Brent Fisse

Sentencing options against corporations

A l t hough it is c o m m o n l y bel ieved that co rpora te c r ime is c o m m i t t e d no t by co rpora t ions themselves but by the people w h o own, manage , or s taf f co rpora t ions , under m a n y legal sys tems bo th the co rpo ra t i on and the ind iv idua ls associated w i th it can be held accountable for c r imina l conduct . As a pract ical mat ter , however , corpora te c r ime la rge ly goes unpun i shed .

U.S. Policy and Practice in Pursuing Individual Accountability for Cartel Conduct: A Preliminary Critique

The extent of individual accountability for cartel conduct in the United States, as elsewhere, may be more limited than some might have one believe. The chances are that individuals responsible for cartel offenses will not be prosecuted and that corporate fines will not result in internal disciplinary action being taken against them. Yet few would disagree with the principle that all who are responsible for serious cartel conduct should be held accountable. Further empirical investigation is required in order to test fully the extent to which the DOJs approach to anticartel enforcement achieves individual accountability. Such an investigation is warranted with regard to the influence of the U.S. model around the world and the strength of advocacy by the U.S. authorities as to its merits.