Benjamin A. T. Graham

Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010

Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. Existing literature associates power sharing with democracy and civil conflict resolution. Unlike the existing literature, this dataset shows inclusive institutions are common in post-conflict states, though least strongly associated with electoral democracy. Conversely, constraining institutions, though comparatively rare in states with current or recent civil conflicts, are highly correlated with electoral democracy.

The effects of information voids on capital flows in emerging markets

Information voids reflect a lack of publicly available information about a country’s investment climate, and represent the information problems associated with institutional voids. We argue that foreign investors differ in their sensitivity to information voids based on their own private information and their flexibility in responding rapidly to change. We predict that foreign banks will be least hampered by information voids, due to their privileged access to private information about local conditions and ability to adapt quickly to new information. Portfolio investors, while impeded by information voids due to their severely limited access to local private information, are able to quickly respond to new information. Foreign direct investors have moderate access to local private information, yet their inability to adapt quickly creates problems dealing with information voids. Using time-series cross-sectional data on local public information and capital flows to the thirty largest emerging markets from 1994 to 2012, we find preliminary support for our hypotheses regarding the sensitivity of different investors to information voids. We find that direct investors are most sensitive to information voids and banks are least sensitive, while portfolio investors are moderately sensitive.RésuméLes vides informationnels reflètent un manque d’informations publiquement disponibles sur le climat d’investissement d’un pays et représentent des problèmes d’informations associés à des vides institutionnels. Nous considérons que les investisseurs étrangers diffèrent dans leur sensibilité concernant les vides informationnels en fonction de leurs propres informations privées et de leur flexibilité à répondre rapidement au changement. Nous prévoyons que les banques étrangères seront moins entravées par les vides informationnels, en raison de leur accès privilégié aux informations privées sur les conditions locales et de leur capacité à s’adapter rapidement à de nouvelles informations. Les investisseurs de portefeuille, bien que bloqués par les vides informationnels en raison de leur accès sérieusement limité aux informations privées locales, sont capables de répondre rapidement à de nouvelles informations. Les investisseurs directs étrangers ont un accès modéré aux informations privées locales, mais leur incapacité à s’adapter rapidement crée des problèmes pour faire face aux vides informationnels. En utilisant des données transversales de séries chronologiques sur les informations publiques locales et les flux de capitaux dans les trente plus grands marchés émergents de 1994 à 2012, nous trouvons une validation préliminaire pour nos hypothèses concernant la sensibilité des différents investisseurs aux vides informationnels. Nous constatons que les investisseurs directs sont les plus sensibles et que les banques sont les moins sensibles aux vides informationnels, alors que les investisseurs de portefeuille sont moyennement sensibles.ResumenLos vacíos de información reflejan una falta de información pública acerca del clima de información en un país, y representa problemas de información asociados con vacíos institucionales. Argumentamos que los inversionistas extranjeros difieren en cuanto a su sensibilidad a los vacíos de información basándose en su propia información privada acerca de las condiciones locales y la habilidad para adaptarse rápidamente a información nueva. Anticipamos que los bancos extranjeros estarán menos impedidos con vacíos de información, debido a su acceso privilegiado a información privada sobre las condiciones y su habilidad de adaptarse rápidamente a la información nueva. Los inversionistas de portafolio, aunque impedidos con vacíos institucionales debido a su severamente limitado acceso a información local privada, son capaces de responder rápidamente a información nueva. Los inversionistas extranjeros directos tienen un acceso moderado a información local privada, pese a esto su incapacidad de adaptarse rápidamente crea problemas al enfrentarse a vacíos institucionales. Usando series de tiempo y datos intersectoriales de información local pública y flujos de capitales hacia el tercer más grande mercado emergente entre 1994 y 2012, encontramos apoyo para nuestras hipótesis en cuanto a la sensibilidad de diferentes inversionistas a vacíos de información. Encontramos que los inversionistas directos son más sensibles a vacíos institucionales y los bancos son menos sensibles, mientras los inversionistas de portafolio son moderadamente sensibles.ResumoOs vazios de informação refletem a falta de informação publicamente disponível sobre o clima de investimento de um país e representam os problemas de informação associados aos vazios institucionais. Argumentamos que os investidores estrangeiros diferem em sua sensibilidade aos vazios de informação com base em sua própria informação privada e sua flexibilidade em responder rapidamente a mudanças. Prevemos que os bancos estrangeiros serão menos prejudicados por vazios de informação, devido ao seu acesso privilegiado a informações privadas sobre as condições locais e a capacidade de adaptar-se rapidamente a novas informações. Os investidores de carteiras, embora obstruídos por vazios de informação devido ao seu acesso severamente limitado à informação privada local, são capazes de responder rapidamente a novas informações. Investidores diretos estrangeiros têm acesso moderado à informação privada local, mas sua incapacidade de se adaptar rapidamente cria problemas para lidar com vazios de informação. Utilizando dados seccionais em série temporal sobre informação pública local e fluxos de capital para os trinta maiores mercados emergentes de 1994 a 2012, encontramos apoio preliminar às nossas hipóteses quanto à sensibilidade de diferentes investidores aos vazios de informação. Descobrimos que investidores diretos são mais sensíveis aos vazios de informação e bancos são menos sensíveis, enquanto os investidores de carteira são moderadamente sensíveis.概要信息空隙反映出一个国家投资环境公开获得信息的缺乏,并显示与制度空隙相关的信息问题。我们认为,外国投资者对基于他们自己的私人信息及他们迅速应对变化的灵活性的信息空隙的敏感度不一样。我们预测,外资银行将受信息空隙阻碍最小,因为他们有特权获得有关当地情况的私人信息和有迅速适应新信息的能力。证券投资者,虽然有当地私人信息获取严重受限的信息空隙阻碍,但能够快速响应新信息。外国直接投资者能适度地获取当地私人信息,但他们的无法迅速适应的能力带来处理信息空隙的问题。使用当地公共信息和三十个最大的新兴市场1994至2012年资金流的时间序列横截面的数据,我们发现我们对不同投资者信息空隙敏感性的假设获得初步支持。我们发现,直接投资者对信息空隙最敏感,银行最不敏感,而证券投资者则是中度敏感。

Even Constrained Governments Steal: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks

This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal model to derive testable implications regarding the effect of political institutions and domestic politics on governments’ ability to collect these two types of rent. Empirically, we use novel time-series cross-sectional data to show that while veto-player-type political constraints diminish expropriation risk, transfer risk is much less affected: even constrained governments impose transfer restrictions.

The International Political Economy Data Resource

Quantitative scholars in international relations often draw repeatedly on the same sources of country-year data across a diverse range of projects. The International Political Economy Data Resource seeks to provide a public good to the field by standardizing and merging together 951 variables from 78 core International Political Economy data sources into a single dataset, increasing efficiency and reducing the risk of data management errors. Easier access to data encourages researchers to perform more robustness checks in their own work and replicate others’ published results more often. It also and makes it easier for teachers of quantitative research methods to assign realistic exercises to their students. This resource will be updated and expanded annually. The full resource is available via the Harvard Dataverse Network, with versions also available via the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and NewGene.

Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace

Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independent judiciaries to protect them, create checks against governmental repression of minority groups and ordinary citizens, whereas other types of power sharing focus on political elites. Constraining power-sharing institutions limit incentives for mass mobilization and raise the costs of conflict, thus reducing the probability of civil war. Drawing on a new global data set, we examine the effects of power sharing on the onset and recurrence of civil war. In contrast to prior findings, our results show that only constraining power-sharing institutions have a pacific effect.

The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory

Studies of regime type and war reveal that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic victory is that democracies fight in larger coalitions. Allies bring additional material capabilities and may provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies may also find coalitions less costly or constraining, even as democratic war aims may be easier to apportion among the victors without diluting the spoils. Evaluating our hypotheses in a sample of all wars (and alternatively in a sample of all militarized disputes) during the period 1816-2000, we find that democracies have more allies when they fight, and that states fighting with more allies are more likely to win major contests. Autocracies also gain a likelihood-of-victory benefit with additional allies, but they appear less willing or able to form large military coalitions. Finally, we show that the indirect effect of democracy on success in war through alliance ties subsumes the direct effect of regime type on victory. ∗University of California, San Diego. †University of California, San Diego. ‡University of California, San Diego and University of Southern California.

Network Ties and the Political Strategies of Firms

It is well established that connections to government officials confer important benefits to firms. However, past work has ignored the crucial role that ties to other firms in the same industry (peer ties) also play in facilitating firms’ political participation. We develop new theory that contrasts the effects of these two distinct types of social ties. We argue that peer ties facilitate collective action, most often with respect to broad policy issues that affect many firms. In contrast, we expect that direct ties to government officials (government ties) are primarily used to pursue narrow, particularistic benefits. Using a new survey of foreign- owned firms operating in the Philippines, we find that peer ties facilitate firms’ political participation at the national level, where issues are more likely to affect large numbers of firms. Government ties are also valuable, though primarily at the local level, where issues are narrower in scope.

Who's Ready for ASEAN 2015? Firm Expectations and Preparations in the Philippines

By December 31, 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has committed to complete the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a plan that was adopted back in 2007. As countries across ASEAN seek to seize the development opportunities associated with the AEC, it is critical for policy makers to understand the perspective of firms towards economic integration and the level and nature of firm preparedness for this new political environment. This paper draws on an original survey of over 300 mostly multinational firms operating in the Philippines. Of particular note, we find widespread optimism about the effects of the AEC on firm profitability, but low levels of firm preparedness. In the last year before AEC implementation, firms’ primary policy demand on the Philippines government was more information and communication. We also develop and test theory regarding variation across firm types in their level of preparedness, their optimism regarding the effects of the AEC on profitability, and their demand for more government-to-firm communication.