Bernard Fook Weng Loo

Transforming the Strategic Landscape of Southeast Asia

This article examines the implications for the regional strategic landscape of uneven regional military modernization in Southeast Asia. At heart, there is a fundamental issue that pertains to all military modernization — no military force can afford to be static in nature and capability. To remain relevant and effective, all military forces have to undergo periodic change, both in terms of their hardware and capabilities on the one hand, but also in terms of their doctrines and strategies, as capabilities change. As strategic conditions in Southeast Asia change — the demise of traditional internal security concerns revolving around revolutionary or armed separatist movements, and the movement towards greater emphasis on external security concerns — this has facilitated the increasing attention that regional armed forces have paid to the process of transformation from counter-insurgency towards conventional military postures and force structures. However, the ever-increasing pace of modern technological change and the increasingly high costs of modern military technologies complicate this modernization process. Not all states in Southeast Asia can actually financially afford to support this military modernization. This has resulted in an uneven process of regional military modernization that can shape the security environment of the region in ways that cannot be anticipated.

Geography and Strategic Stability

This article suggests that the inclusion of geographic considerations helps to create a more nuanced idea of strategic stability. At one level, there are the geographical conditions such as disputing territorial claims that lead policy-makers to perceive the increased propensities for inter-state conflict in a given region. At the other level, there are geostrategic conditions that lead strategic planners to perceive geostrategic vulnerabilities as a result of their assessments about the viability or imminence of military operations.

Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military Affairs

Abstract This article examines the notion of so-called decisive victory, and the apparent relationship between battlefield victory and strategic success. It argues that there is no necessary causal relationship between what happens on the battlefield and the eventual outcomes of wars. It further argues that the Revolution in Military Affairs, because it appears to render battlefield success so much more attainable, further complicates muddled strategic thinking on these issues, and may actually be counter-productive to strategic success.

Naval Modernisation Versus Naval Development: Implications for Strategic Stability in Southeast Asia

The chapter reviews naval development in Southeast Asia as a whole and finds that it is less than a naval arms race but more than a process of normal naval modernisation. It then identifies some of the possible consequences for international stability in Southeast Asia.

The (Over)Promise of Modern Technology

Most of us are familiar with the argument about technology as a force multiplier, allowing states with limited strategic resources—manpower, strategic depth, and so on—to potentially overcome these potential strategic shortfalls. The reason for the emphasis on “potential” is deliberate: the technology-as-force-multiplier argument is focused on the potentials for most states. For Singapore, definitely—Singapore as a modern independent state has never had to taste war; the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has never had to be tested. For the SAF, therefore, their argument about technology helping the organization fulfill its mission of protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Singapore is a potential argument. Unless and until war comes to Singapore, unless and until the SAF has to actually carry out its mission statement of defeating potential aggressors swiftly and decisively, we will never know if the SAF can actually do what it sets out, what it claims to do.