Bradley A. Thayer

Alliance theory and alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state alliance behaviour

Abstract This study critiques traditional alliance theory because it fails to capture the nuanced alliance motivation and needs of small states. We argue that the concept of alliance “shelter” better explains small state alignment. The theory of alliance shelter has been developed to explain the alliance choices of Western small states, including Iceland, and serves as an important addition to alliance theory. Shelter is the diplomatic, economic, societal, and political alignment response of structurally weak states. Alliance shelter theory differs from traditional alliance theories for the following reasons. First, it regards small states as fundamentally different political, economic, and social units than large states. Second, their alliance shelter relationships are distinctly shaped by domestic as much as international factors. Third, small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation, including institutional membership, compared with large states. Fourth, shelter theory claims that small states/entities need political, economic, and societal shelter (as well as strategic protection) in order to thrive. Fifth, the social and cultural relationships of the small states with the outside world are elements that have been neglected by alliance theory. Sixth, shelter may also come at a significant cost for the small state/entity. We conduct a plausibility probe of our argument against three contemporary non-Western cases: Armenia, Cuba, and Singapore. We find that the concept of alliance shelter explains their alliance behavior better than traditional alliance theory.

The evolution of offensive realism

Abstract. Offensive realism, a theory of international relations, holds that states are disposed to competition and conflict because they are self-interested, power maximizing, and fearful of other states. Moreover, it argues that states are obliged to behave this way because doing so favors survival in the international system. Debate continues as to whether modern states actually do, or should, behave in this way, but we are struck by a different question. In this article, we ask whether the three core assumptions about behavior in offensive realism—self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear—have any basis in scientific knowledge about human behavioral evolution. We find that these precise traits are not only evolutionarily adaptive but also empirically common across the animal kingdom, especially in primate and human societies. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that states behave as offensive realists predict not just because of anarchy in the modern international system but also because of the legacy of our evolution. In short, offensive realism may really be describing the nature of the human species more than the nature of the international system. If our hypothesis is correct, then evolutionary theory offers the following: (1) a novel ultimate cause of offensive realist behavior; (2) an extension of offensive realism to any domain in which humans compete for power; and (3) an explanation for why individual leaders themselves, and not just states, seek power. However, a key insight from evolution is that the primacy of self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear does not necessarily condemn individuals or groups to competition and conflict; rather, these traits can in themselves give rise to cooperation and alliances.

Cultivating Beneficial Norms for Strategic Stability

We outline our non-material solution as part of a tailored approach to address the implications of the uncertainty associated with applying deterrence to cyber warfare. Specifically, we argue that the United States and its allies should seek to cultivate beneficial norms for cyber warfare, including norms that, first, constrain strategic cyber attacks, second, lower evidentiary standards for attributing cyber attacks, and, third, prohibit harboring ‘independent’ cyber attackers. We also review norm evolution theory and suggest specific actions that can be taken to cultivate these various norms that would bolster cyber deterrence.

Continuing Efforts to Improve Cyber Forensics and Bolster Defenses

This chapter recommends continuing efforts to improve cyber forensics and bolster defenses, which collectively contribute to a tailored approach to address the implications of the uncertainty associated with applying deterrence to cyber warfare. The United States and its allies can most directly address the unique uncertainty challenges associated with cyber warfare by improving cyber forensics, learning from the development of forensic capabilities for other types of unconventional instruments of war — nuclear and biological weapons. We also recommend continuing efforts to invest in deterrence by denial through robust cyber defenses, which reduce the benefit of hostile adversary action by mitigating the effectiveness of its cyber attacks.

Cyberspace and Cyber Warfare

This chapter introduces the core concepts of cyberspace and cyber warfare in detail and serves as a primer for later discussions of the application of deterrence theory to cyberspace and potential mitigating solutions. It defines cyberspace, cyberspace operations, Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Attack (CNA). It also introduces a variety of characteristics that are unique or particularly pronounced when it comes to cyber weapons, as well as discussing some recent attacks.

Deterrence Theory and the Challenge of Applying It to Cyber Warfare

This chapter explains the core ideas of deterrence theory, specifically that it is largely associated with nuclear policy. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union adopted a survivable nuclear force to present a ‘credible’ deterrent that maintained the ‘uncertainty’ inherent in strategic stability as understood through the accepted theories of major theorists like Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling. This chapter evaluates the limits and challenges associated with the application of deterrence theory to cyber warfare and argues that while there are major insights from deterrence theory for cyber warfare, there are also major problems introduced by the unique aspect of cyber technology that causes significant problems for deterrence. These are, first, uncertainty associated with awareness and attribution of an attack; and second, the uncertain effects of such an attack.

Developing a Declaratory Policy and Offensive Cyber Weapons

This chapter deals with developing and communicating a clear declaratory policy and credible options for deterrence-in-kind so as to make escalation unavoidable and costly. Specifically, we discuss developing and communicating a clear declaratory policy and credible options for deterrence-in-kind so as to make escalation unavoidable and costly, which will further help enhance the deterrence of major cyber attacks.

The Tribal Imagination: Civilization and the Savage Mind

Over 150 years after Darwin, books that explore the impact of evolution on social topics remain relatively rare. Yet, there are a few scholars upon whom we may depend to demonstrate that what is considered ‘‘social’’ is studied usefully through the perspective of human evolution. In line with what readers of Politics and the Life Sciences have come to expect over the years, anthropologist Robin Fox, University Professor of Social Theory at Rutgers University, has produced another exceptional contribution to consilient knowledge. In a sweeping work, part memoir and part scholarly study, Fox explains why human nature is tribal and how the human tribal brain has produced a ‘‘tribal imagination’’ in humans. This tribal imagination influences and governs human social behavior, including our notion of time, religious belief, human rights, the logic of kin-based societies like Iraq—and why these societies have difficulties building democracy— morality, warfare, the rise of civilization, and major themes in literature, drama, and poetry. For Fox, the tribal imagination, or the evolutionary inheritance that is human nature, is the drumbeat that allows us to understand human behavior over the ages and into the future. This imagination enables us to comprehend our ancestors and heirs. This is a powerful book—reflectively and sharply written. Writing of the importance of kin-based social structures in most societies (e.g., Afghanistan), which are necessarily kin-based because you can only really trust immediate or extended family, Fox observes that: ‘‘We in the West had to turn ‘nepotism’ and ‘corruption’ from tribal virtues into criminal offenses, and we struggle with it. I live in New Jersey, and I stare into the pit’’ (p. 70). Many of the problems and difficulties we encounter in modern life are defined by the tension between our tribal imagination, the human evolutionary legacy, and the demands of civilization. Of course, the impulse to do what has served humans well over evolutionary time may offend the norms and dictates of civilized societies. In essence, Fox’s work is a study of the origins and consequences of this tension. For this review, I will focus on two of his major contributions: his critique of how social scientists consider time by overemphasizing more recent, social and political events; and, his consideration of warfare. Fox’s intellectual foundation is the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), which should be familiar to readers of this journal. From this genesis, he first considers time. He writes: ‘‘Our chronomyopia—our fixation on the present and familiar—leads us to overvalue the period of time we label ‘history’ to the point of relegating more than 99 percent of human existence to ‘prehistory’—a mere run-up to the real thing. It would be more logical to label hominids up to, say, the invention of tools, as ‘past man,’ those from thence until the Neolithic revolution as ‘present man,’’’ and contemporary humans as ‘‘late man’’ (p. 16). The human conception of time overemphasizes the immediate past and future. Recognizing Fox’s broader conception permits us to understand that humans have not had a linear conception of time until only recently. The natural conception of time is cyclical. Weaving together insights from anthropology and political theory, Fox argues that most social scientists are only able to see events that mattered, like the Industrial Revolution, within a relatively recent historical period (p. 31). Fox recognizes that the Industrial Revolution has influenced human behavior. But to focus on it, or the Information Revolution, or any of the major social changes in recent (i.e., recorded) history, is to forget the revolution of human evolution. In a passage that merits quoting at length, Fox artfully captures the importance of human evolution and the perspective on time it provides. If we begin with early hominids two and half million years ago at the beginning of the Paleolithic and consider what has happened since as an hour long film, considering only the film’s last minute, ‘‘roughly 40,000 years ago, doi: 10.2990/31_1-2_101 Book Reviews

Taking the science of leadership (and followership) seriously

Introduction: Periodically, the journal will devote an entire issues book review section to a single work when it addresses important topics with relevance for many subfields in the study of politics. Mark van Vugt and Anjana Ahujas Naturally Selected: The Evolutionary Science of Leadership is such a work. Naturally Selected addresses topics relevant to American politics, political psychology, political theory, comparative politics, and international relations. The following three reviews approach the work from different perspectives and demonstrate the valuable contribution to consilient knowledge made by van Vugt and Ahuja. —Bradley A. Thayer, Book Review Editor

The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution

The problems surrounding nation building are some of the most important and difficult confronting the international community and U.S. foreign policy. Through efforts after World War II, the Cold War, or today, the United States has sought to create democratic societies in countries as diverse as Japan and Iraq. As with all major policy problems, the results have been mixed. There have been great successes. In the post-war period, Germany, Italy, and Japan were transformed into democracies. By the end of the Cold War, Spain, Portugal, South Korea, and Taiwan had stable, democratic leadership. More recently, Bosnia and Kosovo have been added to the list. On the opposite side of the ledger, efforts to create democracy in Haiti, Cuba, and Mexico either failed outright, as in the case of Haiti and Cuba, or were fleckless—despite President Woodrow Wilson’s observation in 1914 that he was going to teach the Mexicans to ‘‘elect good men’’ through military intervention. Later, Wilson’s effort to overthrow the Bolshevik regime and return Russia to a democratic path was a more significant failure. More recently, efforts in South Vietnam and Somalia were disasters. Today Iraq and Afghanistan remain difficult problems for the United States, the international community, and the societies themselves. The reasons for success and failure in the endeavors are complicated and result from multiple and overlapping causes: religion, economics, ethnic, racial, and tribal cleavages, culture, and the absence of a democratic tradition. These standard social scientific explanations are valuable for identifying when democratic nation building will result in the splendid success of a Germany or Japan—or the quagmire of Somalia. Indeed, there is a voluminous literature on the topic, particularly over the last two decades due to nation building efforts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, as well as the cases of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Heretofore, the one perspective that had been notably absent was the biopolitical approach. In The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution, Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson address this important topic from the biopolitical perspective. Their central argument is that the United States should curtail its efforts at democratic nation building because democracies require ‘‘very special’’ (p. 1) conditions in order to succeed. Human history shows that these conditions happen rarely; indeed, democracies are still the minority form of political organization in world politics. Democratic political systems are so infrequent, Somit and Peterson argue, because humans ‘‘are social primates and evolution has endowed the social primates with an innate tendency to dominance and submission behaviors’’ (p. 1). Social primates, they explain, ‘‘have an innate predisposition...for hierarchical social and political structures. That is, social primates almost invariably form groups, troops, tribes, and societies characterized by marked individual difference in terms of status, dominance and submission, command and obedience, and by unequal access to many of the good things of life’’ (p. 3). Somit and Peterson’s perspective allows them to grasp what traditional social science approaches do not recognize: humans evolved in a dominance hierarchy. Accordingly, humans have a proclivity for authoritarian rule, and have a difficult time acquiescing to the requirements of democratic polities. In constructing this argument, they are always careful to note that human behavior is the product of genetic and environmental interactions. It is precisely this sensitivity that allows Somit and Peterson to conclude that spreading democracy successfully is an uphill fight. doi: 10.2990/29_2_102