Brian A. Anderson

Value-driven attentional capture

Attention selects which aspects of sensory input are brought to awareness. To promote survival and well-being, attention prioritizes stimuli both voluntarily, according to context-specific goals (e.g., searching for car keys), and involuntarily, through attentional capture driven by physical salience (e.g., looking toward a sudden noise). Valuable stimuli strongly modulate voluntary attention allocation, but there is little evidence that high-value but contextually irrelevant stimuli capture attention as a consequence of reward learning. Here we show that visual search for a salient target is slowed by the presence of an inconspicuous, task-irrelevant item that was previously associated with monetary reward during a brief training session. Thus, arbitrary and otherwise neutral stimuli imbued with value via associative learning capture attention powerfully and persistently during extinction, independently of goals and salience. Vulnerability to such value-driven attentional capture covaries across individuals with working memory capacity and trait impulsivity. This unique form of attentional capture may provide a useful model for investigating failures of cognitive control in clinical syndromes in which value assigned to stimuli conflicts with behavioral goals (e.g., addiction, obesity).

Learned Value Magnifies Salience-Based Attentional Capture

Visual attention is captured by physically salient stimuli (termed salience-based attentional capture), and by otherwise task-irrelevant stimuli that contain goal-related features (termed contingent attentional capture). Recently, we reported that physically nonsalient stimuli associated with value through reward learning also capture attention involuntarily (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, PNAS, 2011). Although it is known that physical salience and goal-relatedness both influence attentional priority, it is unknown whether or how attentional capture by a salient stimulus is modulated by its associated value. Here we show that a physically salient, task-irrelevant distractor previously associated with a large reward slows visual search more than an equally salient distractor previously associated with a smaller reward. This magnification of salience-based attentional capture by learned value extinguishes over several hundred trials. These findings reveal a broad influence of learned value on involuntary attentional capture.

A value-driven mechanism of attentional selection

Attention selects stimuli for cognitive processing, and the mechanisms that underlie the process of attentional selection have been a major topic of psychological research for over 30 years. From this research, it has been well documented that attentional selection can proceed both voluntarily, driven by visual search goals, and involuntarily, driven by the physical salience of stimuli. In this review, I provide a conceptual framework for attentional control that emphasizes the need for stimulus selection to promote the survival and wellbeing of an organism. I argue that although goal-driven and salience-driven mechanisms of attentional selection fit within this framework, a central component that is missing is a mechanism of attentional selection that is uniquely driven by learned associations between stimuli and rewards. I go on to review recent evidence for such a value-driven mechanism of attentional selection, and describe how this mechanism functions independently of the well-documented salience-driven and goal-driven mechanisms. I conclude by arguing that reward learning modifies the attentional priority of stimuli, allowing them to compete more effectively for selection even when nonsalient and task-irrelevant.

Persistence of value-driven attentional capture.

Stimuli that have previously been associated with the delivery of reward involuntarily capture attention when presented as unrewarded and task-irrelevant distractors in a subsequent visual search task. It is unknown how long such effects of reward learning on attention persist. One possibility is that value-driven attentional biases are plastic and constantly evolve to reflect only recent reward history. According to such a mechanism of attentional control, only consistently reinforced patterns of attention allocation persist for extended periods of time. Another possibility is that reward learning creates enduring changes in attentional priority that can persist indefinitely without further learning. Here we provide evidence for an enduring effect of reward learning on attentional priority: stimuli previously associated with reward in a training phase capture attention when presented as irrelevant distractors over half a year later, without the need for further reward learning.

Value-driven attentional and oculomotor capture during goal-directed, unconstrained viewing.

Covert shifts of attention precede and direct overt eye movements to stimuli that are task relevant or physically salient. A growing body of evidence suggests that the learned value of perceptual stimuli strongly influences their attentional priority. For example, previously rewarded but otherwise irrelevant and inconspicuous stimuli capture covert attention involuntarily. It is unknown, however, whether stimuli also draw eye movements involuntarily as a consequence of their reward history. Here, we show that previously rewarded but currently task-irrelevant stimuli capture both attention and the eyes. Value-driven oculomotor capture was observed during unconstrained viewing, when neither eye movements nor fixations were required, and was strongly related to individual differences in visual working memory capacity. The appearance of a reward-associated stimulus came to evoke pupil dilation over the course of training, which provides physiological evidence that the stimuli that elicit value-driven capture come to serve as reward-predictive cues. These findings reveal a close coupling of value-driven attentional capture and eye movements that has broad implications for theories of attention and reward learning.

The attention habit: how reward learning shapes attentional selection

There is growing consensus that reward plays an important role in the control of attention. Until recently, reward was thought to influence attention indirectly by modulating task‐specific motivation and its effects on voluntary control over selection. Such an account was consistent with the goal‐directed (endogenous) versus stimulus‐driven (exogenous) framework that had long dominated the field of attention research. Now, a different perspective is emerging. Demonstrations that previously reward‐associated stimuli can automatically capture attention even when physically inconspicuous and task‐irrelevant challenge previously held assumptions about attentional control. The idea that attentional selection can be value driven, reflecting a distinct and previously unrecognized control mechanism, has gained traction. Since these early demonstrations, the influence of reward learning on attention has rapidly become an area of intense investigation, sparking many new insights. The result is an emerging picture of how the reward system of the brain automatically biases information processing. Here, I review the progress that has been made in this area, synthesizing a wealth of recent evidence to provide an integrated, up‐to‐date account of value‐driven attention and some of its broader implications.

Generalization of value-based attentional priority

Attention is the mechanism by which important or salient stimuli are selected for perceptual and cognitive processing. Which stimuli are attended has important implications for effective goal-directed behaviour, survival, and well-being. A growing body of evidence suggests that reward-predicting stimuli capture attention involuntarily. In previous studies, value-based attentional priority has been observed only when the formerly reward-related stimuli themselves were presented as targets or distractors. Here we show that stimulus–reward associations learned in one task generalize to different stimuli that share a defining feature (colour) in another task. Our results reveal a broad and flexible role for reward learning in modulating attentional priority.

Target-Uncertainty Effects in Attentional Capture: Color-Singleton Set or Multiple Attentional Control Settings?

Previous spatial cuing studies have shown that the capture of spatial attention is contingent on top-down attentional control settings whose specificity varies as a function of the certainty of the defining features of the target. For example, when the target is a singleton defined by one specific color, observers adopt a control setting for that color. When the target can be one of two possible colors, however, observers appear to adopt a control setting for color singletons in general (see, e.g., Folk & Remington, 2008). The present study tested whether such results instead reflect the simultaneous maintenance of control settings for multiple colors (Adamo, Pun, Pratt, & Ferber, 2008). Observers searched for targets that were unpredictably red or green, preceded by spatial cues that were red, green, or blue. All three cue types produced evidence of capture, consistent with a general set for color singletons rather than the maintenance of multiple control settings.

Variations in the Magnitude of Attentional Capture: Testing a Two-Process Model

Although large variations in the magnitude of attentional capture have been evidenced across a wide range of studies and paradigms (see Burnham, 2007, for a review), the nature of these variations is unclear. In the present study, we used a modified spatial cuing task to address two related issues. In the first experiment, we explored the hypothesis that the magnitude of attentional capture varies systematically as a function of cue-target similarity. Targets of a particular color were preceded by uninformative peripheral cues carrying varying percentages of the target color. As was predicted, the magnitude of attentional capture varied directly with the similarity between cue and target. In the second experiment, we explored whether these similarity effects reflect a mixture of trials on which attention is fully captured and trials on which attention is not captured at all (i.e., a two-process model). A mixture analysis conducted on obtained reaction time distributions proved inconsistent with a two-process model.

Attentional bias for nondrug reward is magnified in addiction.

Attentional biases for drug-related stimuli play a prominent role in addiction, predicting treatment outcomes. Attentional biases also develop for stimuli that have been paired with nondrug rewards in adults without a history of addiction, the magnitude of which is predicted by visual working-memory capacity and impulsiveness. We tested the hypothesis that addiction is associated with an increased attentional bias for nondrug (monetary) reward relative to that of healthy controls, and that this bias is related to working-memory impairments and increased impulsiveness. Seventeen patients receiving methadone-maintenance treatment for opioid dependence and 17 healthy controls participated. Impulsiveness was measured using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), visual working-memory capacity was measured as the ability to recognize briefly presented color stimuli, and attentional bias was measured as the magnitude of response time slowing caused by irrelevant but previously reward-associated distractors in a visual-search task. The results showed that attention was biased toward the distractors across all participants, replicating previous findings. It is important to note, this bias was significantly greater in the patients than in the controls and was negatively correlated with visual working-memory capacity. Patients were also significantly more impulsive than controls as a group. Our findings demonstrate that patients in treatment for addiction experience greater difficulty ignoring stimuli associated with nondrug reward. This nonspecific reward-related bias could mediate the distracting quality of drug-related stimuli previously observed in addiction.