Beverly Hirtle

Macroprudential Supervision of Financial Institutions: Lessons from the SCAP

A fundamental conclusion drawn from the recent financial crisis is that the supervision and regulation of financial firms in isolation - a purely microprudential perspective - are not sufficient to maintain financial stability. Rather, a macroprudential perspective, which evaluates and responds to the financial system as a whole, seems necessary, and the ongoing discussions of regulatory reform in the United States underscore this view. The recently concluded Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), better known as the bank “stress test,” is one example of how the macro- and microprudential perspectives can be joined to create a stronger supervisory framework that addresses a wider range of supervisory objectives. This paper reviews the key features of the SCAP and discusses how they can be leveraged to improve bank supervision in the future.

Stock repurchases and bank holding company performance

Using data from regulatory reports, we examine the relationship between stock repurchases and financial performance for a large sample of bank holding companies. The sample includes both publicly-traded and non-publicly traded banking companies. The primary result is that higher levels of repurchases in one year are associated with higher profitability and a lower share of problem loans in the subsequent year. Our results appear to be driven primarily by bank holding companies with publicly-traded stock, especially those companies whose stock is traded on major exchanges. In assessing the source of the repurchase-performance link, we find evidence suggesting that it may be driven by different factors for different types of bank holding companies. In particular, the evidence is consistent with free-cash-flow considerations for banks traded on major stock exchanges, but only weakly supports this explanation for smaller, closely-held companies.

Assessing Financial Stability: The Capital and Loss Assessment under Stress Scenarios (CLASS) Model

The CLASS model is a top-down capital stress testing framework that uses public data, simple econometric models, and auxiliary assumptions to project the effect of macroeconomic scenarios on U.S. banking firms. Through the lens of the model, we find that the total banking system capital shortfall under stressful macroeconomic conditions began to rise four years before the financial crisis, peaking in the fourth quarter of 2008. The capital gap has since fallen sharply, and is now significantly below pre-crisis levels. In the cross section, banking firms estimated to be most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions also have higher capital ratios, consistent with a “precautionary” view of bank capital, though this behavior is evident only since the crisis. We interpret our results as evidence that the resiliency of the U.S. banking system has improved since the financial crisis, and also as an illustration of the value of stress testing as a macroprudential policy tool.

Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases during the Financial Crisis

Many large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) continued to pay dividends during the 2007-09 financial crisis, even as financial market conditions deteriorated, large losses accumulated, and emergency capital and liquidity were being provided by the official sector. In contrast, share repurchases by these BHCs dropped sharply in the early part of the crisis. Documenting this divergent behavior is one of the key contributions of this paper. The paper also examines the role that repurchases played in large BHCs’ decisions to reduce or eliminate dividends. The key findings are that smaller BHCs in the sample with higher levels of repurchases before the financial crisis reduced dividends later and by less than BHCs with lower pre‐crisis repurchases, suggesting that repurchases may have served as a cushion against cutting dividends. In contrast, there is only a weak relationship between pre‐crisis repurchases and the timing and extent of dividend reductions for the larger BHCs, even though these BHCs were more likely overall to reduce or eliminate dividends during the crisis.