Bert White

Effects of Paying Physicians Based on their Relative Performance for Quality

BackgroundStudies examining the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs to improve quality of care primarily have been confined to bonus-type arrangements that reward providers for performance above a predetermined threshold. No studies to date have evaluated programs placing providers at financial risk for performance relative to other participants in the program.ObjectiveThe objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of an incentive program conferring limited financial risk to primary care physicians.ParticipantsThere were 334 participating primary care physicians in Rochester, New York.DesignThe design of the study is a retrospective cohort study using pre/post analysis.MeasurementsThe measurements adhere to 4 diabetes performance measures between 1999 and 2004.ResultsWhile absolute performance levels increased across all measures immediately following implementation, there was no difference between the post- and pre-intervention trends indicating that the overall increase in performance was largely a result of secular trends. However, there was evidence of a modest 1-time improvement in physician adherence for eye examination that appeared attributable to the incentive program. For this measure, physicians improved their adherence rate on average by 7 percentage points in the year after implementation of the program.ConclusionsThis study demonstrates a modest effect in improving provider adherence to quality standards for a single measure of diabetes care during the early phase of a pay-for-performance program that placed physicians under limited financial risk. Further research is needed to determine the most effective incentive structures for achieving substantial gains in quality of care.

Conceptual issues in the design and implementation of pay-for-quality programs.

This article identifies and discusses key conceptual issues in designing and implementing pay-for-quality programs. Such programs offer financial incentives to providers for achieving predefined quality targets. The purpose of the article is to provide health care professionals with a framework for designing, implementing, and evaluating pay-for-quality programs. Examples are drawn from the Rewarding Results demonstration project for which the authors serve as the national evaluation team.

Incentive Implementation in Physician Practices: A Qualitative Study of Practice Executive Perspectives on Pay for Performance:

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs offer health care providers financial incentives to achieve predefined quality targets. Practice executives sit at a key nexus point for determining how P4P programs are implemented in physician practices. Using a qualitative interview design, this article examines the role practice executives play in the implementation of P4P programs and how their perspectives and decisions can influence the success of these programs. The authors identified five key findings related to practice executives’ views on P4P: quality incentives are better than utilization incentives, quality incentives are bonus rewards, quality incentives are agents for change, providers do not feel they have control over attaining quality targets, and the ways in which quality is measured are problematic. The authors discuss five different ways in which practice executives distribute rewards to physicians. These findings may help payers more effectively design and implement financial rewards for quality.

Job Satisfaction of Primary Care Team Members and Quality of Care

In recent years, hospitals and payers have increased their efforts to improve the quality of patient care by encouraging provider adherence to evidence-based practices. Although the individual provider is certainly essential in the delivery of appropriate care, a team perspective is important when examining variation in quality. In the present study, the authors modeled the relationship between a measure of aggregate job satisfaction for members of primary care teams and objective measures of quality based on process indicators and intermediate outcomes. Multilevel analyses indicated that aggregate job satisfaction ratings were associated with higher values on both types of quality measures. Team-level job satisfaction ratings are a potentially important marker for the effectiveness of primary care teams in managing patient care.

Physician Attitudes toward Pay-for-Quality Programs: Perspectives from the Front Line

Pay-for-quality (P4Q) initiatives are becoming an increasingly popular mechanism for improving quality performance and reducing health care costs in the United States. Because these programs often target primary care physicians, it is important to understand how these physicians perceive and respond to P4Q to design successful programs going forward. This study reports results of a survey regarding attitudes toward P4Q among physicians participating in such programs in Massachusetts and California. Findings indicate physicians have generally positive attitudes toward the concept of P4Q, but are ambivalent about certain features of these programs as currently designed and implemented.

The Relationship between Organizational Climate and Quality of Chronic Disease Management

OBJECTIVE To test the utility of a two-dimensional model of organizational climate for explaining variation in diabetes care between primary care clinics. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING Secondary data were obtained from 223 primary care clinics in the Department of Veterans Affairs health care system. STUDY DESIGN Organizational climate was defined using the dimensions of task and relational climate. The association between primary care organizational climate and diabetes processes and intermediate outcomes were estimated for 4,539 patients in a cross-sectional study. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS All data were collected from administrative datasets. The climate data were drawn from the 2007 VA All Employee Survey, and the outcomes data were collected as part of the VA External Peer Review Program. Climate data were aggregated to the facility level of analysis and merged with patient-level data. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS Relational climate was related to an increased likelihood of diabetes care process adherence, with significant but small effects for adherence to intermediate outcomes. Task climate was generally not shown to be related to adherence. CONCLUSIONS The role of relational climate in predicting the quality of chronic care was supported. Future research should examine the mediators and moderators of relational climate and further investigate task climate.

The early experience of a hospital-based pay-for-performance program

This study evaluated the effect of a health-plan-sponsored, hospital-based financial incentive program, focused on heart-failure quality indicators, to improve quality. We conducted separate, hour-long, semistructured group interviews with senior managers and cardiologists at ten hospitals involved in the Participating Hospital Agreement (PHA) program implemented by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). Under PHA, hospitals are eligible for an annual incentive payment of up to 4 percent of BCBSMs diagnosis-related-group-based inpatient claims, depending on their performance in patient safety, community outreach, and selected quality indicators. Interviews focused on knowledge, perceptions, and impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) strategies. We compared BCBSM-provided data on heart-failure quality indicators between 2002 and 2004 with our qualitative findings. Our analyses suggest that pursuit of incentive-based quality targets may be largely dependent on the context of a particular hospital. In settings where performance did not change, incentives did not appear to drive organizational or individual practice changes. Underperforming hospitals with some of the infrastructure necessary for quality improvement had the greatest success when presented with incentives. We concluded that one formula for a successful P4P program is to direct incentive payment to an organized entity capable of supporting process improvement by applying resources and organizational expertise. In this model, the incentive program supports the organization, and the organization in turn may apply resources to facilitate improvement in clinician performance. Consideration of the requirements of organizations to facilitate improvement in relation to existing quality improvement infrastructure may lead to the future success of hospital-based P4P programs.

VA’s Expansion of Supportive Housing: Successes and Challenges on the Path Toward Housing First

OBJECTIVES The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is transitioning to a Housing First approach to placement of veterans in permanent supportive housing through the use of rental vouchers, an ambitious organizational transformation. This qualitative study examined the experiences of eight VA facilities undertaking this endeavor in 2012. METHODS A multidisciplinary team interviewed facility leadership, midlevel managers, and frontline staff (N=95 individuals) at eight VA facilities representing four U.S. regions. The team used a semistructured interview protocol and the constant comparative method to explore how individuals throughout the organizations experienced and responded to the challenges of transitioning to a Housing First approach. RESULTS Frontline staff faced challenges in rapidly housing homeless veterans because of difficult rental markets, the need to coordinate with local public housing authorities, and a lack of available funds for move-in costs. Staff sought to balance their time spent on housing activities with intensive case management of highly vulnerable veterans. Finding low-demand sheltering options (that is, no expectations regarding sobriety or treatment participation, as in the Housing First model) for veterans waiting for housing presented a significant challenge to implementation of Housing First. Facility leadership supported Housing First implementation through resource allocation, performance monitoring, and reliance on midlevel managers to understand and meet the challenges of implementation. CONCLUSIONS The findings highlight the considerable practical challenges and innovative solutions arising from a large-scale effort to implement Housing First, with particular attention to the experiences of individuals at all levels within an organization.

Accounting for Variation in Technical Quality and Patient Satisfaction The Contribution of Patient, Provider, Team, and Medical Center

Background:The delivery of healthcare depends on individual providers, coordination within teams, and the structure of the work setting. We analyzed the amount of variation in technical quality and patient satisfaction accounted for at the patient, provider, team, and medical center level. Methods:Data abstracted from Veterans Health Administration patient medical records for 2007 were used to calculate measures of technical quality based on adherence to best practice guidelines in 5 domains. Outpatient satisfaction was obtained from a 2007 standardized national mail survey. Hierarchical linear models that accounted for the clustering of patients within providers, providers within teams, and teams within medical centers were used to partition the variation in technical quality and satisfaction across patients and components of the system (ie, providers, teams, and medical centers). Results:Providers accounted for the largest percent of system-level variance for all technical quality domains, ranging from 46.5% to 71.9%. For the single-item measure of patient satisfaction, medical centers, teams, and providers accounted for about the same percent of system-level variance (31%–34%). For the doctor/patient interaction scale providers explained 59.9% of system-level variance, more than double that of teams and medical centers. For all the measures, the residual variance (composed of patient-level and random error) explained the largest proportion of the total variance. Conclusions:Providers explained the greatest amount of system-level variation in technical quality and patient satisfaction. However, in both of these domains, differences between patients were the predominant source of nonrandom variance.

Pay-for-performance in safety net settings: issues, opportunities, and challenges for the future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A major trend among Medicaid programs is the adoption of pay‐for‐performance (P4P) programs, but little evidence exists about the impact of these programs on quality improvement. Our in‐depth case investigation of P4P in two safety net settings suggests that such programs may have minimal short‐term effect on quality improvement. Two potentially important barriers for P4P in safety net settings are limited motivational effects from financial incentives and complex patient care requirements. We did not uncover any opposition against P4P among providers, nor did we find any evidence that P4P programs may compromise quality of care through unintended consequences. Overall, study results point to opportunities to improve the design and implementation of P4P programs in safety net settings.