Bethany L. Leonhardt

Social cognition and metacognition in schizophrenia: evidence of their independence and linkage with outcomes

Lysaker PH, Gumley A, Luedtke B, Buck KD, Ringer JM, Olesek K, Kukla M, Leonhardt BL, Popolo R, Dimaggio G. Social cognition and metacognition in schizophrenia: evidence of their independence and linkage with outcomes.

Metacognition and social cognition in schizophrenia: stability and relationship to concurrent and prospective symptom assessments.

OBJECTIVE Schizophrenia has been linked with deficits in the ability to form complex representations about oneself and others. Less clear is whether these deficits are stable over time, and whether they are related to symptoms. METHOD We assessed metacognition capacity, affect recognition, executive function, and symptoms at baseline and 6 months later for 49 adults with schizophrenia. RESULTS Paired t tests revealed assessments of metacognition and affect recognition were stable across measurements points. Metacognition was related to concurrent assessments of positive, negative and disorganized symptoms. Multiple regressions revealed metacognition was related to prospective assessments of negative symptoms after controlling for baseline negative symptoms and executive function. CONCLUSIONS Metacognitive deficits are a stable feature of schizophrenia related with negative symptoms.

Metacognition, social cognition, and symptoms in patients with first episode and prolonged psychoses.

While it has been documented that persons with prolonged schizophrenia have deficits in metacognition and social cognition, it is less clear whether these difficulties are already present during a first episode. To explore this issue we assessed and compared metacognition using the Metacognition Assessment Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A) and social cognition using the Eyes, Hinting and Bell-Lysaker Emotional Recognition Tests (BLERT) in participants with first episode psychosis (FEP; n=26), participants with a prolonged psychosis (n=72), and a psychiatric control group consisting of persons with a substance use disorder and no history of psychosis (n=14). Analyses revealed that both psychosis cohorts scored lower than controls on the MAS-A total and all subscales except metacognitive mastery. Compared to the FEP group, the persons with prolonged psychosis demonstrated greater metacognitive capacities only in those MAS-A domains reflective of the ability to understand the mental state of others and to see that others may have motivations and desires separate from their own. Other domains of metacognition did not differ between psychosis groups. The Eyes, Hinting and BLERT scores of the two psychosis groups did not differ but were poorer than those produced by the control group. Exploratory correlations in the FEP group showed a pattern similar to that previously observed in prolonged psychosis. Taken together, these findings suggest that while certain domains of metacognition could improve with prolonged psychosis, difficulties with global metacognition and social cognition may be stable features of the disorder and perhaps unique to psychosis.

Metacognitive reflective and insight therapy for people in early phase of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

Schizophrenia often involves a loss of metacognitive capacity, the ability to form complex and integrated representations of self and others. Independent of symptoms and neurocognition, deficits in synthetic metacognition are related to difficulties of engaging in goal-directed activities in social and vocational settings. Within this backdrop, we provide a case report of the effects of Metacognitive Reflective Insight Therapy (MERIT) that assisted a patient suffering from first episode schizophrenia during 2 years of individual psychotherapy. A total of 8 elements of MERIT that stimulate and promote metacognitive capacity are presented. As illustrated in this report, these procedures helped the patient move from a state in which he had virtually no complex ideas about himself or others to one in which he had developed integrated and realistic ideas about his own identity and the identity of others. He then could use these representations to understand and effectively respond to life challenges.

Stereotype endorsement, metacognitive capacity, and self-esteem as predictors of stigma resistance in persons with schizophrenia.

OBJECTIVE While research continues to document the impact of internalized stigma among persons with schizophrenia, little is known about the factors which promote stigma resistance or the ability to recognize and reject stigma. This study aimed to replicate previous findings linking stigma resistance with lesser levels of depression and higher levels of self-esteem while also examining the extent to which other factors, including metacognitive capacity and positive and negative symptoms, are linked to the ability to resist stigma. METHOD Participants were 62 adults with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders who completed self-reports of stigma resistance, internalized stigma, self-esteem, and rater assessments of positive, negative, disorganization, and emotional discomfort symptoms, and metacognitive capacity. RESULTS Stigma resistance was significantly correlated with lower levels of acceptance of stereotypes of mental illness, negative symptoms, and higher levels of metacognitive capacity, and self-esteem. A stepwise multiple regression revealed that acceptance of stereotypes of mental illness, metacognitive capacity, and self-esteem all uniquely contributed to greater levels of stigma resistance, accounting for 39% of the variance. CONCLUSION Stigma resistance is related to, but not synonymous with, internalized stigma. Greater metacognitive capacity, better self-esteem, and fewer negative symptoms may be factors which facilitate stigma resistance.

Deficits in metacognitive capacity distinguish patients with schizophrenia from those with prolonged medical adversity

Research has suggested that many with schizophrenia experience decrements in synthetic metacognition, or the abilities to form integrated representations of oneself and others and then utilize that knowledge to respond to problems. Although such deficits have been linked with functional impairments even after controlling for symptoms and neurocognition, it is unclear to what extent these deficits can distinguish persons with schizophrenia from others experiencing significant life adversity but without psychosis. To explore this issue we conducted logistic regression analysis to determine whether assessment of metacognition could distinguish between 166 participants with schizophrenia and 51 adults with HIV after controlling for social cognition and education. Metacognition was assessed with the Metacognitive Assessment Scale Abbreviated (MAS-A), and social cognition with the Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition Test. We observed that the MAS-A total score was able to correctly classify 93.4% of the schizophrenia group, with higher levels of metacognition resulting in increased likelihood of accurate categorization. Additional exploratory analyses showed specific domains of metacognition measured by the MAS-A were equally able to predict membership in the schizophrenia group. Results support the assertion that deficits in the abilities to synthesize thoughts about oneself and others into larger representations are a unique feature of schizophrenia.

Metacognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia: Presence and Associations With Psychosocial Outcomes.

Abstract Early formulations of schizophrenia suggested that the disorder involves a loss of ability to form integrated ideas about oneself, others, and the world, resulting in reductions in complex goal-directed behaviors. Exploring this position, the current review describes evidence that persons with schizophrenia experience decrements in their ability to form complex ideas about themselves and to ultimately use that knowledge to respond to psychological and social challenges. Studies are detailed that find greater levels of these impairments, defined as metacognitive deficits, in persons with schizophrenia in both early and later phases of illness as compared with other clinical and community groups. Furthermore, studies linking metacognitive deficits with poorer psychosocial functioning and other variables closely linked to outcomes are summarized. Clinical implications are also discussed.

Metacognitive mastery moderates the relationship of alexithymia with cluster C personality disorder traits in adults with substance use disorders

Cluster C personality disorder traits have been observed in substance use disorders and linked with poorer outcome. One potential factor which may cause these disturbances in personality function is alexithymia, or the inability to name and express emotion. There may be other proximate factors which moderate the impact of alexithymia on the expression of cluster C traits, such as metacognitive mastery, which is the ability to use knowledge about mental states of self and others to cope with distress and solve social problems. To examine the possibility that mastery mediated the effects of alexithymia on cluster C traits, we assessed each of these constructs using the Metacognitive Assessment Scale Abbreviated, Toronto Alexithymia Scale and SCID II among 58 adults in an early phase of recovery from substance misuse disorders in a residential setting. Results of a multiple regression revealed that, after controlling for symptom severity and severity of substance misuse history, metacognitive mastery moderated the effect of alexithymia on number of cluster C traits. A median split and subsequent ANCOVA revealed that participants with higher levels of alexithymia and poorer metacognitive mastery had more cluster C traits than the other groups. These findings may have clinical implications, suggesting that patients with substance use disorders may benefit from treatment which addresses metacognitive mastery.

Capacities for theory of mind, metacognition, and neurocognitive function are independently related to emotional recognition in schizophrenia.

While many with schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience difficulties understanding the feelings of others, little is known about the psychological antecedents of these deficits. To explore these issues we examined whether deficits in mental state decoding, mental state reasoning and metacognitive capacity predict performance on an emotion recognition task. Participants were 115 adults with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder and 58 adults with substance use disorders but no history of a diagnosis of psychosis who completed the Eyes and Hinting Test. Metacognitive capacity was assessed using the Metacognitive Assessment Scale Abbreviated and emotion recognition was assessed using the Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition Test. Results revealed that the schizophrenia patients performed more poorly than controls on tests of emotion recognition, mental state decoding, mental state reasoning and metacognition. Lesser capacities for mental state decoding, mental state reasoning and metacognition were all uniquely related emotion recognition within the schizophrenia group even after controlling for neurocognition and symptoms in a stepwise multiple regression. Results suggest that deficits in emotion recognition in schizophrenia may partly result from a combination of impairments in the ability to judge the cognitive and affective states of others and difficulties forming complex representations of self and others.

Deficits in Metacognitive Capacity Are Related to Subjective Distress and Heightened Levels of Hyperarousal Symptoms in Adults With Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Among persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the severity of symptoms and concurrent distress are not fully explained by trauma severity. Interest has consequently arisen in the psychological processes that cause distress and heighten PTSD symptoms. This study accordingly sought to examine whether differences in metacognitive capacity are related to levels of emotional distress, avoidance/numbing, and hyperarousal. Participants were 48 adults with a confirmed diagnosis of PTSD. Comparison groups included 51 adults with HIV and 183 with schizophrenia. Metacognition, emotion recognition, depression, and emotional distress and levels of avoidance/numbing and hyperarousal were assessed concurrently using the Metacognition Assessment Scale–Abbreviated, the Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition Test, the Beck Depression Inventory, and the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale. Results revealed that the PTSD group had better ratings of overall metacognitive capacity than the schizophrenia group and specifically poorer levels of metacognitive mastery, or the ability to use metacognitive knowledge to respond to challenges, than the HIV group. Within the PTSD group, poorer metacognitive mastery was linked with greater distress and higher hyperarousal when depression was controlled for statistically. Emotion recognition was not linked with distress or symptom severity. Results are consistent with models in which symptom severity in PTSD is related to the extent to which persons can use knowledge of themselves and others to find ways to respond to distress that match their own unique needs.