Berry Tholen

The changing border: developments and risks in border control management of Western countries

In recent decades we have witnessed the development of a new type of migration regulation and border control in Europe, North America and Australia. In this new system of controls, the focus is less on the physical crossing of territorial borders and more on the process as a whole; from airline reservations, ticketing and visa applications to monitoring individuals after arriving in the country of destination. The developing mode of border control encompasses a multiplication of borders, a multiplication of actors and a multiplication of data and technology. The question arises: Does the new form of border management in Western countries bring forward the aims of border control more effectively and does it entail new risks (for visitors/migrants)? In this article I will first outline a normative framework for evaluating current developments in border control, building on studies in political theory and the philosophy of law. I then substantiate my claim that a new type of border control is developing and present an overview of three interconnected multiplications. Next, using findings from empirical and legal studies, (likely) consequences of the multiplications will be presented. Linking these consequences to the normative framework allows us, finally, to point out risks of the currently developing system of border control. Points for practitioners In recent decades Western countries have introduced new measures of border control, including new technologies and new types of agents in new roles. Together, these new measures make for a new type of global border control management. Our evaluation of this development shows that it entails new types of risks, and that these risks are likely to increase if this type of management develops further along the same lines. This analysis calls for a reorientation on instruments of border control leading to a more encompassing type of risk management in this field.

The Inclusion and Exclusion of Minorities in European Countries: A Comparative Analysis at the Local Level

Facing the reality of groups in Europe being in effect socially and politically marginalized, this article asks how the political inclusion of minorities is and should be established at the local level. First, a model is developed building on normative theories of political inclusion. This points to the importance of two dimensions of inclusion and exclusion, namely the possibility of direct participation and the granting of (special) rights to minorities. In order to test the relevance of the model data based on a survey among approximately 5000 members of the local élite in East and West European countries are analysed. The conclusion is that most local officials in East and Western Europe are remarkably unwilling to allow for special participatory arrangements or special rights. A difference between the old and new democracies in Europe as to the propensities towards possible democratic arrangements is revealed. In the old democracies, local élites are more positive as to general participatory arrangements, whereas the élites in the new democracies are more inclined to grant minorities the right to organize and institutionalize. Further analysis indicates that the differences found cannot be explained in terms of individual traits. Moral and cultural values and structural circumstances seem to be dominant factors. The relative stability of such factors suggests that we cannot be optimistic about the development of more inclusive arrangements on behalf of those that now seem to be systematically excluded.

Privileging the Near and Dear? Evaluating Special Ties Considerations in EU Migration Policy

Many studies have analysed the relation between the self understandings of citizenship or identity of western states on the one hand and national integration and immigration policies on the other. As migration regulation in recent years has shifted to a considerable extent to the European level, it seems appropriate to address issues of migration and identity also in that context. The central question of this article is whether European Union (EU) immigration policies that privilege people from some countries over others — because of special cultural, ethnic or historical ties — can be justified. Criteria for evaluation are developed and the EU visa regulations are put to the test.

Citizen participation and bureaucratization: the participatory turn seen through a Weberian lens

Recently, many scholars in public administration have argued for a participatory turn: the introduction of deliberative arrangements to include citizens in policymaking. In this article, the arguments and likely consequences of these proposals are assessed by using Max Weber’s classical analysis of the interplay between democracy and bureaucratization. It is argued that advocacy for a participatory turn contains blind spots. In consequence, the proposed measures are likely to increase the problems that they were intended to remedy. Points for practitioners The conclusion for practitioners is that direct participatory arrangements are not the panacea to the multiple problems they are often presented to be. The view through a Weberian lens urges caution on those who consider introducing such arrangements, as they might lead to a diminishing of predictability and accountability of public administration, a decrease in (substantial) expertise within government, and a general dissatisfaction with arrangements that do not provide citizens with what they were led to expect. More direct participation, then, easily contributes to the problems they were meant to remedy.

Deciding on Tools and Risks

The choices that must be made in the second phase of a scientific study also inevitably involve social values. First, there are the values that urge the scientist to respect the subjects he researches (e.g., animals, environment, or human beings). Second, choices must be made between measuring instruments that are epistemologically equivalent but might have different social consequences. Third, choices must be made about the level of risk of being wrong that is acceptable.

Conclusion: Scientific Policy Advice and Ethical Judgment

It is concluded that science and scientific policy advice inevitably involve making decisions that involve values—epistemological and non-epistemological values. A virtue ethics that includes the strong elements of the other three solutions might show the best way to address these value issues. This approach urges a particular academic curriculum and leadership. It demands virtuosity in employing an academic citizenship and a continuous balancing between the memberships of two practices.

Deciding on the Advisory Role

In the third and last phase of scientific study and advice, decisions must be made on transforming the research findings into a message for policymakers. Such decisions involve selection of material. They also involve choosing between possible frames and communicative and rhetorical instruments. The selective role of the scientific advisor is larger when he is confronted with policy problems that are unstructured.

Deciding What Is Worth Knowing

In the first phase of a scientific study, a set of choices must be made for which scientific advisors cannot completely rely on epistemological values: doing scientific research, choice of research topic, research question and theories. The choices that are made in this phase of a study have implications for the advice that can be given. They determine about what issues inconvenient truths might be provided. Theory choices also lead to a particular value slope or appreciative system built-in in the conclusion.

Addressing Non-Epistemological Issues

From the previous three chapters, it follows that in scientific advice, many decisions must be made for which scientific advisors cannot exclusively rely on epistemological values. For two reasons, this requirement might be a problem. First, it appears to be at odds with democracy; decisions with important societal implications are made by a select group. Second, such decisions often appear not to be made deliberatively and, therefore, possibly irresponsibly.

The Ideal of Value Neutrality in Policy Research and Advice: Some Inconvenient Observations

For many scientific policy advisors, as for most critics of contemporary scientific advisory practice, value freedom or political neutrality is the guiding ideal. Max Weber is often presented as the champion of this position. On closer inspection, however, this championship of value freedom becomes puzzling. Weber’s claims on intellectual honesty, on studying what is worth knowing and on presenting inconvenient truths to policymakers urge investigation of the ideal of value neutrality. What type of value decisions must an expert advisor make, and how can he best address those issues?