Bonnie Wilson

Asset returns in an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets

An air bag has an air bag main body and a sheet. The air bag main body is formed into such a sac like shape as having a circumferential wall portion that extends in a sleeve-like form from a peripheral edge of an opening and a bottom wall portion that closes the circumferential wall portion. The sheet is arranged so as to extend from the peripheral edge of the opening to the bottom wall portion via the circumferential wall portion in such a manner that the air bag main body is split into two parts, and the sheet has a communicating hole. The sheet in sewn only to a portion of the peripheral edge of the opening in the circumferential wall portion and to a portion of the bottom wall portion.

Pulmonary diffusion and aerobic capacity: is there a relation? Does obesity matter?

Aim:  We sought to determine whether pulmonary diffusing capacity for nitric oxide (DLNO), carbon monoxide (DLCO) and pulmonary capillary blood volume (Vc) at rest predict peak aerobic capacity (O2peak), and if so, to discern which measure predicts better.

Special-Interest Groups and Volatility

This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.

Sex, girth, waists and hips (what matters for gas exchange in extreme obesity?)

What matters for gas exchange (arterial blood-gas status) in the obese? The empirical literature to date suggests that sex matters, with women exhibiting better gas exchange (higher arterial oxygen pressure and lower alveolar-to-arterial oxygen pressure difference) than men. Our findings suggest that women are not better at gas exchange than men because they are women per se. Rather women exhibit better gas exchange than men because they have smaller waists relative to their hips. The findings also imply that all fat mass is not created equal with respect to gas exchange.

INSTITUTIONS, LOBBYING, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

We investigate whether the impact of institutions depends not just on their current state, but also on how they came to be. In particular, we hypothesize that while economic freedom that emerges spontaneously may be growth promoting, economic freedom that emerges as a result of costly lobbying efforts may be less fruitful. In an extreme case, costly lobbying efforts may even negate the growth-enhancing effect of economic freedom. To the extent that lobbying efforts constitute an opportunity cost of resources diverted away from investment and production, our hypothesis also implies that the opportunity cost of lobbying is greater the more efficient is the institutional environment. Panel data analysis reveals the expected positive relation between economic freedom and growth, and consistent with our hypothesis, the findings indicate that the impact of economic freedom on growth does indeed diminish as lobbying efforts increase. In addition, we find that lobbying is more harmful to growth at greater levels of economic freedom.

Interest Groups and the 'Rise and Decline' of Growth

This paper empirically explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility, with focus on the interplay between groups and democracy and on the impact of groups on policy volatility. We find that countries with more interest groups are characterized by less policy volatility; that the number of interest groups has a direct impact on growth volatility, in addition to an indirect impact through policy volatility; and that interest groups appear to be a channel through which democracy impacts both policy volatility and growth volatility.

Diversification of Risk and Growth

This paper provides evidence that domestic opportunities to share risk have contributed to slower growth. We first provide a simple model economy that demonstrates how a countrys ability to diversify risk is linked to its growth rate. In the context of the model economy, we then investigate empirically whether there is any systematic relationship between domestic opportunities to diversify risk and growth. We employ two econometric procedures: (1) traditional instrumental variables estimation and (2) dynamic panel methods. Interpreted in the context of the model economy, the empirical analysis reveals a robust negative relationship between domestic opportunities to diversify risk and both capital stock and output growth.

Diversification of Risk and Saving

This paper provides evidence that domestic opportunities to share risk have contributed to lower rates of private saving. Two econometric procedures are used in the analysis: (1) traditional instrumental variables estimation and (2) dynamic panel methods. The results reveal a negative relationship between domestic opportunities to diversify risk and aggregate private saving rates in a cross-section of developing and industrial countries.

Fractionalization and Economic Freedom

Diversity is often thought to create conflict and harm economic institutions. We hypothesize, however, that the impact of diversity on economic institutions is conditional on political institutions, and may be negative in some settings but positive in others, due to differences in the nature of rent seeking in different regimes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom, conditional on the level of political rights. We find that the marginal impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom is positive in the most democratic nations and that the marginal impact of ethnic fractionalization is negative in the most autocratic nations. Our results suggest that the nature of the relation between diversity and economic institutions may be more complicated than prior literature conveys.

Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility

Democratic polities appear to produce more stable policy than do autocracies. In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special-interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society.