Beverly R. Walther

Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd “preannounce” quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the markets reaction to that information.

The effect of experience on security analyst underreaction

We examine if analysts more fully incorporate prior earnings and returns information in their current quarter forecasts as their experience following a firm increases. We measure analyst firm-specific forecasting experience as the number of prior quarters for which the analyst has issued an earnings forecast for the firm. We find that analysts underreact to prior earnings information less as their experience increases, suggesting one reason why analysts become more accurate with experience.

The role of volatility in forecasting

Theories of underinvestment propose a link between cash flow volatility and investment and subsequent cash flow and earnings levels. Consistent with these theories, our results indicate that forecasting models that include volatility as an explanatory variable have greater accuracy and lower bias than forecasting models that exclude volatility. The improvement in forecast accuracy and bias is greatest when the firm is most likely to experience underinvestment. The profitable implementation of a trading strategy based on these findings, however, suggests that equity market participants do not incorporate fully the information in historical volatility when forecasting future firm performance.

Earnings Surprises and the Cost of Equity Capital

Controlling for other determinants of the cost of capital, we find that firms with repeated large earnings surprises experience a higher cost of equity capital. This finding holds regardless of the sign of the earnings surprises, but firms that consistently report negative surprises have relatively higher cost of equity capital. Although firms that frequently surprise the market experience a decrease in analyst following relative to no surprise firms, this reduction in monitoring cannot account for the higher cost of equity capital. Overall, these findings document that repeated earnings surprises are costly, and provide evidence that managers have incentives to avoid missing earnings targets.