: Mira Wilkins/Frank Ernst Hill, American Business Abroad: Ford on six continents, Detroit 1964; The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise. American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970, Cambridge, M A 1974; Geoffrey Jones, Courtaulds in Continental Europe, 1920-194}, in: Geoffrey Jones, British Multinationals: Origins, Management and Performance, Aldershot 1 9 8 6 , 1 1 9 1 3 6 ; The multinational expansion ofDunlop 1890-1939,