Bernd Theilen

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firms hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used.

HEALTH CARE AND IDEOLOGY: A RECONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC HEALTHCARE FUNDING IN THE OECD

In this article, we examined if partisan ideology and electoral motives influence public healthcare expenditure (HCE) in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We distinguished between the effects on the growth of the expenditures and its adjustment to violations of a long-run equilibrium linking HCE with macroeconomic and demographic trends. Regarding the influence of partisan ideology, we found that if governments are sufficiently long in power, right-wing governments spend less on public health than their left-wing counterparts. Furthermore, if a right-wing party governs without coalition partners, it responds more strongly to deviations from the long-run HCE equilibrium than left-wing governments. With regard to electoral motives, we found that health expenditure increases in years of elections. Independent of their partisan ideology, single-party (minority) governments induce higher (lower) growth of public HCE. Each of these political factors by its own may increase (decrease) HCE growth by approximately one percentage point. Given an average annual growth of HCE of approximately 4.1%, political factors turn out to be important determinants of trends in public HCE.

Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents

Abstract While the existing literature assumes either agents to be risk neutral or information about the outcome to be perfect, in this paper we allow for risk averse agents and find an optimal contract scheme which is robust to errors on the distribution of outcome. The optimal payment contract is derived and the comparative statics of the optimal payment scheme are analyzed. As the main insight it is shown that in the presence of simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection, the agent strictly prefers to relax the first of the two informational problems.

The determinants of health-care expenditure: new results from semiparametric estimation†‡

Recent cross-country studies have questioned the existence of a systematic relationship between per capita health-care expenditure (HCE) and explanatory variables such as income, population ageing and total public expenditure. We reexamine this issue mainly focussing at a flexible semiparametric estimation method that allows the parameters of the model to depend on a state variable. Using the age structure of the population as the state variable, we find that the income elasticity increases with population ageing, while other explanatory variables are not significantly influenced by it. Additionally we find that the HCE relationship becomes more and more unstable in ageing economies. These results explain the difficulty to identify both the influence of population ageing and income on HCE in previous studies. Furthermore they indicate that international convergence of HCE across countries crucially depends on the convergence of the population age structure. We also discuss the policy implications of our results regarding the design of a fair health-care financing system and the evolution of HCE to avoid budgetary problems.

CONTRACT DELEGATION WITH BARGAINING

In the theoretical literature on contract delegation, it is assumed that the contractor has all the bargaining power when contracts are proposed to the subcontractee. In this case, the principal prefers centralized to decentralized contracting structures. This paper analyzes the consequences of relaxing this assumption. It is shown that when contracts are determined by bargaining, the principal might prefer decentralization to centralization. Furthermore, it is shown that this can happen even when subcontractees have very little bargaining power. The results explain, for example, the coexistence of centralized and decentralized contracting in public procurement.

Does the EU financing system contribute to shadow economic activity

Financial contributions to the EU budget depend basically on official GDP. This means that countries with higher shadow economic activity contribute less than they should contribute in a system based on actual GDP and therefore could reduce their incentive to fight against such activities. In this paper we investigate if the EU financing system really has an influence on the intensity with which governments in EU member states fight against shadow economic activity. We find that the EU net contributors significantly fight more intensively against shadow economic activity while EU net receivers fight less. As a result, shadow economic activity is higher in net receiver and lower in net contributor countries than it were in comparison with a scenario of nationally balanced EU funding. Quantitatively and averaged over the time period 2001–2007, the diagnosed effect amounts to a stimulation of hidden economic activity by almost 10% for particular economies.

Monitoring Gains and Decentralization

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the final production can obtain soft information about the other agents effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts with only one agent, and delegates the power to contract with the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement.

PARTIAL TAX HARMONIZATION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION

In this article, we analyze the role of infrastructure coordination in facilitating partial tax harmonization within a coalition of asymmetric jurisdictions. Two main results are obtained. First, productivity asymmetries represent a serious handicap for partial tax harmonization that can be remedied by coordinating nontax instruments when they allow to reduce these asymmetries. Second, infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when asymmetries between potential members of a tax coalition are large. The current usage of European Union (EU) structural funds orientated to reduce regional infrastructure deficits is therefore suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the EU. (JEL H87, H54, H21)