Brian D. Taylor

Law enforcement and civil society in Russia

Abstract Many Russian civil society organisations are directly engaging with state law enforcement agencies, particularly the police, in joint efforts to improve the performance and change the norms and values of state officials involved in administering justice. These activities are based upon a model of state–society relations that stresses the possibility of a positive relationship of mutual assistance and partnership between the state and civil society. Such assistance is often described by these organisations as helping low-level bureaucrats better perform their core organisational tasks. This model is contrasted with two alternative models of the role of civil society, which depict civil society either as teaching citizens the norms and values associated with liberal democracy, or as a potential counter-weight to an over-reaching state. Three cases studies of cooperation between NGOs and law enforcement agencies demonstrate the utility of such an approach. Although these projects suffer from some common pathologies of civil society work in Russia, they remain important, not least because of the presence of ‘uncivil society’ extremist groups who also are trying to influence the norms and beliefs of state law enforcement officials. The civil society activities profiled here suggest that direct, cooperative engagement with the state is one important component of long-term efforts to transform the Russian state in a more liberal, ‘civil’ direction.

Police reform in Russia: the policy process in a hybrid regime

Do hybrid regimes have policy processes distinct from other regime types? This article explores this issue through a case study of police reform in Russia, focusing specifically on the adoption of a new Law on the Police from 2009 to 2011. Drawing on concepts from the comparative policymaking literature, the study traces the policy enactment process and shows how the public parts of the process were largely (but not entirely) a façade behind which the real policy process took place.

Difference Equations via the Classical Umbral Calculus

The classical umbral calculus, formalized in [7] and [8] following the classical examples of Blissard, Bell, Riordan, Touchard, etc. (see for example [4] or the papers listed in the bibliography of [8]), has two primary advantages over its more conventional modern forebears (see for example [5], [6], etc.). It allows classical results to be easily read, verified and extended while maintaining the suggestive notation which was the strength of the classical umbral calculus.

Putin's "historic mission" state-building and the power ministries in the North Caucasus

Putin has restored order in Russia, but fulfillment of his self-imposed mission depends on whether he can translate order into long-term improvements in state capacity.

Russia's Passive Army Rethinking Military Coups

Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the armys corporate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situations in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics.

The Russian Siloviki & Political Change

The siloviki – Russian security and military personnel – are a key part of Team Putin. They are not, however, a coherent group, and there are important organizational and factional cleavages among the siloviki. Compared with some security and military forces around the world, Russian military and security forces generally lack the attributes that would make them a proactive and cohesive actor in bringing about fundamental political change in Russia. In the face of potential revolutionary change, most Russian military and security bodies do not have the cohesion or the will to defend the regime with significant violence. Russian siloviki are a conservativeforce supportive of the status quo. Future efforts by the siloviki to maintain the stability of the existing political order are most likely to be reactive, divided, and behind the scenes.

Politics and the Russian Army: The Army and the Revolution, 1917

The control and use of coercive power was central to the dramatic events of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the bloody civil war that followed. The Bolsheviks would not have succeeded if they had faced concerted resistance on the part of the Imperial Russian armed forces. The army was of necessity a crucial actor in the revolution. The four sovereign power issues in which the military was involved were the February Revolution, the Kornilov affair in late August, the October Revolution, and the Civil War. The February Revolution forced the abdication of the tsar in early March 1917. The military was thrust into the arbiter role by the three-way standoff between the tsar, the revolutionary forces, and the leaders of the political opposition in the State Duma, the Russian parliament. The military leadership refused to stand behind Nicholas II during the crisis because of their fear that if order was not soon restored the revolution would spread to the front and endanger the war effort. The Kornilov affair refers to the conflict between the Commander in Chief of the army, General Lavr Kornilov, and the head of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky. In late August, Kerensky accused Kornilov of planning a coup and treason. Kornilov had not in fact been planning to seize power, but Kerenskys accusation drove him into open rebellion, and Kornilov and several other leading officers were arrested. Most officers, however, sat out the affair.