Bennett L. Schwartz

Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning and feelings of knowing.

Metamnemonic judgments probe people’s awareness of their own memory processes. The research reviewed here is an examination of the sources of information that subjects use to make judgments of learning (e.g., paired-associate judgments, ease-of-recognition predictions, free-recall judgments), and feelings of knowing (e.g., speeded strategy decisions, tip-of-the-tongue states, feeling-of-knowing judgments). The general pattern in the data suggests that subjects use different sources of information to form these judgments. Target-based sources appear to be important in judgments made at the time of acquisition, whereas cue-based judgments appear to be important in judgments made at the time of retrieval. In general, these sources of information serve as useful heuristics, and metamnemonic judgments tend to be accurate.

Cue familiarity but not target retrievability enhances feeling-of-knowing judgments.

Two hypotheses concerning peoples ability to predict later memory performance for unrecalled items were investigated. The target retrievability hypothesis states that feeling-of-knowing judgments (FKJs) are based on partial target information; and the cue familiarity hypothesis asserts that they are based on recognition of the cues. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects either generated or read the targets of paired associates. Half of the cues had been primed in a pleasantness-rating task. The generation manipulation increased recall but had no effect on FKJs. Cue priming had no effect on recall but increased FKJs. In Experiment 3, using general information questions, primed after the initial recall attempt, both cue and target priming increased FKJs. Experiment 4, which remedied difficulties in Experiment 3, showed no effect of target priming whereas cue priming increased FKJs. The results favor the cue familiarity hypothesis.

Episodic memory in nonhumans: what, and where, is when?

Episodic memory is defined as the recollection of specific events in ones past, accompanied by the experience of having been there personally. This definition presents high hurdles to the investigation of episodic memory in nonhumans. Recent studies operationalize episodic memory as memory for when and where an event occurred, for the order in which events occurred, or for an animals own behavior. None of these approaches has yet generalized across species, and each fails to capture features of human episodic memory. Nonetheless, the study of episodic memory in nonhumans seems less daunting than it did five years ago. To demonstrate a correspondence between human episodic memory and nonhuman memory, progress is needed in three areas. Putative episodic memories in nonhumans should be shown to be; first, represented in long-term memory, rather than short-term or working memory; second, explicit, or accessible to introspection; and third, distinct from semantic memory, or general knowledge about the world.

Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: retrieval, behavior, and experience

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the feeling that accompanies temporary inaccessibility of an item that a person is trying to retrieve. TOTs have been studied experimentally since the seminal work of Brown and McNeill (1966). TOTs are experiences that accompany some failed or slow retrievals, and they can result in changes in retrieval behavior itself, allowing us to study the interplay among experience, retrieval, and behavior. We often attribute the experience of the TOT to the unretrieved target, but TOTs are based on a variety of cues, heuristics, or sources of evidence, such as partial information, related information, and cue familiarity, that predict the likelihood of overcoming retrieval failure. We present a synthesis of the direct-access view, which accounts for retrieval failure, and the heuristic–metacognitive view, which accounts for the experience of the TOT. We offer several avenues for future research and applications of TOT theory and data.

Sparkling at the end of the tongue: The etiology of tip-of-the-tongue phenomenology.

The tip-of-the-tongue experience (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a currently inaccessible word is stored in memory and will be retrieved. TOTs appear to be a universal experience that occurs frequently in everyday life, making the TOT an ideal case study in human phenomenology. This paper considers TOTs in light of Tulving’s (1989) challenge to the doctrine of concordance, which is the assumption that behavior, cognition, and phenomenology are correlated, if not caused by identical processes. Psycholinguistic and memory theories, consistent with concordance, argue for direct access, or the view that TOTs and word retrieval are caused by the same retrieval processes. The metacognition view challenges concordance and views TOTs as an inference based on nontarget information that is accessible to rememberers. Current data, reviewed here, suggest that TOTs are caused via direct access and through inferential processes. Dissociations between TOTs and retrieval suggest that the causes of TOT phenomenology and the processes of retrieval are not identical.

English speakers attend more strongly than Spanish speakers to manner of motion when classifying novel objects and events.

Three experiments provide evidence that the conceptualization of moving objects and events is influenced by ones native language, consistent with linguistic relativity theory. Monolingual English speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in an English-speaking context performed better than monolingual Spanish speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in a Spanish-speaking context at sorting novel, animated objects and events into categories on the basis of manner of motion, an attribute that is prominently marked in English but not in Spanish. In contrast, English and Spanish speakers performed similarly at classifying on the basis of path, an attribute that is prominently marked in both languages. Similar results were obtained regardless of whether categories were labeled by novel words or numbered, suggesting that an English-speaking tendency to focus on manner of motion is a general phenomenon and not limited to word learning. Effects of age of acquisition of English were also observed on the performance of bilinguals, with early bilinguals performing similarly in the 2 language contexts and later bilinguals showing greater contextual variation.

The phenomenology of real and illusory tip-of-the-tongue states

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a word is on the verge of being recalled. Most research has been directed at TOT etiology and at retrieval processes occurring during a TOT. In this study, TOT phenomenology was examined. In Experiment 1, strong TOTs were more likely than weak TOTs to be followed by correct recognition, and resolution (later recall) of TOTs was higher for strong than for weak TOTs, but only for commission errors. In Experiment 2, emotional TOTs were more likely to be resolved and recognized than nonemotional TOTs. In Experiment 3, imminence was defined as the feeling that retrieval is about to occur. Imminent TOTs were more likely to be followed by resolution and recognition than were nonimminent TOTs. Illusory TOTs (TOTs for unanswerable questions) tended to be weaker, less emotional, and less imminent than TOTs for answerable questions.

Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.

The relation of tip-of-the-tongue states and retrieval time

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a word is on the verge of being recalled. Participants rated TOTs as either emotional or nonemotional. In Experiment 1, given general-information questions, participants spent more time attempting retrieval during emotional TOTs than during nonemotional TOTs or n-TOTs (retrieval failures not accompanied by TOTs). Experiment 2 replicated the effect that TOTs show longer retrieval times than n-TOTs. In Experiment 3, with word definitions as stimuli, retrieval times were longer for emotional TOTs. Experiment 4 showed the same relation between retrieval times and TOTs even when participants made retrospective decisions about whether they had experienced a TOT before they retrieved the correct target. Valence of emotion was correlated with correct resolution of the TOT. These results are discussed in the context of a metacognitive model, in which TOTs serve to monitor and control cognition.

Illusory Tip-of-the-tongue States

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a target word is on the verge of being recalled. An illusory TOT occurs when a person experiences a TOT, but the actual target is either unavailable, forgotten, or never learned. Illusory TOTs were induced by asking participants to answer questions that did not have correct answers. In Experiment 1, an episodic-memory paradigm, participants were shown fictional animals, some of which were accompanied by the animals name (identified targets) and some of which were not (unidentified targets). Some participants experienced TOTs for unidentified targets. In Experiment 2, a semantic-memory paradigm, participants were asked general-information questions, some of which were questions with no correct answer. Every one of the 31 participants experienced at least one illusory TOT. The characteristics of illusory TOTs are discussed in light of inferential and direct-access views of TOTS.