Benjamin Schefer
University of Münster
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Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
The task of competition policy is to eliminate or to prevent restraints of competition and not to cause them. For this reason, all legal restrictions of entrepreneurial freedom of action in competition must be examined regularly on the “test bench” of deregulation. The most recent cartel-law interventions in the vertical coordination of the value chains and the resulting rigid limitation of freedom of action in consumer-goods distribution are currently the subject of controversy and viewed increasingly critically in all related disciplines.
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
`It is no longer disputed that vertical restraints may have positive competition-policy effects. The negative effects of vertical price restraints are, on the other hand, much more difficult to determine.’ This situation is partly due to the fact that almost no experience with the effect of price maintenance is available, as it has been prohibited in Germany since 1973 (apart from some exceptions). Therefore, one can only speculate or theorise on the impact.
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
The misconception that it is only necessary to fight price maintenance in order to guarantee the supply at favourable prices to consumers of the desired branded goods is widespread among the public and, surprisingly, also among students of economics.
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
The conclusion to be drawn from the above statements is that the preservation of supply diversity by protecting strong brands and the expansion of diversity by protecting investments in innovation—given the lack of State protection mechanisms—necessarily requires freedom to take action oneself to regulate internal relationships in value system. However, the strict prohibition of every form of vertical price and brand care largely cancels out this freedom. Undisputedly regarded as evident today is the fact that no general increase in welfare is achieved as a result. On the contrary, the effectiveness of competition between the major brands is seriously endangered. This evidence is examined once again systematically in this section.
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
On the one hand, the deregulation of this statutory prohibition is recommended without delay. This is combined with the hope that the abolition of legal restrictions on price formation will increase the diversity of supply. This would result in price-maintained offers competing locally for the favour of consumers alongside non-price-maintained offers, and if appropriate, also with recommended retail prices.
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
Cartel-law intervention is intended to prevent restraints of competition, not to cause them. Therefore, for all regulations governing freedom of action in business, the universally acknowledged principle applies that they must be reviewed with a view to de-regulation at regular intervals. There is an acute need for review particularly when—as in the case of coordinated price management between manufacturing and retailing—the enforcement by the authorities of restrictive legal provisions may be tightened up further. However, groups of experts at national and international levels, at the same time, disagree increasingly as to whether such legal restrictions can be justified in terms of the underlying principle. There is a risk that any further restriction of freedom to contract will tend to stifle innovation and competitive diversity rather than sustainably improve consumer welfare.
Archive | 2012
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen zu verhindern oder diesen vorzubeugen, ist die Aufgabe kartellrechtlicher Interventionen, nicht aber sie zu verursachen. Daher gilt fur alle Reglementierungen der unternehmerischen Handlungsfreiheit im Wettbewerb der allseits anerkannte Leitsatz, dass sie in regelmasigen Zeitabstanden auf den Prufstand der (De-)Regulierung gehoren. Akuter Uberprufungsbedarf besteht insbesondere dann, wenn – wie im Falle des zwischen Industrie und Handel koordinierten Preismanagements – die behordliche Durchsetzung der restriktiven Rechtsnormen verscharft zu werden droht, obwohl zur gleichen Zeit in den einschlagigen Fachkreisen, national wie international, zunehmend daruber gestritten wird, ob solche Rechtsrestriktionen uberhaupt noch als leitbildkonform zu rechtfertigen sind. Es droht die Gefahr, dass eine weitere Einschrankung der Vertragsfreiheit eher zur Strangulierung von Innovation und Vielfalt im Wettbewerb beitragt als die Verbraucherwohlfahrt nachhaltig zu verbessern.
Archive | 2010
Dieter Ahlert; Julian Kawohl; Isabelle Kes; Felix Brüggemann; Jennifer Peperhowe; Benjamin Schefer; Eva Schütrumpf
Der vorliegende Beitrag, der die Thematik des Solution Selling im B2C-Bereich in Form eines theoretisch-konzeptionellen Ansatzes behandelt, wurde innerhalb eines methodisch innovativen Projektes im Rahmen eines Universitatsseminars vorbereitet. So ist ein Grosteil dieses Beitrags in einer interaktiven Zusammenarbeit einer Vielzahl von Autoren im Rahmen eines Wikis entstanden. Zielsetzung dieses Artikels ist es, eine Typologisierung fur Losungsanbieter zu entwickeln.
Archive | 2009
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer
Archive | 2013
Dieter Ahlert; Benjamin Schefer