Brett W. Curry

Does Descriptive Race Representation Enhance Institutional Legitimacy? The Case of the U.S. Courts

In the past two decades, numerous studies have tested empirically the normative theory of descriptive race representation. Here, we focus specifically on one aspect of descriptive representation—the relationship between increased racial representation and institutional legitimacy. Does greater racial diversity within a political institution increase its reservoir of good will? Using a novel experimental design centered on the federal courts, we find that greater descriptive representation for blacks causes increased legitimacy for the institution among African Americans. However, we also find that white support declines under the same experimental condition. In probing our data further, we discover that increased diversity does not impact blacks and whites in the same manner across the ideological spectrum. Rather, a persons ideology mediates how he or she assesses racial diversity on the bench. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.

Keepers of the Covenant or Platonic Guardians? Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court

How do the justices of the Supreme Court make their decisions? How does the Supreme Court of the United States make its decisions? The answer to these questions may not be the same. In studying judicial decision making, there has been a disconnection between individual and institutional levels of analysis. Lifetime tenure insulates individual justices and permits them to act on their substantive preferences. At the same time, the Court lacks the “sword and purse” and must rely on the other branches to fund or implement its directives. This study develops an integrative model to explain Supreme Court decision making. Using constitutional civil liberties and civil rights cases in the 1953 to 2000 period, conditions favorable to the attitudinal model, we find that institutional decision making is a function of attitudinal, strategic, and legal factors.

The effect of per se recusal rules on donor behavior in judicial elections

Recent judicial decisions and political developments have elevated the issue of impartiality among elected judges as a topic of public and scholarly interest. Using a data set of all donations to candidates for the Supreme Court of Alabama from 1994 through 2010, we explore one potential proposal for limiting the appearance of judicial bias and its effects on the behavior of campaign donors—per se recusal. Our results indicate that the existence of a per se recusal statute significantly decreases the likelihood of observing large donations from several categories of donors. In auxiliary analysis, we find that attorney donors have increasingly funneled contributions through PACs since this statutes enactment—presumably, because such contributions are exempted from the law.

Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006

In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.

Case Citation Patterns in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Legal Academy

ABSTRACT Is there a disconnect between the priorities that make cases important to the legal academy and American courts and judges? We use previously unexplored data on the decisions of federal appellate judges to cite cases compared to the decisions of legal academics to cite the same cases. One component of our approach is an investigation of case-level characteristics, and we focus on these and other factors that structure decisions to cite cases across three different contexts: within a federal circuit, by courts out of circuit, and in law review articles. Our results highlight a divergence between what prompts judges and those in the legal academy to cite cases, and, to our knowledge, this is the first study to compare the drivers of court citation with those of law review citation.

Of politics, self-preservation, and symbolism: An investigation of jurisdiction-stripping and legislative redistricting

Abstract Jurisdiction-stripping has long been a questionable component of Congresss power to supervise the judiciarys policymaking role. It has gained notoriety in recent debates surrounding judicial involvement in areas including religious establishment and privacy issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Most scholarship equates the advocacy of jurisdiction-stripping measures with symbolic position-taking that is unmotivated by the goal of traditional policy success. This work, a quantitative case study of the first such measure to pass the House of Representative since Reconstruction, seeks to isolate legislative motivations for exerting jurisdictional controls against the Supreme Court. Legislators’ votes on this measure were multifaceted. While those decisions were guided in part by the symbolic and representational considerations that traditionally underlie the advocacy of such legislation, there is also evidence more substantive motivations played a part. The study highlights the evolving objectives of jurisdiction-strippings advocates and, more broadly, Congresss objectives vis-à-vis the courts.