Blessing Chiripanhura

The African Political Business Cycle: Varieties of Experience

Abstract We seek to understand both the incidence and the impact of the African political business cycle in the light of a literature which has argued that, with major extensions of democracy since the 1990s, the cycle has both become more intense and has made African political systems more fragile. With the help of country case studies, we argue, first, that the African political business cycle is not homogeneous, and occurs relatively infrequently in so-called ‘dominant-party systems’ where a pre-election stimulus confers little political advantage. Secondly, we show that, in those countries where a political cycle does occur, it does not necessarily cause institutional damage. Whether it does or not depends not so much on whether there is an electoral cycle as on whether this cycle calms or exacerbates fears of an unjust allocation of resources. In other words, the composition of the pre-election stimulus, in terms of its allocation between different categories of voter, is as important as its size.

Aid, Political Business Cycles and Growth in Africa

This paper develops a model of opportunistic behaviour in which an incumbent government resort to expansionary fiscal and/or monetary stimuli to foster economic growth and thus, maximize the probability of re-election. Using a panel dataset of 51 African countries covering the period 1980 to 2012, we test first, whether aid and institutional quality factors have an effect on growth. We find evidence to support the most recent studies showing that aid has a positive impact on growth. We however, do not find evidence to support the proposition that institutional quality is a sine qua non conditional for aid to achieve impact on growth. Second, we test whether donor aid facilitates political business cycles, and investigates their effect on growth. We find evidence that donors, through guaranteeing support to incumbent governments, unwittingly do instigate political business cycles. Forbearance, and sometimes complicity by donors, aid seems to allow incumbent governments to instigate macroeconomic stimuli that ensure electoral victory with no fear of losing aid.

The impacts of the food, fuel and financial crises on households in Nigeria. A retrospective approach for research enquiry

This paper examines the impacts of the financial, food and fuel crises on the livelihoods of low-income households Nigeria. It uses primary household level data from Nigeria to analyse the impacts of induced price variability on household welfare. Our results indicate that aggregate shocks have significant adverse effects on household consumption, human capital, and labour decisions with a degree of impact variability between northern and southern regions of the country. We find that the coping strategies adopted by the poor to deal with the short-term effects of the crises, and which include substitution for lower quality food, increasing the intensity of work, withdrawing children from school – especially girls – and engaging children in child labour, can lock households in a low-income equilibrium or poverty trap. Provided that covariate shocks exacerbate these effects, tackling the effects of covariate risks becomes central for present and future development policy.

The impacts of the food, fuel and financial crises on poor and vulnerable households in Nigeria: A retrospective approach to research inquiry

This article examines the impacts of the financial, food and fuel crises on poor and vulnerable households in two states of Nigeria: Lagos and Kano. It uses retrospective household‐level data to analyze the impacts of induced price variability on household welfare. The results indicate that aggregate shocks have significant adverse effects on household consumption, schooling and child labour decisions, with a degree of impact heterogeneity across regions and rural and urban areas of the country. We find that the coping strategies adopted by the poor to deal with the short‐term effects of the crises can lock households in a low‐income equilibrium or poverty trap. Provided that covariate shocks exacerbate these effects, they become central for policy design.