Breck L. Robinson

What makes community reinvestment act agreements work? A study of lender responses

Abstract One response to the incentives provided by the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) has been for lenders and community groups to enter into CRA agreements, which involve pledges to provide prescribed levels of service to targeted neighborhoods. This article examines whether lenders actually change their behavior after entering into these agreements. Using data on CRA agreements and on mortgage lending, we find that institutions increase their lending activity with each year an agreement is in force and that increased lending persists after an agreement expires. Additional analysis shows that agreements that include provisions for mortgage counseling and technical assistance are associated with increased targeted lending. By contrast, agreements with provisions requiring small business counseling and technical assistance and periodic meetings by review committees are associated with somewhat depressed lending levels. Further research is needed to draw definitive implications from this second set of results.

Disparities in Mortgage Lending, Bank Performance, Economic Influence, and Regulatory Oversight

This study investigates factors affecting changes in the disparity of home mortgage denial rates between white and minority loan applicants in the U.S. during the period 1991–1997. We develop a two-stage least-squares regression model that incorporates applicant-level characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, regional economic data, and bank-specific data as explanatory variables. Some have argued that mortgage lenders were under increasing pressure from industry regulators to extend additional credit to minorities and low-income groups during the period under study. The model includes each institutions periodic CRA rating as a proxy for regulatory influence. An alternative explanation is that market forces, such as improvements in economic conditions and in bank financial condition and performance, affected default loss estimates and credit standards in a way that disproportionally benefited minority and low-income applicants. The empirical findings are consistent with the latter hypothesis. We conclude that policy makers should consider the impact of market factors when assessing the allocation of mortgage credit in a particular demographic market. The findings also underscore the importance of controlling for lender assessments of credit risk when evaluating compliance with CRA and fair lending statutes.

The Role of Non-Owner-Occupied Homes in the Current Housing and Foreclosure Cycle

Non-occupant homeowners differ from owner occupants in that they tend to have lower-risk credit characteristics, such as higher credit scores, but may also have weaker incentives to maintain mortgage payments when housing values fall. During the recent housing boom, the share of mortgage borrowing by non-occupant owners was relatively high in states where home values appreciated relatively rapidly. After the housing boom, foreclosures on non-occupant mortgages in several Midwestern and Northeastern states reflected primarily a high rate of foreclosure per mortgage, not a high volume of mortgages to non-occupants. The reverse held true in some coastal and mountain states. Nevada and Florida have experienced the greatest impact overall, because they have both a high volume of mortgages to non-occupant owners and a high rate of foreclosure on those mortgages.

Is Race an Important Factor in Bank-Customer Preferences? The Case of Mortgage Lending

This paper tests whether there is a preference by borrowers and lenders of a particular ethnic or racial group that may predispose them to borrow and lend from each other. Using a narrow geographic area called zip code clusters, this paper groups minority-owned and non-minority-owned banks to allow for a homogenous applicant pool from which both borrower and lender preferences can be determined. This study compares Asian-owned, black-owned and Hispanic-owned banks versus white-owned banks that are located in the same zip code and adjacent zip codes. The results show that borrowing preferences exist between all applicant groups and banks from the same racial classification. In addition, some cross-racial borrowing preferences exist. The results show that across sample lending preferences exist for both black and white applicants with black-owned banks and white applicants with white-owned banks that are located in the same area as Asian-owned banks. Also, the results of the within sample lending preference model shows that white-owned banks have a preference for white applicants, at the expense of Hispanic applicants and both white-owned and Asian-owned banks exhibit a preference for Asian applicants.

Comparing lending decisions of minority-owned and White-owned banks: Is there discrimination in mortgage lending?

Abstract A recent paper by Black, Collins and Cyree [J. Financ. Serv. Res. 11 (1997) 189.] attempted to determine if Black-owned banks discriminated against Black applicants for mortgage credit. They concluded that Black applicants were more likely to be rejected than White applicants when applying for mortgage credit at a Black-owned bank. However, the use of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as the geographic delineation from which minority-owned and non-minority-owned banks are compared may not provide a narrowly defined market from which an accurate comparison can be made. Here, the zip code cluster technique developed by Clair [Econ. Rev. (1988) 11.] is used to control for differences in applicant base that may result when using a broader geographic definition such as an MSA. The results reported in this study show that contrary to the results of Black, Collins and Cyree, Black-owned banks are not statistically more likely to reject Black applicants. The study also considers Asian-owned and Hispanic-owned banks. The results show that Asian-owned banks are equally as likely to provide a mortgage to Asian applicants, while Hispanic applicants are more likely to receive a mortgage from a Hispanic-owned bank.

Do lenders discriminate against low-income borrowers?

Summary and ConclusionThe purpose of this paper is determine whether the use of a narrow geographic definitions of the market served by banks results in conclusions that are different from those found if a broader geographic definitions is used. Using ZIP code clusters for a sample of low-income applicants, we find results that are different from those when the traditional MSA sampling technique is used.

The impact of the failure of Continental Illinois and the too‐big‐to‐fail doctrine on changes in operating efficiency

Outlines the US development of the “too‐big‐to‐fail” (TBTF) doctrine following the collapse of the Continental Illinois Bank, reviews relevant research and explores the impact on the efficiency of the banking system. Uses 1983‐1985 call report data, explains the methodology and presents the results, which analyse economies and diseconomies of scope and scale between different types of loans; and levels of inefficiency for TBTF and non‐TBTF banks. Shows that TBTF banks had the greatest increase in inefficiency following Continental’s failure but reduced this in the following year, as did small banks which did not benefit from complete depository coverage. Confirms that the TBTF doctrine increased stability for all banks, but particularly those covered by the doctrine.