Birgit Elsner

Linking Actions and Their Perceivable Consequences in the Human Brain

Voluntary action is goal-directed and therefore depends on the ability to learn associations between movements and their perceivable consequences. The neural substrate of this ability was investigated with H2(15O) positron emission tomography (PET). Healthy adults first learned that self-initiated keypresses were consistently followed by certain tones (i.e., action effects). During PET imaging, participants listened to varied ratios of action-effect tones and neutral tones without performing any movement. The caudal supplementary motor area and the right hippocampus increased their activity with the frequency of action-effect tones, suggesting that both cortical areas play a role in linking the consequences of an action and the action itself. This integration process represents a highly flexible mechanism that helps to promote the learning, automatization, and control of voluntary

Busy Doing Nothing: Evidence for Nonaction-Effect Binding

Research on voluntary action has focused on the question of how we represent our behavior on a motor and cognitive level. However, the question of how we represent voluntary not acting has been completely neglected. The aim of the present study was to investigate the cognitive and motor representation of intentionally not acting. By using an action-effect binding approach, we demonstrate similarities of action and nonaction. In particular, our results reveal that voluntary nonactions can be bound to an effect tone. This finding suggests that effect binding is not restricted to an association between a motor representation and a successive effect (action-effect binding) but can also occur for an intended nonaction and its effect (nonaction-effect binding). Moreover, we demonstrate that nonactions have to be initiated voluntarily in order to elicit nonaction-effect binding.

Goal Salience Affects Infants’ Goal-Directed Gaze Shifts

Around their first year of life, infants are able to anticipate the goal of others’ ongoing actions. For instance, 12-month-olds anticipate the goal of everyday feeding actions and manual actions such as reaching and grasping. However, little is known whether the salience of the goal influences infants’ online assessment of others’ actions. The aim of the current eye-tracking study was to elucidate infants’ ability to anticipate reaching actions depending on the visual salience of the goal object. In Experiment 1, 12-month-old infants’ goal-directed gaze shifts were recorded as they observed a hand reaching for and grasping either a large (high-salience condition) or a small (low-salience condition) goal object. Infants exhibited predictive gaze shifts significantly earlier when the observed hand reached for the large goal object compared to when it reached for the small goal object. In addition, findings revealed rapid learning over the course of trials in the high-salience condition and no learning in the low-salience condition. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the results could not be simply attributed to the different grip aperture of the hand used when reaching for small and large objects. Together, our data indicate that by the end of their first year of life, infants rely on information about the goal salience to make inferences about the action goal.

The reciprocal relationship between executive function and theory of mind in middle childhood: a 1-year longitudinal perspective

There is robust evidence showing a link between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in 3- to 5-year-olds. However, it is unclear whether this relationship extends to middle childhood. In addition, there has been much discussion about the nature of this relationship. Whereas some authors claim that ToM is needed for EF, others argue that ToM requires EF. To date, however, studies examining the longitudinal relationship between distinct subcomponents of EF [i.e., attention shifting, working memory (WM) updating, inhibition] and ToM in middle childhood are rare. The present study examined (1) the relationship between three EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM updating, inhibition) and ToM in middle childhood, and (2) the longitudinal reciprocal relationships between the EF subcomponents and ToM across a 1-year period. EF and ToM measures were assessed experimentally in a sample of 1,657 children (aged 6–11 years) at time point one (t1) and 1 year later at time point two (t2). Results showed that the concurrent relationships between all three EF subcomponents and ToM pertained in middle childhood at t1 and t2, respectively, even when age, gender, and fluid intelligence were partialled out. Moreover, cross-lagged structural equation modeling (again, controlling for age, gender, and fluid intelligence, as well as for the earlier levels of the target variables), revealed partial support for the view that early ToM predicts later EF, but stronger evidence for the assumption that early EF predicts later ToM. The latter was found for attention shifting and WM updating, but not for inhibition. This reveals the importance of studying the exact interplay of ToM and EF across childhood development, especially with regard to different EF subcomponents. Most likely, understanding others’ mental states at different levels of perspective-taking requires specific EF subcomponents, suggesting developmental change in the relations between EF and ToM across childhood.

The influence of hot and cool executive function on the development of eating styles related to overweight in children.

Studies linking executive function (EF) and overweight suggest that a broad range of executive functions might influence weight via obesity-related behaviors, such as particular eating styles. Currently, however, longitudinal studies investigating this assumption in children are rare. We hypothesized that lower hot and cool EF predicts a stronger increase in eating styles related to greater weight gain (food approach) and a weaker increase in eating styles related to less weight gain (food avoidance) over a 1-year period. Hot (delay of gratification, affective decision-making) and cool (attention shifting, inhibition, working memory updating) EF was assessed experimentally in a sample of 1657 elementary-school children (German school classes 1-3) at two time points, approximately one year apart. The childrens food-approach and food-avoidance behavior was rated mainly via parent questionnaires at both time points. As expected, lower levels of hot and cool EF predicted a stronger increase in several food-approach eating styles across a 1-year period, mainly in girls. Unexpectedly, poorer performance on the affective decision-making task also predicted an increase in certain food-avoidance styles, namely, slowness in eating and satiety responsiveness, in girls. Results implicate that lower EF is not only seen in eating-disordered or obese individuals but also acts as a risk factor for an increase in particular eating styles that play a role in the development of weight problems in children.

Executive function and food approach behavior in middle childhood

Executive function (EF) has long been considered to be a unitary, domain-general cognitive ability. However, recent research suggests differentiating “hot” affective and “cool” cognitive aspects of EF. Yet, findings regarding this two-factor construct are still inconsistent. In particular, the development of this factor structure remains unclear and data on school-aged children is lacking. Furthermore, studies linking EF and overweight or obesity suggest that EF contributes to the regulation of eating behavior. So far, however, the links between EF and eating behavior have rarely been investigated in children and non-clinical populations. First, we examined whether EF can be divided into hot and cool factors or whether they actually correspond to a unitary construct in middle childhood. Second, we examined how hot and cool EF are associated with different eating styles that put children at risk of becoming overweight during development. Hot and cool EF were assessed experimentally in a non-clinical population of 1657 elementary-school children (aged 6–11 years). The “food approach” behavior was rated mainly via parent questionnaires. Findings indicate that hot EF is distinguishable from cool EF. However, only cool EF seems to represent a coherent functional entity, whereas hot EF does not seem to be a homogenous construct. This was true for a younger and an older subgroup of children. Furthermore, different EF components were correlated with eating styles, such as responsiveness to food, desire to drink, and restrained eating in girls but not in boys. This shows that lower levels of EF are not only seen in clinical populations of obese patients but are already associated with food approach styles in a normal population of elementary school-aged girls. Although the direction of effect still has to be clarified, results point to the possibility that EF constitutes a risk factor for eating styles contributing to the development of overweight in the long-term.

Grounding the self in action

Consciousness and cognition are phenomena that seem to be inextricably bound to an individual first-person perspective: at least in standard situations, there is not only conscious experience, but also an experiencing self. And there is not only thought as such, but a thinking self as well. Why is there not only the flow of experience, but also someone—someone who has these experiences? And why do most thoughts not just occur in a free-floating way, like clouds in the sky, but seem to originate from—and within—a thinking self, a self somehow mentally portrayed as an independent cause in itself, a cognitive agent? Presently, in a number of different disciplines, two general answers seem to slowly emerge. First, the subject of consciousness and the subject of thought are frequently present in the unfolding process of phenomenal experience and cognition. They are present in the form and content of a self-representation, i.e., a representation of the experiencing, thinking system as a whole, which can be more or less explicit, more or less accessible to introspection, and more or less conscious. This self-representation is central to any understanding of the deep structure of mind. Second, the theoretically most relevant aspect of phenomenal and cognitive self-representation is likely to be found in the aspect of agency. It has to do with action control. The experience of agency is of maximal importance in constituting a first-person perspective as well as in the development of empathy and social cognition. This is so, because selfhood is not only characterized by phenomenal and representational properties, but also by highly specific functional properties—properties that somehow turn biological organisms into agents, sometimes even into persons. In order to fully understand these functional properties we need to know more about how they are implemented: neurobiologically, behaviorally, and socially. And we need a truly

Executive function and weight status in children: A one-year longitudinal perspective

There is considerable evidence for an association between obesity and impaired executive function (EF) in adolescents and adults. However, little research has examined EF in overweight or obese children. Furthermore, data on EF in underweight individuals is lacking. In addition, there is no consensus on the directionality of the relationship between Body Mass Index (BMI) and EF, and longitudinal studies are rare. Thus, the present study examined whether children differ in their performance on a battery of EF tasks depending on their weight status (underweight, normal-weight, overweight), and investigated the longitudinal cross-lagged associations between EF and BMI. Hot EF (delay of gratification, affective decision-making), cool EF (attention shifting, inhibition, working memory [WM] updating), and BMI were assessed in 1,657 German elementary-school children at two time points, approximately one year apart. Overweight children exhibited slightly poorer attention shifting, WM updating, and affective decision-making abilities as compared to normal-weight children. Unexpectedly, they did not show any deficits in inhibition or delay of gratification. EF levels of underweight children did not differ significantly from those of normal-weight children. Furthermore, poor attention shifting and enhanced affective decision-making predicted a slightly higher BMI one year later, and a higher BMI also predicted poorer attention shifting and WM updating one year later. The latter association between BMI and subsequent EF scores, however, diminished when controlling for socioeconomic status. Results indicate that hot and cool EF plays a role in the weight development of children, and might be a promising factor to address in preventive interventions.

Event-related potentials for 7-month-olds' processing of animals and furniture items.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) to single visual stimuli were recorded in 7-month-old infants. In a three-stimulus oddball paradigm, infants watched one frequently occurring standard stimulus (either an animal or a furniture item) and two infrequently occurring oddball stimuli, presenting one exemplar from the same and one from the different superordinate category as compared to the standard stimulus. Additionally, visual attributes of the stimuli were controlled to investigate whether infants focus on category membership or on perceptual similarity when processing the stimuli. Infant ERPs indicated encoding of the standard stimulus and discriminating it from the two oddball stimuli by larger Nc peak amplitude and late-slow-wave activity for the infrequent stimuli. Moreover, larger Nc latency and positive-slow-wave activity indicated increased processing for the different-category as compared to the same-category oddball. Thus, 7-month-olds seem to encode single stimuli not only by surface perceptual features, but they also regard information of category membership, leading to facilitated processing of the oddball that belongs to the same domain as the standard stimulus.

Good is up—spatial metaphors in action observation

Positive objects or actions are associated with physical highness, whereas negative objects or actions are related to physical lowness. Previous research suggests that metaphorical connection (“good is up” or “bad is down”) between spatial experience and evaluation of objects is grounded in actual experience with the body. Prior studies investigated effects of spatial metaphors with respect to verticality of either static objects or self-performed actions. By presenting videos of object placements, the current three experiments combined vertically-located stimuli with observation of vertically-directed actions. As expected, participants’ ratings of emotionally-neutral objects were systematically influenced by the observed vertical positioning, that is, ratings were more positive for objects that were observed being placed up as compared to down. Moreover, effects were slightly more pronounced for “bad is down,” because only the observed downward, but not the upward, action led to different ratings as compared to a medium-positioned action. Last, some ratings were even affected by observing only the upward/downward action, without seeing the final vertical placement of the object. Thus, both, a combination of observing a vertically-directed action and seeing a vertically-located object, and observing a vertically-directed action alone, affected participants’ evaluation of emotional valence of the involved object. The present findings expand the relevance of spatial metaphors to action observation, thereby giving new impetus to embodied-cognition research.