Benjamin E. Ferrett

Firm heterogeneity in modelling foreign direct investment location decisions

This article investigates the probability of the FDI location decisions of multinational enterprises using a mixed logit panel data model, which is the most flexible discrete choice model. We employ a three-level data set, which includes over 1100 FDI location decisions into 13 alternative Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) over an 11-year period. Our empirical results on the effect of host country, industry and firm characteristics on the probability of undertaking FDI in a particular location are significant and consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.

Wage-Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks

We analyse how union structures that differ in the degree of wage-setting centralization affect the pattern of R&D network formation. Within the context of a three-firm industry, a central union that sets a uniform wage is shown to induce a partial R&D network that includes two firms but excludes the third. In contrast, we find that, under less centralized union structures, firms have incentives to form R&D networks with a larger number of alliances. This result is consistent with the stylised facts for industrialised countries: recent decades have seen an upsurge in R&D alliances along with labour market deregulation towards more flexible wage-setting institutions.

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent with empirical findings that R&D complementarities between firms positively influence the formation of horizontal agreements. The insiders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications of the firms’ merger/RJV choice.