Brent F. Nelsen

Religion and Youth Support for the European Union

Religion is an important influence on adult attitudes toward European integration, as devout Catholics strongly support integration, while committed Protestants are less enthusiastic. Here we consider whether this relationship holds for reputedly secularized European youth. Using Eurobarometer 47.2OVR, we show that devout Catholic and Orthodox youth do in fact support the European Union, as do committed Protestants, and generically religious youths, but at lower levels. Atheists and agnostics are more critical of the EU. High levels of social capital and pro-immigration sentiments also predict euro-enthusiasm. We conclude by analysing the variation in youth attitudes across Member States.

Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe

Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies on the determinants of support for the European Union among national publics. Scholars have analyzed economic, political, informational, and identity factors as influences, but there has been less exploration of cultural factors, most notably religion. This article replicates our earlier studies exploring the impact of confessional culture and religious commitment on support for the European Union, expanding the purview from early member states to more recent accessions and candidates for membership. Using Eurobarometer 65.2 (Papacostas 2006), we demonstrate that religion still shapes attitudes toward European integration, but in varying ways and to different extents in several parts of the Union. In early member states, Catholics — especially committed ones — are more supportive of the European Union than Protestants, confirming earlier findings. In more recent accessions, however, religions impact is weaker and assumes different configurations. Finally, we present evidence that even in the early member states religion is losing its influence over Europeanist sentiment and suggest that this development presents obstacles to further political integration.

Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags

F rom the very beginning, proponents of European integration knew that ordinary citizens would be crucial to achieving their ultimate objective: a new supranational identity, undergirding a united continental polity. National leaders might develop a deep mutual sense of community through interaction in European institutions and try to foster a “European” identity among their publics, but if citizens did not feel that same sense of community, unity would not be possible. Economic, social, and political integration would proceed just as far as growth of a common identity allowed. Although some theorists argue that the European Union (EU) does not require a demos to achieve democratic legitimacy (Weiler 1995), most scholars and EU political leaders have sought a common bond strong enough to unite peoples divided by language, nationality, class, religion, ethnicity, and other social markers. Indeed, from the very start of the integration project its leaders sought to build a new identity, assuming that eventual union required emergence of what Deutsch et al. (1957) famously called a “we feeling” among national publics. Today, more than ever, the EU must have the support of a “people” to make difficult policy choices, whether on preserving the Eurozone, revising basic economic regulation, addressing the migrant crisis, or dealing with terrorism (Delanty 1995; Schmitter 2000; Siedentop 2001; Schmidt 2006; Maas 2007). Many scholars have addressed the vital question of whether citizens of the EU have been developing such a shared identity. Most find that at least some folks are coming to think of themselves as “Europeans,” not just as British, French, German, or Maltese. For a few citizens that European identity may be “primary,” or even “exclusive,” but for most it is added to a stilldominant national identification. Of course, many others still think of themselves exclusively in national terms (Bruter 2005). Scholars attribute the creation of existing “European” identity variously to factors such as economic prosperity, expanded higher education, greater international mobility, the decline of traditionalism, and the rise of “postmaterial” values such as social tolerance (Keulman and

Preamble to the Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty)

Several factors, including the success of the Single Market program and the collapse of communism, increased momentum for integration as the European Community entered the 1990s. In December 1990, the member states opened negotiations to complete economic and monetary union, reform ec institutions, and expand Community competence in foreign and security policy. Final negotiations took place in December 1991 in Maastricht, The Netherlands, and the Maastricht treaty was signed there on 7 February 1992. Ratification seemed certain until Danish voters rejected the treaty on 2 June 1992 and opened a debate in Europe over the merits of integration. Public dissatisfaction with the complex treaty combined with a currency crisis and a severe economic recession to sap popular and elite enthusiasm for the European project. Nevertheless, all twelve countries finally ratified the treaty, which came into force in late 1993.

Preamble to the Single European Act

Representatives of the twelve members of the European Community signed the Single European Act (sea) in February 1986 and saw it implemented in July 1987. The sea, the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome, brought together in one “single” act a treaty on European cooperation in the area of foreign policy and institutional and procedural reforms (such as the increased use of qualified majority voting) designed to facilitate the completion of the single market. The act, although not universally recognized at the time as significant, marked a milestone in the attempt by Community leaders to bury the legacy of Charles de Gaulle and “relaunch” Europe. The success of the sea in facilitating the single market opened the way for further institutional reforms in the early 1990s.

European Union or Kingdom of the Antichrist? Protestant apocalyptic narratives and European unity

ABSTRACT This article examines Protestant Euroscepticism in its purest form by focusing on the apocalyptic narratives of conservative Protestant dispensationalists in the UK, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. It estimates the numbers of end-times Eurosceptics, summarizes their apocalyptic narrative, traces its lineage to the Reformation, and explores its use in debates on European integration. The article argues that analyzing Protestant apocalyptic narratives contributes to understanding some important roots of present-day Euroscepticism in sixteenth-century anti-Catholicism and Protestant distrust of the ‘Catholic’ continent.

IN DEFENSE OF HOLY UNSAMENESS

Abstract A review of: George Weigel, The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics Without God (Basic Books, 2005). 202 pp.

Preambles to the Treaties of Rome

23.00. Weigels book is structured like a cathedral, with side corridors of thought around a central aisle. The central aisle is that Europe is in the midst of a crisis of civilization due to atheistic humanism. Although Weigel diagnoses part of the disease, Nelsen suggests that there aremultiple causes for Europes current malaise and re-Christianization is not the monolithic solution. One of Gods gifts to humanity is a democracy that can be sustainedapart from Christian faith.

Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union

On 25 March 1957, the six member countries of the European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc) signed treaties establishing the European Economic Community (eec) and the European Atomic Energy Community (erratom). The three treaties together are commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome.