Bernard Brodie

Strategy as a Science

T HE recent resignations from posts of high civil authority or ceremonial rank of former military officers will no doubt allay somewhat the suspicions current a year or more ago that the military were “moving in” where they did not belong. Although the original appointment to civil posts of such men as Generals George C. Marshall and Walter B. Smith was hardly due to design on the part of the armed services, being quite easily and plausibly explained on other and quite innocuous grounds, the military departments unquestionably do have a greater influence upon high policy decisions than was true before the recent war. It is therefore time to express concern not so much that that military will move in where they do not belong, but rather that in the process of moving in where in part, at least, they do belong, their advice will reflect their imperfections not as diplomatists but as soldiers.

The Anatomy of Deterrence

From the American point of view, the strategy of deterrence, and the related principle of limiting to tolerable proportions whatever conflicts become inevitable, tend to spring from the premise that the favourable results of a total war can never be sufficient to justify its cost. Such a war, according to that conception, would be too big, too all-consuming, to permit the survival even of those final values, like personal freedom, for which alone one could think of waging it. It need not be certain that it would turn out so badly; it is enough that there is a large chance that it would.

On Clausewitz: A Passion for War

We are especially indebted to the author of this book because of the extraordinary paucity of biographies of the great man who is its subject. As the British military historian, Michael Howard, says in the foreword: “Clausewitz as a man remains almost completely unknown.” And again: “As yet mere has appeared no serious biography in English and for this reason alone Roger Parkinsons book breaks important new ground.”

Navy Department Thinking on the Atomic Bomb

The BULLETIN completes its presentation of the report on “The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on National Security” with this summary of Navy Thinking prepared by Dr. Brodie after interviews with Admiral Nimitz and senior naval officers. Dr. Brodie, a member of the Institute of International Studies, Yale University, worked under the auspices of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. The full report is here published for the first time.

A critique of Army and Navy thinking on the atomic bomb.

After compiling the summaries of Army and Navy Thinking on problems posed by the advent of atomic weapons which appeared in the June and July issues of the BULLETIN, Dr. Brodie prepared a critical analysis of these views. We reprint here in full for the first time with the permission of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, Dr. Brodies critique of Navy Thinking and an excerpt from his critique of Army Thinking.

MILITARY DEMONSTRATION AND DISCLOSURE OF NEW WEAPONS

Abstract : The paper is concerned with the continuous conflict, which occasionally poses a specific problem of decision, between the legitimate ends of security in military technology and of disclosure for the sake of demonstration potential. The needs of security may conflict with many other desirable ends as well (e.g., accelerating the rate of scientific progress), but such considerations are ruled out of the present discussion except in so far as they may be supplementary to the considerations governing the decision to disclose for the sake of demonstration value, or to refrain from so doing.

International Relations: HENRY A. KISSINGER. The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. Pp. xiv, 266. New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965.

The Program in International Relations (IR) offers an interdisciplinary undergraduate major, minor and honors program allowing students to explore how global, regional and domestic factors influence relations between actors on the world stage. The program equips students with the skills and knowledge necessary to analyze choices and challenges that arise in this arena. IR majors pursue study in world politics, including courses in Political Science, Economics, History, languages, and other fields focusing on issues such as international security, political economy, economic development, and democratization. The major prepares students for careers in government and the corporate sector, and for admission into graduate programs including, but not exclusive to law, business, economics, and political science.

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perspectives. He could have given us an instructive tour d’horizon of key issues in international politics. Unfortunately, his preoccupation with the philosophical warrant of geopolitical analysis makes for discontinuity of exposition and thus distracts the attention of the reader. In fact, the volume could pass review as a collection of essays, from which to choose according to one’s fancy. The book fails

HEDLEY BULL. The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age. (Studies in Inter national Security, II.) Pp. 215. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961.

LESTER B. PEARSON. Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. Pp. vi, 114. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.

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2.75. This little book comprises the author’s four Clayton Lectures, delivered at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1958, and the Nobel Peace Prize Lecture of 1957. They present the views of an articulate and wise public official with long diplomatic experience in the service of the Canadian government. Since Mr. Pearson’s intelligence and authority have always been bywords at the numerous international conferences at which he has participated, students of diplomacy and international relations are bound to find his views interesting, and the reading of them is pleasant and not very time-consuming. They should not, however, expect anything particularly novel. This reviewer has seen or heard elsewhere practically every idea expressed in this book. Words of wisdom and experience are, after all, not usually arresting for their originality. But it is useful to have them repeated conveniently, especially if they are well stated, and there are always new students to whom a book such as this will have fresh-